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Disadvantage as Impairment of the Will 
  
Abstract                291 Words 
 
This thesis argues that unfair social disadvantage is best conceived as the 
relative impairment of the will of the person when that will is directed towards a 
valuable end. That valuable end is self-realisation. The term ‘self-realisation’ 
signifies a perfectionist conception of social justice in which the self-realisation 
of other persons forms part of one’s own self-realisation. Although the notion 
of a substantive will is taken to be illusory, the experience of will is taken to be 
as real as the experience of pain. The experience of will is therefore taken to 
be the de facto will. It is argued that the will extends beyond the mind of the 
individual to include the culture, technology, and circumstances of the 
person’s environment.  
This conception of the will connects social disadvantage and morality 
within a framework of capabilities. It is then argued that social disadvantage 
can be mitigated by application of a principle of will-egalitarianism: the idea 
that all persons ought to have an equal opportunity to exercise will compatible 
with a similar scheme for all. This scheme is sufficientarian, but one in which a 
lower threshold of sufficiency of the will is tracked by an upper threshold. This 
upper threshold represents the degree of realised will above which persons 
cannot progress further towards self-realisation in the presence of others 
below that threshold.  
The thesis concludes with a discussion of the significant implications 
(both practical and theoretical) for the role of the state. These include the 
adoption of policies designed to empower individuals, rather than targeting the 
circumstances of disadvantage. Such an approach would support policies that 
enhance social mobility, public participation, and the breaking down of social 
and class barriers, whilst addressing some of the problems associated with a 
‘benefits culture’. 
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Ethical Statement 
 
 
As this thesis is almost entirely based upon the analysis of concepts, most of 
the common difficulties with ensuring an ethical approach to research do not 
apply. However, the thesis does make reference to the personal 
circumstances of a genuine example of social disadvantage. In this case the 
identity of the person concerned has not been revealed. Care has been taken 
to ensure that neither the name nor any of the circumstances can lead to her 
identification or any other breach of confidentiality. 
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Disadvantage as Impairment of the Will 
Chapter One 
Introduction and Methodology 
 
1. Introduction 
According to Gerald Cohen, “exactly what should count as an advantage […] is 
surely one of the deepest [questions] in normative philosophy”.1 Although 
Cohen is discussing advantage, his comment is directed towards clarifying and 
addressing the question of disadvantage. One reason why this is a difficult 
question, according to Cohen, is due to: 
 
[the] heterogeneity of the components of the vector of 
advantage. One hopes that there is a currency more 
fundamental than either resources or welfare in which the 
various egalitarian responses [to disadvantage] can be 
expressed.2  
 
In this thesis it will be argued that when unfair disadvantage is conceived as 
the impairment of the will of the individual relative to others (when directed 
towards a valuable end), that this can provide the fundamental currency that so 
eluded Cohen. 
                                            
1
 Cohen, G.A., 1989, p. 920 
2
 Cohen, G.A., 1989, p. 921 
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 This thesis can be read in two halves. The first half covers chapters one 
to five, and the second half chapters six to nine. In the first half, a background 
account is given in which the nature of the problem is described within the 
context of the claims of rival theories. The culmination of the first half is the 
claim that a proper conception of disadvantage turns on the will of the person 
or persons affected by the disadvantageous circumstances. In the second half, 
the conception of unfair disadvantage as impairment of the will is described, 
analysed, and the implications for the state are explored.  
In order to help orient the reader, a very brief overview will now be 
given. The thesis will start with an analysis of the term ‘disadvantage’. This is 
because the term is often used in a vague or loose manner, and to ensure that 
we have a good understanding of the problem. Once we are clear on the 
subject, the thesis proceeds by considering the assessment of disadvantage 
as a lack of welfare, resources, or liberty. For a variety of reasons, each of 
these approaches is shown to be inadequate. The alternative means to 
evaluate disadvantage, the capabilities approach, is then considered. This too 
proves to be inadequate in its current form. It will be argued that the 
capabilities approach promotes an unacknowledged ideal model of humanity. 
This model places the freedom of choice of the person at the centre. It is 
argued that the notion of ‘agency’ (upon which the capabilities approach relies) 
is insufficient for this application: what is required is a viable conception of the 
will. The culmination of the first half gives an account of the will as being 
extended to encompass our cultures, background, environment, technologies 
and so forth – not as influences upon, but as part of the will of the self. It is 
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accepted that the will is an ultimately illusory conception, but that the 
experience of will is as real as the experience of pain. 
The second half of the thesis proceeds by giving an account of unfair 
disadvantage as impairment of the extended will. It is suggested that a 
perfectionist model of humanity requires that all persons ought to have an 
equal opportunity to exercise will, but only when that will is directed towards 
self-realisation. This is a sufficientarian approach, but one in which a lower 
threshold is accompanied by an upper threshold. The lower threshold 
represents an achievement of an equal opportunity to express will (this is 
sufficiency of the will). Since the will is extended, and a perfectionist model is 
advocated, one cannot proceed towards self-realisation without recognising 
that such progress requires assisting others towards their own self-realisation. 
The upper threshold would therefore represent that degree of satisfaction of 
the will that one would not be able to exceed in the presence of others below 
that threshold.  
In the remainder of the thesis the implications for the state are explored. 
These would support policies designed to empower citizens where this would 
allow development towards self-realisation, but support the state to impede or 
discourage activities that do not allow such development. The conclusion of 
the thesis gives a summary, a reflective account of the process, shows how an 
original contribution has been made, and suggests areas for future 
development. Hopefully, this very brief overview will allow the reader to 
recognise the place of the arguments as they develop. A more detailed 
account of the process and methodology will now be given. 
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2. Background 
An adequate account of social justice must correctly identify those unfairly 
disadvantaged within society. Although the legitimacy of the conception of 
social justice is not without dispute (this will be explained in chapter three) its 
legitimacy will be assumed for the moment. The ‘traditional’ view (as this will 
be called) describes persons as being disadvantaged when they lack welfare, 
resources, or liberty. Such a view is problematic: as John Rawls remarks “it 
seems impossible to avoid a certain arbitrariness in actually identifying the 
least favoured group”.3 There are two problems here: the identification of the 
worst-off group, and the means by which such comparisons can be measured. 
One might see poverty, or profound disability, misery, or subjugation in the 
various communities around us, but be unable to decide which group is the 
worst off, or identify a common metric in which to make such an assessment. A 
disability is a different sort of concern from poverty, say, or misery, or other 
such circumstances. Yet the idea of a worst-off group appears to invite 
comparison. Rawls acknowledges these difficulties, but sets them aside in 
favour of a procedural approach to justice.4 As will be discussed in chapter 
three, Rawls advocates rules of justice in which, as long as certain activities 
also benefit the least well off, this will accord with his conception of a just 
society. 
Although Rawls acknowledges that this approach may fail the most 
vulnerable individuals, other advocates of the procedural approach (such as 
the classical utilitarian) are less worried by this omission. Rather than 
                                            
3
 Rawls, J., 1999, p. 84 
4
 Rawls, J., 2003, p. 10, and pp. 52-4 
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attempting to ease the circumstances of the least well off directly, the classical 
utilitarian identifies happiness or the satisfaction of preferences as a target to 
be maximised, or sets rules to this end. Those who happen to be the least well 
off under such circumstances are incidental to the procedure: the utilitarian 
seeks to apply the process that maximises the total sum of happiness or 
satisfaction, and is not concerned if some (or many) individuals suffer perhaps 
extreme hardship as long as this is offset by the happiness of others. 
Yet there is an alternative to the traditional view: the ‘capabilities’ 
approach, as advocated by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum.5 This 
approach attempts to tackle the problem of identifying the least well-off by 
focusing upon what the individual can or cannot be or do. Sen and Nussbaum 
simply identify certain capabilities as criteria for judgements as to how well a 
person’s life is going. As such, the capabilities approach holds a model or ideal 
of human capability by which a worthwhile life is judged: to fall short of this 
model is thus to fail to achieve (or have the freedom to achieve) an acceptable 
standard of living. A comparison of circumstances can then identify acceptable 
levels of capability, or threshold limits. Yet in doing so they too either fall foul of 
Rawls’s problem of arbitrariness (Nussbaum’s list) or remain vague as to who 
the disadvantaged are, or what disadvantage is.6 Although the use of an ideal 
model of capability has some parallels with the idea of perfectionist self-
realisation, this model does not give sufficient room for the will of the person 
subjected to the supposedly disadvantageous conditions. It will be argued that 
without giving room for the will of the individual, both Sen and Nussbaum’s 
                                            
5
 Sen, A., 1995, p. 39; Nussbaum, M., 2006, pp. 4-14, and 2007, p. 155 
6
 Sen, A., 1995, pp. 46-9, and 2009, pp. 232-3; Nussbaum, M., 2001, pp. 223-225, and 2006, 
p. 12 
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approaches conflate the conception of disadvantage with the further matter of 
its fairness.  
It is not only the capabilities approach that makes this error: the 
traditional conception of disadvantage in terms of welfare, resources, or liberty, 
often includes an unnoticed assessment of fairness. To assess a person as 
disadvantaged because they suffer poverty, say, is a normative evaluation: it is 
to say that that person is lacking in resources and that she ought not to be 
suffering in this way. The evaluation of disadvantage in itself carries with it the 
implication that ‘something ought to be done’ to correct it. It thus couples an 
assessment of the person’s relation to others, and a judgement of the fairness 
of that situation. These two aspects (the assessment of the conditions of 
disadvantage, and the evaluation of fairness) are best kept apart.  
It will be argued that the conception of disadvantage is best understood 
as the degree of impairment of the will, and that this gives a unifying metric for 
the subsequent evaluation of fairness: one is unfairly disadvantaged if one’s 
will, when directed towards self-realisation, has been impaired to a greater 
extent than other persons (the idea of self-realisation will be explained further 
in chapter six, although a preliminary account will be given shortly). 
Conversely, one is unfairly advantaged if one is able to realise a greater 
degree of will than other persons, unless directed towards self-realisation. It is 
the ‘direction towards self-realisation’ that defeats the evaluation of unfairness 
since self-realisation requires that one assists others in moving towards their 
own self-realisation. If one’s will is directed towards assisting others, such a 
will cannot be unfair, and so ought to be uninhibited. A will that is not so 
directed may or may not be unfair, but a person would be unable to 
Chapter One – Introduction and Methodology 
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simultaneously progress towards her own self-realisation whilst exercising a 
will that did not contribute to the benefit of others. 
As Daniel Dennett notes when discussing the idea of free will, what is 
important to us as individuals is the degree of control that we have over our 
lives.7 It might therefore be suggested that social disadvantage would be better 
recast as a relative lack of control, rather than impairment of will. Such a move 
would avoid the need for the conception of self-realisation whilst retaining the 
idea that resources, welfare, and liberty are not the significant factors in the 
assessment of disadvantage. Although this thesis will not go into the issue of 
free will, if one considers control over one’s life to be the significant factor in 
the conception of disadvantage, then the notion of control would not be 
reducible to a more fundamental factor. Yet control of one’s life presupposes 
that an individual is empowered to make choices (or appears to do so), and 
this in turn presupposes an ability to exercise will towards preferred options. 
Since control is reducible to the exercise of will, it is the will that is fundamental 
to control.  
Another reason to prefer the conception of will to the notion of control is 
that control alone would not be able to account for the conception of fairness. 
Control is too blunt a term to be able to distinguish between control that is 
directed towards others and control that is directed inwardly: both would count 
as control of the self. In other words, the idea of control is self-centred whereas 
the conception of the extended will necessarily incorporates relations with 
others. The self-centred approach can only evaluate fairness in relation to the 
self, whereas the extended will can evaluate fairness more widely.  
                                            
7
 Dennett, D., 1984, pp. 67-73 
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Furthermore, disadvantage conceived in terms of control alone would 
be vulnerable to the ‘expensive tastes’ objection, and would be committed to 
compensating those with undesirable or immoral preferences. Some of these 
issues are discussed in a moment when the perfectionist approach is 
defended, and further specific issues are discussed in chapter three where 
Ronald Dworkin’s views are raised. For these reasons, social disadvantage is 
cast in terms of will rather than control. 
Yet the idea of control is still important, provided that one remembers 
the caveat that the will is prior to control. This becomes apparent when one 
considers the place of the valuable end to which the will might be directed. If 
the actions of an agent X causes the impairment of the exercise of will towards 
a valuable activity of a person (or persons) Y, and if Y has not been accorded 
equal moral concern in that process, then Y has been unfairly disadvantaged. 
X’s attempt to exercise control thus thwarts Y’s ability to exercise control, and 
this becomes unfair when the object of control is valuable to one or other of 
them. It is not unfair if both have an equal opportunity to exercise will, but if 
one impairs the other, then it might become unfair. It becomes unfair because 
what counts as a valuable activity is one that contributes towards the 
individual’s self-realisation within a perfectionist framework. If the exercise of 
will were toward some trivial objective it would not be a concern of social 
justice (it might still be unfair, but would not be morally significant). It is argued 
that the will is the decisive feature of unfairness in relation to social 
disadvantage. Minimum and maximum thresholds of social justice then follow, 
in which the lower threshold represents equal opportunity to exercise will, 
whereas the upper threshold represents the achievement of equal satisfaction 
Chapter One – Introduction and Methodology 
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of the will (but not necessarily realised with the same goods). It is thus a 
‘sufficientarian’ thesis inasmuch as what is important to social justice is that 
each person has sufficient opportunity to exercise will, not that each person 
has the same goods.8 These claims will be explained in chapter seven. 
So, it is suggested that wherever the will is impaired when directed 
towards self-realisation, and without treating those affected as moral equals, 
there is unfair disadvantage. There may well be disadvantage in the traditional 
sense, but if the person has truly volunteered to accept that disadvantage, then 
it may even contribute towards her self-realisation. For example, an adequately 
nourished individual might forego her fair share of food in order to give it to 
another person in greater need. Such a sacrifice would put that individual at a 
disadvantage (in the traditional sense) since she no longer receives her due 
share, but such a virtuous act would align with a perfectionist ideal for 
humanity and might therefore contribute towards her realising that ideal. Using 
this perfectionist view, the person making the sacrifice is disadvantaged in the 
first normative way of using the term, but is benefited when the second 
normative evaluation is used: the sacrifice is evaluated as being good or right, 
and thus contributes towards the giver’s self-realisation. The traditional 
conception is thus inadequate in its assessment of the situation. Furthermore, 
it would appear that wherever the will is exercised towards self-realisation, 
there can be no unfair disadvantage.  
Yet errors of judgement and human fallibility might cause individuals to 
mistake what is actually necessary for self-realisation. These issues are 
discussed further in chapter eight. Under such circumstances, the evaluation of 
                                            
8
 Frankfurt, H., 1987, p. 21, Casal, P., 2007, p.296 
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disadvantage must change when the person realises the error and changes 
her mind.  The person who mistakenly accepts a disadvantage in the belief 
that this is the good or right thing to do does not suddenly become unfairly 
disadvantaged: she only becomes disadvantaged if she realises that she has 
made a mistake and is blocked from correcting the situation. In volunteering to 
accept such a disadvantage this would incidentally contribute towards her self-
realisation, and so would not amount to unfair disadvantage, but if she has 
made a mistake in accepting those conditions, then such voluntariness does 
not negate the evaluation of unfairness. It will be taken that voluntariness 
requires full knowledge of the likely consequences and wholehearted 
acceptance of those circumstances. This will rule out the possibility of 
deliberate acts of deception (tricking the virtuous person into accepting a 
disadvantage) from being assessed as fair. However, if she has simply made a 
genuine mistake, and she is unable to rectify that mistake, then her will is 
impaired in the presence of the disadvantageous conditions (even though she 
previously volunteered to accept them). She becomes disadvantaged not by 
the existence of the particular conditions, but from being denied the opportunity 
to realise her newly changed will. 
Although the implications for the role of the state will be explained 
shortly, the reader is asked to allow for the moment that the just state must 
treat its citizens with equal concern. Since unfair disadvantage suggests a lack 
of equal concern, then the state would not be fulfilling its obligations towards all 
of its citizens if it allowed unfair disadvantages to persist. One of the aims of 
the state should therefore be to eliminate unfair disadvantage. Since unfair 
disadvantage is eliminated for the individual by her exercise of will (since she 
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would wholeheartedly accept the disadvantageous circumstances in full 
knowledge of the likely consequences), the state need not attack the 
circumstances of disadvantage directly: it is argued that the state must ensure 
that all citizens have the equal opportunity to exercise will in controlling the 
way in which their lives turn out. This approach must remain sufficiently flexible 
to allow individuals to make mistakes in their assessment of the good. State 
policies must therefore keep opportunities for personal development open. In 
other words, a policy is advocated of facilitating equal opportunity to exercise 
will compatible with a similar scheme for all (sufficiency of the will). This would 
favour policies of widespread consultation (perhaps through encouraging 
public participation and the use of social incentives) ensuring equality of 
opportunity (legislation) and facilitating or increasing social mobility (perhaps 
through such measures as the reduction of economic inequality, the limitation 
of inherited wealth, and free higher education). 
 
3. Why Perfectionism? 
Given this brief scene-setting, it might be thought that the requirement to treat 
others as moral equals would be sufficient to give a full account of 
disadvantage. Under such an account, moral equality would require that 
persons are able to pursue whatever they considered to be their own good, 
subject to compatibility within a scheme in which all others have an equal 
opportunity to exercise will. Such a scheme will be referred to as ‘will-
egalitarianism’. One would then be unfairly disadvantaged if her will were 
impaired within this scheme. Since such a mechanism appears to be doing all 
the work, then the introduction of perfectionism might appear superfluous. 
Chapter One – Introduction and Methodology 
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 However, following a scheme of will-egalitarianism alone would give no 
reason by which to adjudicate between competing wills, would give 
unnecessary weight to trivial matters, and would give weight to considerations 
of unpalatable moral value. Thus the sadist, or the racist, would have to be 
accommodated within the scheme, as would a person with the conviction that 
watching a football match is more important than rendering assistance to the 
needy, or the person who believed that the number thirteen ought to be 
eliminated from hotel rooms. Each would be given equal status to their claims. 
In short, such a scheme has regard for each person as an equal locus for 
moral value, but has no regard for the goodness or rightness of the content. 
 Consideration of human perfection allows us to self-reflect in a way that 
will-egalitarianism alone would not: it allows objective reflection since the good 
is not defined by individual assessment. A perfectionist view of humanity gives 
the necessary connection with morality that a proper conception of unfair 
disadvantage requires. In his analysis of perfectionism, Thomas Hurka argues 
that an adequate perfectionist ideal must accord with our intuitive moral 
judgements.9 The idea of individuals becoming morally better persons such 
that they may develop towards some form of ideal human being is a common 
intuitive position. Take the common phrase ‘what would Jesus do?’ This slogan 
is used whenever deemed appropriate by someone demanding that others 
reflect on their conduct. Such phrases would suggest that persons intuitively 
seek some form of ideal role model as a template for their own behaviour. The 
common conceptualisation of a perfect entity upon which many religions are 
                                            
9
 Hurka, T., 1993, p.30 
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based gives further support to the idea of an intuitive need for some form of 
perfectionist ideal.  
Perfectionism, then, sets boundaries within which will-egalitarianism can 
be applied. Even if these boundaries are widely set, such a framework requires 
a substantive conception of the good. As Thomas Hurka puts it:  
 
[p]erfectionism is not a magical entrée into morality, but a 
substantive position within it. It assumes a general willingness 
to act on moral ideals and proposes a specific ideal to 
follow.10  
 
Human perfection will therefore be taken to relate to those qualities of human 
nature that are commonly regarded as representing the best qualities that a 
person can have, leading to becoming the best person that that person can 
ideally become. Such qualities include such things as generosity, selflessness, 
courage, and kindness. These qualities refer to things that are constitutive of a 
good life, and are objectives that persons would choose to pursue or become 
in order to lead an ideal life.   
 It is accepted that such a justification of perfectionism appears 
somewhat circular, but a more forceful defence would change the entire focus 
of the thesis from disadvantage to the whole basis of morality. Some comfort 
will therefore be taken from Hurka’s view that ‘[t]he best perfectionism, then, 
                                            
10
 Hurka, T., 1993, p. 30 
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equates human nature with the properties essential to humans and conditioned 
on their being living things’.11 
 
4. Definitions and Scope 
The various terms used in the thesis will now be explained, starting with a 
preliminary account of the terms ‘welfare’, ‘resources’, and ‘liberty’. Although 
these terms are central to the thesis, there are complexities and refinements 
that will be further described in chapter three. The term ‘welfare’ describes the 
intrinsically valuable aspects of a decent quality of life, such as the physical 
and psychological attributes of health, happiness and the satisfaction of 
preferences. The term ‘resources’ describes the instrumental necessities for a 
decent quality of life: these necessities include wealth, income, shelter, 
property and such forth. The term ‘liberty’ describes both the positive freedoms 
to take self-directed actions, and the negative freedoms from deliberate 
interference by others. The terms ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’ will be used 
interchangeably. 
The terms used to describe groups such as ‘community’, ‘state’, or 
‘society’ are also significant. A ‘community’, will refer to a group within a 
common location, and that share a cultural identity. Thus British Muslims could 
be described as a community, as could the people of Yorkshire, or the church-
goers of any town parish. A ‘state’ will refer to the political organisation having 
sovereignty over a territory, including the institutions that make this possible. A 
state can thus incorporate a number of communities within its territory. In turn, 
a ‘citizen’ is an individual member of the state who is entitled to participate in 
                                            
11
 Hurka, T., 1993, p. 17 
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the institutions and arrangements of that state, and who has a right to receive 
protection from the state. Not all individuals subject to the authority of the state 
are citizens, but the state still has some responsibilities towards such persons. 
Thus an asylum seeker is not yet a citizen, but the state bears a duty to protect 
the welfare of that individual. Despite this responsibility, it must be emphasised 
that this thesis is limited to the responsibilities of the state towards its unfairly 
disadvantaged citizens. To qualify as a citizen will be by birth, close family 
relationship, or naturalisation. A ‘society’, however, does not refer to any 
particular organisation or state, or geographical location. This term thus refers 
to the more general collective interactions and persistent relationships with and 
between persons. Moreover, there is no implied common cultural, belief, or 
value systems that connect and define such a group.  
Since the thesis will deal with aspects of social justice, it will only be 
concerned here with the idea of a just state. Any state which did not seek to be 
just towards its citizens would be unlikely to be concerned with ideas of 
disadvantage. Whilst such an entity could still be described as a state, it would 
not by this account be a legitimate state. The principle of justness towards its 
citizens requires that a state must be interventionist, at least to the standards 
of a minimal state. A minimal state, such as that advocated by Robert Nozick, 
could therefore still claim to be a just state provided that it was interventionist 
to at least to some degree (such that it would intervene to ensure that injustice, 
howsoever conceived, is rectified).12 Whilst it might be suggested that a state 
by definition cannot exist without exercising authority and therefore must be 
interventionist to some extent, this thesis is not concerned with the subtleties 
                                            
12
 Nozick, R., 2003, p. 26 
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surrounding the definition of the state. It is merely emphasised that the 
conception of disadvantage, and the measures advocated to deal with it, are 
only of interest to those states that claim to be just towards their own citizens.  
It will also be taken that the function of the just state is to protect the 
interests of its citizens, both from external and internal threat. Whilst this does 
not deny that a non-interventionist state might still be a state: the possibility 
remains that an anarchist state could still claim to be just. However, the 
suggestion is that such a state would be dysfunctional. Since dealing with 
disadvantage requires a state to be interventionist, any obligations of the state 
would in fact be instructions to the government of that state to act. A state 
without formal government would therefore be unable to act. Furthermore, a 
government that merely protected its citizens from external threat, but allowed 
internal injustice, would not be performing all of the functions of the state that it 
ought to do: such a state would thus have the potential to allow injustice 
towards certain individuals or groups within its own curtilage. Any state that 
permitted, perpetuated, or ignored injustice towards its own citizens cannot by 
these terms be described as just.  
Likewise, if a state did not protect its citizens from external threat, or lost 
its ability to do so, it would also be dysfunctional, and would be in danger of 
losing its identity as a state. The current situation in Somalia is an example of 
such a state: it is incapable of protecting its territorial waters, and so must 
allow foreign vessels to enforce order. Yet in doing so, the state becomes 
further disempowered, and more likely to be subsumed under the control of its 
more powerful neighbours. In contrast, the just state, in protecting its citizens 
from both external threat and injustice, cannot display bias towards or against 
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any particular group of its citizens. That is, it must treat all citizens as moral 
equals. 
The idea of self-realisation will be refined in chapter six, but a 
preliminary account will be given for now. Self-realisation is taken to be the 
achievement of human perfection: it is an ideal whereby a person will embody 
all that is good or virtuous in humanity, and will reject those attributes regarded 
as vices. How such virtues and vices are evaluated is not as problematic as 
might at first appear. A very broad range of such qualities are already 
commonly accepted within most (if not all) human societies. For example, 
qualities and actions such as selfishness, theft, murder, dishonesty, avarice, 
are readily recognisable amongst the vices. On the other hand, courage, 
generosity, love, respect for others, selflessness, and honesty are all readily 
recognisable amongst the virtues. Self-realisation is therefore the attainment of 
each and every one of the virtues (being the best qualities of humanity), with 
the simultaneous rejection of the vices (being the worst qualities of humanity) 
as evaluated by the self, but for which the wider society in which one lives 
would plausibly agree. As with all perfectionist accounts, such ideal conditions 
are recognised as being unachievable in practice. We are all prone to making 
mistakes, or succumbing to temptations that might seem to be good for us at 
the time. However, as a perfectionist ideal, we can still seek to progress 
towards such a condition. 
Finally, the term ‘impairment’ in relation to ‘impairment of the will’ is 
taken to include frustration, obstruction, limitation, prevention of development 
or exercise, or other such ways in which the will can be hampered. This is 
regardless of whether or not the impairment is caused intentionally or 
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accidentally by the actions of others. One cannot self-impair one’s will since to 
do so is to voluntarily exercise will: impairment is therefore always external to 
the self.  Although weakness of will is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
impairment of the will is also taken to include the possibility that a person’s will 
might be harmed, damaged, or weakened such that the person loses a sense 
of control over important decisions that will affect her well-being.  
 
Having explored some of the important terms, at least enough to allow the 
discussion to begin, we will now turn to the matter at hand: the problem of 
disadvantage.  
 
5. The Problem of Disadvantage 
 
A major difficulty with egalitarian theories of distributive justice was pointed out 
by Amartya Sen when he asked the question ‘Equality of What?’13 Whilst his 
question highlighted the issue of welfare versus resources, two important 
associated questions remain unanswered: (a) what is it that persons lack when 
we say that one person has more than another? and (b) why should this 
matter? It is suggested that to describe the least well-off in terms of a lack of 
primary goods, utility, resources, opportunities, welfare or liberties is 
inadequate for a full account of the concept of disadvantage. It is the aim of the 
thesis to answer this difficulty by gaining a better understanding of 
disadvantage.  
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In the introduction to this chapter, Gerald Cohen identifies only two 
forms in which disadvantage might be assessed. However, disadvantage is 
commonly manifested in three broad but distinct ways: as a lack of welfare, 
resources, or liberty. Welfare disadvantage can take the form of poor health, 
unhappiness, the failure to satisfy one’s desires, disability, or lack of capability. 
Resource disadvantage can be assessed in terms of poverty, shortage of 
wealth, or lack of primary goods. The third manifestation of disadvantage 
becomes evident as a lack of liberty. It is disadvantage as a relative lack of 
liberty that perhaps provides the clue to a proper understanding of 
disadvantage.  
To understand disadvantage in just three manifestations, it is 
suggested, would be a mistake: and on the face of it a common one. John 
Rawls and Ronald Dworkin suggest that disadvantage can be addressed by 
concentrating one’s attentions upon the distribution of resources.14 Amartya 
Sen’s capabilities approach, along with the many forms of utilitarianism, rejects 
this view for failing to realise that resources are only instrumental to the 
achievement of welfare: it is the distribution of some form of welfare attribute 
that is thus advocated as being the appropriate mechanism to address 
disadvantage.15 Robert Nozick and Hillel Steiner point to the importance of 
rights and liberty to argue that one cannot redistribute either resources or 
welfare if to do so would violate liberty.16  
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Yet Sen’s The Idea of Justice advocates a pluralistic approach in which 
all of these views have some important element, but are not the whole story.17 
He suggests that these other views are ‘niti’ theories, focussing upon 
organisational and structural forms and procedures, when what is needed is a 
Nyaya approach – a practical ‘outcome based’ view simply aimed at removing 
injustice without dogmatic adherence to any one particular theory.18 To this 
extent the later Sen now agrees with Frankfurt that the proper focus of social 
justice is upon the existence of suffering, and its removal.19 Jonathan Wolff and 
Avner de-Shalit also advocate a capabilities-based pluralistic understanding of 
disadvantage in which different forms of disadvantage can accumulate in 
‘clusters’. They also agree with Sen that a practical solution is more important 
than theoretical understanding.20 Nevertheless, the question remains as to how 
one can practically address the problem of disadvantage if one does not fully 
understand what disadvantage is. 
Perhaps Wolff and de-Shalit’s observation of clusters of disadvantage 
gives a clue as to why the niti approach is commonly taken.21  Since each form 
of disadvantage seems closely related to others, it is easy to assume that 
addressing disadvantage in the favoured dimension will somehow address 
disadvantage in its other manifestations. Resource disadvantages can cause 
poor diet, lack of shelter, and force individuals to live in unsanitary conditions. 
Resource disadvantages are thus associated with welfare disadvantage 
manifested as disease, misery, lack of education, or physical or mental 
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incapacity. Similarly, a lack of education, or having no fixed abode, can limit 
one’s ability to participate in the political process, and the lack of 
representation might then lead to a lack of recognition of rights and liberties. 
Furthermore, a lack of resources is associated with a lack of those 
liberties that form part of (as Tony Honoré would say) the ‘incidents’ of property 
ownership.22 The lack of resources to buy decent clothing can cause shame, 
thus impacting upon self-esteem (a welfare disadvantage). This is not to 
suggest that resource disadvantage necessarily leads to welfare disadvantage, 
or that welfare disadvantage necessarily leads to liberty disadvantage, or that 
liberty disadvantage necessarily leads to resource disadvantage: the 
relationship is complex. Examples can readily be given to show that a 
disadvantage in one dimension can cause disadvantage to become apparent 
in any other dimension. Yet as Wolff and de-Shalit comment: “it is not always 
the case that a disadvantage in one respect can be discharged or overcome by 
a greater provision of a particular universal currency such as money or 
preference satisfaction”.23 
The forms in which disadvantages appear are distinguishable. This 
raises problems with comparison and commensurability. It does not seem 
likely that one can weigh x units of liberty, say, as being comparable with y 
units of welfare or z units of resources.  Even given the suggestion that money 
is the universal mechanism of exchange, this is clearly not the case. Just 
because money can be used to purchase certain freedoms or liberties does 
not entail that such transfers are comparable between different spheres of 
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transaction. In many cases, such transactions are associated with immoral or 
criminal activities, demonstrating the inappropriate use of money as a universal 
medium of exchange. As Michael Walzer objects, when money is allowed to 
exert influence in the wrong sphere, it can become a form of corruption: he 
offers examples such as the purchase of religious forgiveness for sins, and the 
use of wealth to gain political office.24 If these three manifestations of 
disadvantage are incommensurable, then it seems inadequate to suggest that 
a system of redistribution can prioritise one manifestation over the others. 
Such systems seem to rely on some intangible connection so that variations in 
the prioritised dimension automatically adjust the other two.  
Yet if these dimensions are incommensurable, such an approach can 
only address disadvantage as an approximation of the circumstances by 
‘shoehorning’ the disadvantage into the framework of the favoured dimension. 
Prioritising one’s favoured dimension is to simultaneously allow compromise in 
the other two. For example, giving a bereaved widow a sum of money cannot 
fully compensate for the welfare loss, but it is taken to suffice to an 
approximate extent. The welfare dimension is thus compromised by its 
translation into a resources format. This is where Sen’s approach has 
advantages. Although he would not be attempting to compensate such a loss, 
his pluralistic approach would advocates the removal of the circumstances of 
the disadvantage, without prioritising any particular aspect. Yet despite his 
inclusive approach, his theory does not tell us what injustice actually is. He 
tells us how the phenomenon of injustice ought to be dealt with, but without a 
conception of disadvantage any attempt at recognising which injustice is the 
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most grave and thus how it might be prioritised must remain an intuitive hunch 
on the part of the assessor. More will be said on the problem of prioritising 
disadvantage in Chapter Seven.  
Furthermore, the expression of disadvantage only in terms of welfare, 
resources, or liberty does not seem to exhaust all of the possible 
manifestations. It is suggested that an important ingredient has still to be 
properly appreciated: this ingredient is related to the psychological disposition 
and how we choose to live. Take the case of Doris, an elderly woman recently 
taken into residential care. Although this relates to a genuine case in the East 
Riding of Yorkshire during 2010, the name has been changed for 
confidentiality reasons. Doris lived much of her later years as a pauper. When 
she was eventually taken into care, she was severely undernourished, and 
suffering from dementia. Despite her living in a state of poverty over a number 
of years (pre-dating her dementia) it was discovered that she had over £30 000 
in cash secreted around her house. Whilst she was young, and able to exert 
her will in choosing to live as she did, she could not be accurately described as 
disadvantaged. If anything she was resource rich, and so able to change her 
lifestyle any time she wished. Yet as her illness progressed, she might be 
considered amongst the disadvantaged despite the wealth remaining formally 
available. The only relevant aspect that has changed is her mental capacity. 
The simple assessment of disadvantage in terms of welfare, resources, or 
liberty cannot recognise these changes. The welfare approach might suggest 
that she is disadvantaged if she can no longer satisfy preferences, but might 
also suggest that she is not disadvantaged if she appears happy with her lot. In 
contrast, since the availability of resources (as wealth) has not changed she is 
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therefore not disadvantaged. Yet the characterisation of disadvantage as 
relative lack of liberty is also materially unaffected by Doris’s dementia. Even 
the capabilities approach is unclear in this regard, although why this should be 
so will be explained in chapter four. The loss of mental ability, and therefore 
the loss of will, has left Doris a victim of her previous choices. Although the 
cash was available, she was unable to access or use it. She thus had the 
conditions of disadvantage but without the control, and as will be argued, it is 
the control that is the significant feature.  
As suggested in the preliminary remarks, it might be thought that Doris 
should be included amongst the disadvantaged since her loss of capacity 
amounts to impairment of the will and therefore a loss of control. However, the 
impairment of the will is not the same as the loss of capacity. In losing capacity 
our concern for her becomes one of duty. We will return to this issue in chapter 
eight, where the implications of the state towards the vulnerable are discussed. 
Even though she has no one to blame but herself, (inasmuch as her 
circumstances are the result of decisions she made when she had capacity) it 
might be objected that since no one can be said to deserve to lose their 
faculties in this way, then the circumstances are unfair. However, so far as 
social justice is concerned, it is disadvantage through the failure to be treated 
as a moral equal that is the issue at hand, and this requires human agency. 
Whilst the loss of mental capacity is unfortunate, it is not on that account 
unfair. It is suggested that the fact of Doris’s lost capacity is not a suitable 
subject for the evaluation of fairness: the proper focus for that evaluation is 
how other persons respond to her circumstances. What is significant about 
disadvantage in this case is the unfairness (or otherwise) of the response, and 
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since the unimpaired will is argued to be the determining factor of that fairness, 
then it is the will that is fundamental to a proper conception of disadvantage. 
Where the capacity for will does not exist, the question of unfair impairment 
does not arise, therefore the scope of the conception of disadvantage as 
impairment of the will is restricted to those that possess the capacity for will.  
Even though Doris has lost capacity, others might still behave unfairly 
towards her. If the response of others were to fail to respect her previous 
wishes, or were to fail in our duties towards her care, then she would be 
treated unfairly. In much the same way as a person’s last will and testament 
can become incorporated within the extended will of the living relatives, the 
wishes of Doris can still become incorporated into the wills of her carers (the 
idea of an extended will is discussed briefly in a moment, and in further depth 
in chapter six). It thus becomes part of the culture, customs and practices of 
the community that care will be provided for persons in Doris’s circumstances. 
Furthermore, the self-realisation of those around her requires the provision of 
care in line with the perfectionist model of humanity that this thesis endorses. 
The failure to provide care, or to respect her wishes, would be unfair because 
we have impaired the extended wills of those others around us in the 
community who would be appalled if Doris were neglected. The duty of care is 
owed to Doris, but the matter of fairness is owed to our peers out of respect for 
the moral equality and dignity of us all as human beings.   
Whilst other views might struggle with such a scenario, it is suggested 
that when disadvantage is conceived as impairment of will, then such 
examples can be readily explained. Yet the conception of the will is notoriously 
problematic, particularly if understood in a Cartesian ‘substantive’ sense. 
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However, the sense in which it will be used here is not Cartesian. The will is to 
be understood as an explanatory device for human behaviour (without implying 
any mechanism for how the experience of will might correlate with the events 
taking place within our minds). This is not a behaviourist interpretation of the 
will: the belief that ‘I did that’ is not to be understood as simply behaving in 
such a way as to make a claim; hold up one’s hand; utter ‘I did that’; or 
otherwise engage in actions consistent with that statement. Rather, the will is 
to be understood as a genuine experience that results in the belief that ‘I did 
that’. It is this belief that explains the behaviour without entailing the existence 
of a substantive will. Even if the will is ontologically illusory (as Gilbert Ryle, 
Daniel Dennett, Daniel Wegner, Andy Clark, and Saul Smilansky suggest) as 
an explanatory device it has yet to be surpassed.25  
Yet it is also a part of self-realisation, part of perfection, to recognise 
that other persons are part of our self-identity. This is more than suggesting 
that we are merely influenced by other persons: those others (and our relations 
with them) form a component part of the self. The perfect person does not 
situate the self as an isolated entity amongst other separate individuals: the 
perfectionist ideal identifies other persons as ends seeking the same good.  
Yet in situating the self, one draws upon the culture, technology, environment, 
and other persons in the formation of one’s identity. One could not claim to be 
the same person were it possible to remove or expunge from one’s existence 
the fact of having had a mother, for example, or siblings, or a certain 
upbringing. A person born with a disability will not see that condition as merely 
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an influence upon their self identity: it is an essential part of it. Similarly, a 
person raised in a particular environment, culture and so forth, cannot see 
these factors as mere influences: they also are defining components of the 
self. Self-realisation as a perfectionist ideal, given a conception of an extended 
will, must also identify the perfection of the self as being dependent upon the 
achievement of the same end in other persons. Any of our actions that do not 
assist others in their own pathway toward self-realisation thus simultaneously 
inhibit our own self-realisation. The self-realisation of other persons is therefore 
part of our own self-realisation. This argument gives the communities, culture 
and environment in which we live a central role in our own self-realisation. The 
self, and therefore the will, is both constructed by, and constructs that external 
social network and environment.  
By introducing the idea of interdependence upon others as part of the 
construction of the will, the idea of morality can be brought to bear upon an 
extended will. The conception of the will may well be illusory, but this is 
because it is merely a conceptual device, with (as Andy Clark argues) a 
location extending beyond the biological boundaries of the individual human 
being.26 This is not a new idea: Thomas Hill Green deserves credit for 
recognising that the will is not merely located in the biological entity of each 
human being.27 Although Green sought a theological conception of an 
extended will, this is not the view presented here. Nevertheless Green is 
acknowledged as the inspiration for this idea. Together with his analysis of 
what it means to exercise will, the distinctions between passive and active will, 
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and the role of morality, warrant the description of this thesis of disadvantage 
as being a broadly Greenian conception. 
It is suggested that when disadvantage is explained as the impairment 
of will, then the different manifestations of unfair disadvantage are simply 
evidence of that impairment. It is the reduction, removal, or limitation of control 
that a person has over her life, relative to others, in such a way that the person 
concerned is not afforded moral equality. This is not to say that disadvantage 
is the simple frustration of one’s will: such an idea has no connection with 
justice. The simple frustration of will might describe a person’s being 
disadvantaged, but without a consideration of the fairness of that 
disadvantage, then there is no necessary connection with justice. She might be 
assessed (in an almost factual way) as having a particular set of 
circumstances relative to others, but justice requires an evaluation of the 
fairness of those circumstances in order to give a proper account of social 
disadvantage. This distinction will be explained in the next chapter. Thus a 
criminal is disadvantaged by his imprisonment, and to that extent is likely to 
have had his will frustrated, but that does not make his imprisonment unfair. 
He may also lose control over his life, but this too is not unfair so long as his 
moral status is not undermined. Conversely, where a person has been treated 
unfairly, it is suggested that it is necessarily the case that she has had her 
exercise of will impaired.  
It is the recognition of persons as moral equals that is significant to the 
assessment of fairness, but this does not require that all persons are able to 
equally realise their will. It is the opportunity to exercise will that ought to be 
equal, at least to the extent of reasonableness and commensurability with all 
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others having the equal opportunity to exercise their wills. Furthermore, just as 
a voluntarily accepted disadvantage is not unfair, a coerced disadvantage in 
which one has not had a say usually is. Yet even a coerced disadvantage is 
not necessarily unfair, and this is where reasonability comes in. If a 
disadvantage is imposed, but under circumstances to which the sufferer 
cannot reasonably reject, or even if they do so, the wider society would not 
reasonably reject, than any resulting disadvantage may still be regarded as 
fair. Thus the criminal imprisoned for an offence is coercively restricted, but 
cannot reasonably reject the imposition of a reasonable penalty: if she accepts 
that she has committed a crime then she must also accept the justification of a 
penalty. Furthermore, if she does not accept that the action she has done 
counts as a crime, but all other reasonable members of that state disagree, 
then it is not unfair to impose a penalty. The onus is upon the individual to 
persuade others that they are not being reasonable, or to accept that she did 
commit a wrongful act. 
If the will is an individually and culturally distributed synthesis, then 
disadvantage as impairment of the will might simply be to express a truism: but 
only if disadvantage is expressed in a non-perfectionist way. The combination 
with a perfectionist objective introduces a moral ‘best’ approach. Without such 
a perfectionist interpretation, the distributed synthesis in which some do better 
than others would be morally neutral, or misplace the location of morality. For 
example, the classical utilitarian approach would place the determination of 
goodness, that is, the location of morality, entirely externally to the person. The 
perfectionist interpretation of the distributed synthesis of the self with the 
environment places morality, like the will, both within the individual and in the 
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culture/community/environment in which she is placed. This seems to be a 
much better fit with how morality is perceived and practiced. 
In summary, the problem of disadvantage is that it is evident in a 
number of seemingly incommensurable ways. Many philosophers, such as 
Rawls, Dworkin, the classical utilitarians, and the libertarians, have tried to 
identify a fundamental or primary form in which all types of social disadvantage 
can be weighed, measured, or adjusted. Others, such as Cohen and Sen, 
have metaphorically thrown their hands in the air and declared that the 
problem might never be solved. It is suggested that by focussing upon the 
normative assessment of the conditions of disadvantage rather than upon the 
normative evaluation of its fairness, they may have missed the fundamental 
role that the will must play.  
Pinpointing the precise nature and concept of disadvantage has proven 
to be a slippery and challenging project. The three commonly assessed 
dimensions of welfare, resources, and liberty, are all important to the 
individual’s experience of disadvantage, but are not sufficient to define it. Even 
combining all three dimensions into some form of capabilities approach cannot 
give a precise account (as even Sen now recognises).28 Whilst it is accepted 
that the capabilities approach might provide the basis of the best practical 
approach to assessing disadvantage (as it recognises the essentially pluralistic 
nature of the circumstances of disadvantage), it is argued that it is the role of 
the will that gives the unifying and defining feature.  
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6. Methodology 
This thesis is in the form of a conceptual analysis. This methodology is the 
mainstream in the contemporary tradition of Anglo-American analytical moral 
and political philosophy. However, conceptual analysis does not lend itself to 
quantitative measurement or qualitative methods. Although it may have been 
possible to design surveys of opinion, or interviews with disadvantaged 
persons, this would have lent little to the validity of the process, given that we 
are analysing concepts. A number of other sources and authors will be cited, of 
course, to support the arguments where appropriate, as will appeals to 
rational, reasonable, and/or logical argument.  
The thesis necessarily draws upon and responds to the most influential 
positions within the field of social justice. These include the arguments of 
Ronald Dworkin (Sovereign Virtue), John Rawls (A Theory of Justice; Justice 
as Fairness – A Restatement), Amartya Sen, (Inequality Reexamined; 
Development as Freedom; The Idea of Justice), Martha Nussbaum, (Women 
and Human Development; Frontiers of Justice; Creating Capabilities), and 
Jonathan Wolff, and Avner De Shalit, (Disadvantage). To these authors must 
be added the general arguments of utilitarianism. Each of these have been 
selected as being the most important and relevant works to this thesis, and are 
representative of the range of views available. As such they cover views that 
advocate a welfare approach, or a resources approach, or a libertarian 
approach to the conception of social justice, and therefore towards the least 
well-off in society.  
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The thesis will be presented in nine chapters. Chapter Two is concerned with 
the generic conception of disadvantage. In particular, it separates out the 
normative character of the concept into two distinct parts. The first compares a 
model or standard condition with the circumstances, and the second evaluates 
the goodness or rightness of that condition. As has already been indicated, 
many theories of social justice wrongly assume that disadvantage is 
unproblematic, or attempt to avoid the difficulties. It is argued that a better 
understanding of the conception of disadvantage can resolve these problems. 
This chapter considers the generic conception of disadvantage in order to give 
the reader a better understanding of the issues. The conception of 
disadvantage is then narrowed to refer to social disadvantage only. The 
chapter points out that disadvantage can be either fair or unfair, and suggests 
a pivotal role for the will in that evaluation. 
Chapter Three introduces the controversial concept of social justice. 
Friedrich Hayek and Antony Flew argue that the two terms should not be 
paired at all since justice has nothing to do with distribution. This argument is 
rejected. It is suggested that the ways in which the arrangements of the state 
impacts upon its citizens are clearly a matter of social justice. This analysis of 
disadvantage begins with a general discussion of distributive justice in order to 
set the framework for the debate. This will include a literature review of the 
main positions, particularly the work of John Rawls, and Ronald Dworkin.  
In Chapter Four, the capabilities approach of Sen and Nussbaum is 
discussed, along with its practical application (as advocated by Wolff and de-
Shalit). It is pointed out how each theory struggles with the identification of the 
least well-off group, or sets aside such difficulties, or conflates disadvantage 
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with unfairness. None of these approaches identifies what disadvantage really 
is, or recognises the significance of the will of the individual in these matters. 
Nevertheless, whilst many of these theories produce elaborate 
recommendations for the arrangements of a just society, the identification of 
the least well-off person or group is neglected. This issue is becoming 
increasingly recognised, particularly in the work of Wolff and de-Shalit, who 
note that disadvantage is manifested in several ways, and exists in ‘clusters’ of 
different aspects of disadvantage. Yet where they concentrate on a practical 
solution based on de-clustering, they avoid the theoretical foundations 
(particularly in relation to the question of fairness). Whilst their practical 
conclusions are supported, this thesis attempts to fill that theoretical gap.  
It has now been suggested that the ‘traditional’ conceptions of 
disadvantage in terms of welfare, resources, and liberty are inadequate. It is 
also suggested that the capabilities approach falls short. In each of these 
views the role of the will has not been recognised or is under appreciated. 
Social justice, it is argued, thus turns on having a viable notion of the will. This 
is the subject of Chapter Five. In this chapter the views of Dennett, and Clark 
are drawn upon to argue that the will is extended outside of each individual to 
encompass one’s environmental, cultural, and technological circumstances. 
The views of Wegner are then added to support the argument that the will is an 
ultimately illusory creation of the physical human organism. The experience of 
will is real enough, allowing each individual to recognise authorship and to 
communicate relative intentions to others. 
In Chapter Six it is argued that unfair disadvantage is the impairment of 
the will towards a valuable end in the presence of others that have a greater 
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opportunity to exercise will. It is the lack of equal opportunity for the exercise of 
will that determines the unfairness of disadvantage. The conception of fairness 
is crucial to social justice but little discussed in the literature (other than 
Rawls’s circular view of justice as fairness). Any person impaired in the 
process of moving towards self-realisation by the actions of others, in such a 
way that does not recognise her moral equality, has thus been unfairly 
disadvantaged.  
Chapter Seven explores the general view that the morally significant 
feature of disadvantage is not that some persons have less than others, but 
that some persons do not have enough. This is Harry Frankfurt’s argument, 
which is accepted but to a limited extent. Although Frankfurt’s conception of 
sufficiency relates to resources, it is suggested that such a scheme would be 
better conceived in relation to sufficiency of opportunity to exercise will. 
Frankfurt’s development of his position, that it makes equality irrelevant, is not 
accepted. It is argued that the conception of disadvantage as impairment of the 
will reconciles Frankfurt’s emphasis on sufficiency whilst recognising that 
equality is morally significant, at least insofar as the opportunity for the 
exercise of will is equal. Furthermore, it is suggested that fairness would 
require not only a lower threshold of sufficiency but an upper limit that tracks 
the impact upon those at the lower level.  
Chapter Eight ties the conception of unfair disadvantage as the 
impairment of the exercise of will to the implications that this places upon the 
state. A policy of empowerment and consultation is therefore advocated rather 
than simply targeting resources or welfare deficiencies. It is also argued that 
the requirement for consultation can be met without the need for the direct 
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involvement of each affected individual. This would be the case if 
arrangements take into account Thomas Scanlon’s principle such that persons 
could not reasonably reject any imposed conditions.29 However, any 
arrangements that fail to involve consultation, either directly or in accordance 
with reasonability, will be taken as resulting in an unfair disadvantage to those 
with less than an equal distribution of the traditional ‘goods’. Furthermore, it 
would also imply that the further the disparity between the position of equality, 
and the existence of perhaps extreme wealth or poverty, then the stronger the 
justificatory reason must be. Thus the further removed from an equal 
distribution of welfare, resources, or liberty, the more difficult it will be to meet 
the consultation criteria, and the more likely it will be that such a distribution is 
unfair. This practical tendency would be mirrored by the theoretical suggestion 
of an upper threshold that accompanies the lower. Nevertheless, a further 
implication from the argument that voluntary disadvantage is not unfair, is that 
the lifestyle choice not to work would rule out many obligations that the state 
holds towards providing benefits. A number of potential objections to this view, 
and to the conception of disadvantage as impairment of the will are then 
discussed. 
The thesis concludes with Chapter Nine, in which a summary is 
provided and in which further closing remarks are made. This will include a 
reflective account of the thesis, how this thesis has made an original 
contribution, and raises possible issues for further research and investigation 
in future.  
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Chapter Two 
The Meaning of ‘Disadvantage’ 
 
1. Introduction 
Many theories of social justice seem to assume that the term ‘disadvantage’ 
is unproblematic and universally understood. Yet different approaches to 
social justice are based upon different conceptions of disadvantage. For 
example, Rawls, Mill, Scanlon, and Sen each offer solutions to the problem of 
‘the disadvantaged’, but do not agree what ‘disadvantaged’ means: they 
either take disadvantage to be synonymous with ‘the least well-off’, or as a 
matter of having the least ‘well-being’, or of being subject to a failure to 
recognise moral responsibilities, or of being the least capable of converting 
resources into well-being.1 
Wolff and de-Shalit recognise the difficulty that this lack of agreement 
presents and so deliberately avoid a definition, preferring to suggest a 
consensus to identify the worst off.2  Wolff and de-Shalit’s aim is to offer 
practical means for agreement on the best policy to address the needs of the 
worst off. Despite this compromise they conflate the issue of disadvantage 
with the separate issue of fairness.3 As will be argued shortly, these two 
concepts are distinguishable and best not conflated.  
The concept of disadvantage is fundamental to the conception of social 
justice, since without a solid understanding of what disadvantage is, we 
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cannot identify who the disadvantaged are, or identify an appropriate 
response. In this chapter, the generic concept of disadvantage will first be 
discussed, as distinct from the evaluation of disadvantage. It will be argued 
that the conception of disadvantage is normative in two distinct ways. In the 
first, comparison is made between different conditions, circumstances, or 
states of affairs to make a ‘factual’ assessment of the relationship between 
persons. This is the generic conception of disadvantage. In the second, 
comparisons are again made of relations between persons, but an evaluation 
is made of the goodness or rightness of those relations. This is the specific 
conception of social disadvantage by which the idea of fairness is introduced.  
 
2. The generic concept of disadvantage 
  
In this section, the generic conception of disadvantage is first discussed, 
using the etymology and OED definitions as the starting point. From this 
discussion, it becomes clear that the generic conception is entirely 
descriptive. As such it is inadequate to describe social disadvantage since 
this conception has both descriptive and evaluative components. This 
prepares the ground for the following section in which the normative nature of 
disadvantage is discussed, along with the place of fairness and 
reasonableness in the proper conception of social disadvantage. 
Disadvantage is a relational term. It would be nonsense to describe 
someone or something as disadvantaged without also specifying in relation to 
what. The ascription of disadvantage can apply to an individual, or a caste, 
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race, or class of people. One can be said to face a disadvantage, suffer a 
disadvantage, put oneself at a disadvantage, or accept disadvantage relative 
to one person whilst simultaneously claiming an advantage over another. As 
examples, a member of a lower class or caste can be disadvantaged both as 
an individual and as a member of that class or caste; one can be 
economically disadvantaged insofar as one is poor, but advantaged in having 
physical well-being; or suffer welfare disadvantage in having poor health, but 
have economic advantage in being wealthy; or the beggar in the west might 
be considered to be wealthy relative to others in the developing world, and 
thus be economically disadvantaged and advantaged at the same time, 
depending upon the context. Such examples describe serious circumstances, 
yet the term ‘disadvantage’ can also be used trivially to explain a racing 
handicap, say. The term therefore appears to be used in contrasting and 
varying ways: sometimes referring to individual challenges, or challenges to 
whole groups; sometimes one is and is not disadvantaged at the same time; 
or disadvantaged in one respect but advantaged in another; or describes 
circumstances of the utmost importance, or circumstances of little importance.  
 What, then, is meant when one proposes to organise a society to 
eliminate (or mitigate) disadvantage, or to make arrangements to benefit the 
most disadvantaged, when disadvantage relates to so many different 
circumstances? Such proposals are made in the name of social justice: it just 
seems natural to suppose that the disadvantaged are the poorest, all things 
considered, and that we should ‘do something about it’. Aside from the 
justification of the pairing of the terms ‘social’ and ‘justice’, such a proposal is 
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dependent upon the identification of disadvantage, and it simply will not do to 
suggest that they are ‘the least well off’ since this merely begs the question. 
Yet the term ‘disadvantage’ is used in so many different ways and contexts 
that it can be difficult to pin down not just who it identifies, but what it means.  
Clearly, a stipulative definition will not do either: we are looking for how 
the term is to be understood in its actual use. Yet the extent and variety of 
ways in which the term is used may even indicate that different underlying 
concepts are being applied to each circumstance. Despite this apparent 
possibility, this would be unlikely to be the case. It seems far more likely that 
the same underlying concept is being applied, but that it is merely ill-defined. 
If so, then one would expect a common defining feature: disadvantage must 
relate to the same ‘something’ that is lacking in each case.  
Etymologically, the term ‘disadvantage’ has its roots in the Latin ab 
ante meaning ‘from before’.4 This has moved through French ‘avante’ to 
become ‘avantage’, and its opposite ‘disavantage’. However, the meaning 
has now changed: whereas the original meaning is naturalistic (stating a 
natural fact), the new meaning is, using Derek Parfit’s categorisation, “partly 
normative and partly naturalistic”.5 The meaning has moved from a blunt 
statement of fact of origin to ‘having (and not having) the property of being 
from before’, that is, being in advance or behind. As such, the property invites 
a further evaluation of better or worseness. Take the examples of damage, or 
loss: each appear to state a natural fact: one has an injury, or less of 
something that they had before. This usage remains normative inasmuch as a 
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model of the previous condition is used as a standard for comparison. 
However, compare this with the term’s usage in which disadvantage is 
considered as harmful, or bad: a property is now evaluated in which an 
‘ought’ statement is implied. A standard of comparison is still present, but now 
the term’s usage includes an additional evaluation of the goodness or 
rightness of the disadvantageous circumstances. There are thus two distinct 
ways in which the term ‘disadvantage’ can be applied and understood. We 
will return to this distinction in a moment, but first let us look at how the 
generic conception of disadvantage might be defined. 
Although not intended as a philosophical account, the Oxford English 
Dictionary suggests basic descriptive definitions of disadvantage that might 
make a useful starting point to our enquiry. Firstly as: “[a]bsence or 
deprivation of advantage; an unfavourable condition or circumstance”, and 
secondly as: “[d]etriment, loss, or injury to interest; diminution of or prejudice 
to credit or reputation”.6 In both definitions, the common feature is the 
interests of the person or persons affected. Although general, the OED 
definitions do indicate the range of subjects to which the term may be applied. 
Thus the removal of a privilege might count as a disadvantage to an 
individual, or the occurrence of rain, say, might be to the disadvantage of 
those wishing to watch or play a game of cricket.  
These are relatively trivial examples of the way in which the term might 
be applied, however. Of greater interest to this thesis are the more serious 
applications of the term to describe physical, economic, social, and political 
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circumstances. In order to count as a disadvantage, at least so far as is 
relevant to this thesis, the something that is lacking must be valued both by 
the individuals affected, and by other members of the society. The question of 
value might therefore vary according to the parameters of intrinsic worth as a 
vital need, or worth to the individual according to her own conception of the 
good, or in accordance with other societal norms.  
 Social disadvantage is at the core of this thesis, yet the OED 
definitions struggle with these aspects. For example, if disadvantage is the 
absence or deprivation of advantage, (as the first OED definition asserts) then 
everyone is advantaged or disadvantaged relative to others to some extent. 
This might be readily applied to economic circumstances, or other such 
situations where accurate measurement can be made, but seems wholly 
unsuited when an evaluation of appropriateness becomes necessary (that is, 
where an evaluation of the goodness or rightness of a set of circumstances is 
called for). Add in the difficulty that social and political aspects cover a huge 
range of topics (culture, background, education, class, ability, various 
liberties) each of which might need to be given some sort of ordering, and the 
description of social disadvantage becomes increasingly difficult. 
Furthermore, since each person might be advantaged in one area whilst 
disadvantaged in another, then the accurate assessment of disadvantage 
according to generic criteria becomes unachievable, and any attempt to do so 
must make arbitrary choices.  
 Aside from the circularity of defining disadvantage as the opposite of 
advantage (as indicated in the first OED definition) loss of advantage can 
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simply restore equality: it would then be confusing to claim that a person is 
now disadvantaged when in fact they have been brought into line with 
everyone else. Such a person might still be described as individually 
disadvantaged in the relative sense to their former condition, but the OED 
definitions makes no reference to the importance of the relational constraints 
of disadvantage. However, the OED definition of ‘advantage’ (to which 
‘disadvantage’ is the opposite) as “a favouring circumstance; anything which 
gives one the superiority or tends to improve one's position”, does suggest a 
relational aspect but without referring to any particular standards, thus the 
OED versions are devoid of these particular normative implications.7 
Disadvantage in this sense cannot imply that one ought not to be placed 
under those conditions.  
Using the first definition, physical disadvantage would relate either to 
the absence of an advantage, or presence of an unfavourable condition. Yet 
when one considers physical disabilities one does not usually describe those 
within a species norm as being an ‘advantaged’ group. Moreover, to describe 
disabled persons as holding an unfavourable condition is also disputable 
since to do so would rely upon a social model of disability. To apply the 
second definition would suggest that a physical disability is a loss to that 
person’s interests. Yet such a conception is vulnerable to accusations of 
prejudice, since many persons with ‘disabilities’ deny that they are disabilities 
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at all. For example, some deaf parents might prefer to have a deaf rather than 
a ‘normal’ child.8 These points will be discussed further in a moment, but 
might suggest that the first definition is inadequate, at least in this particular 
application.  
To be fair to the OED, it is not aiming to provide a philosophically 
robust account of disadvantage. It is merely providing definitions that fit the 
generic conception. It would therefore be unfair to criticise for failing to fulfil an 
objective that it does not intend to meet. The OED definition is merely used as 
a starting point in this thesis to show the nature of the problem, and to show 
that the generic conception does not adequately fit the ways in which the 
concept is actually used in a social context. If the concept of disadvantage is 
not clear, then how do we know that we are talking about the same concept in 
different discussions? Without a clear understanding, we cannot ask the more 
serious questions of what obligations disadvantage may place on others (if 
any) or how they might be addressed, or who it is that ought to act. If the 
generic conception is inadequate to meet the challenge of social justice, what 
then is the proper conception of disadvantage? 
A moment’s consideration reveals that the term ‘disadvantage’ does 
not relate to the absolute ‘least’ of anything since only the least well-off 
individual in the world could meet this condition. This is more than a matter of 
accurate measurement of the circumstances, or of accurate interpersonal 
comparison. If one were to lump together a number of candidate ‘least well-
off’ persons into a set, and call these ‘the disadvantaged’, it would only 
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postpone the problem, for one might still wish to order this group into the 
more and less disadvantaged. Even consideration of the least advantaged 
group must address the problem of multiple candidate groups and 
comparability between different forms of disadvantage. 
Yet the poverty-stricken starving person might just as accurately be 
described as the least well-off as the desperately depressed individual, or the 
person trapped in a house fire, or the victim of torture. The same would apply 
to candidate groups. Given that at every moment any number of persons is in 
desperate circumstances, then the absolute least well-off person or group 
does not identify anyone at all. The idea of the least well-off individual or 
group is therefore a fiction. Even where the context is specified, such as in 
Rawls’s reference to the least well-off representative in a particular society, 
unless this society is very small indeed, there may still be many such persons 
that could stake a claim to be the one absolutely disadvantaged.9  
Rawls recognises this difficulty, remarking that “it seems impossible to 
avoid a certain arbitrariness in actually identifying the least favoured group”.10 
He explains that he is merely using this fiction as a heuristic device, yet in 
doing so the concept of disadvantage he uses must also be heuristic.11  
Disadvantage now relates to a fictitious ‘least well-off’ group, therefore the 
absolute level of disadvantage becomes further obscured. Other persons are 
now compared with an indeterminate condition of disadvantage in order to 
relate their own circumstances. As this difficulty confirms, and since one 
cannot say that any individual is disadvantaged without also specifying in 
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relation to what, then if that something is indeterminate, the conception of 
disadvantage remains unclear.  
However, to describe a person as being in poverty might suggest that 
the ‘something’ they lack is a certain level of resources below a particular 
threshold. It would also be to claim that that threshold represents a level that 
all persons ought to be able to achieve: it would therefore represent a level of 
acceptability. Yet there is no clear cut-off point here: the existence of a line 
between disadvantage and an acceptable level of access to resources 
appears to be unlikely. Furthermore, disadvantage is also a matter of degree. 
A person just under a particular threshold can be described as advantaged 
relative to another person even further below that threshold. Likewise, a 
person just above that threshold can be considered disadvantaged relative to 
a person above it. It would therefore appear possible to give an ordinal 
ordering between different degrees of disadvantage. Yet this would seem to 
be in tension with the arbitrariness and indeterminateness of any attempt to 
define a least advantaged person or group. The idea of a threshold would 
thus appear to be arbitrary so far as the conception of disadvantage is 
concerned, despite disadvantage being clearly relational. We will return to this 
point in chapter seven, where it will be shown that this appearance of 
arbitrariness is mistaken. 
 It is for these reasons that Wolff and de-Shalit describe disadvantage 
in general terms: “[b]y designating those who lack access to some goods (for 
example, those lacking employment) ‘disadvantaged’ we immediately locate 
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these people in relation to others”.12 In doing so they recognise that 
disadvantage is not just about primary goods, but that disadvantage is caused 
or created by others. Unfortunately, they do not develop this idea to show the 
connection with fairness (an omission hopefully corrected in this thesis). As 
an egalitarian project, they take it as read that disadvantage is unfair.13 
Instead of worrying about identifying the nature of disadvantage, or the 
difficulties with identifying who they are, they consider disadvantage in broad-
brush terms as categorising the least advantaged persons, and cut directly to 
the practical urgency to address their needs.  
In the next section we will examine the two-way normativity of 
disadvantage. It will be argued that when social relations between persons 
are concerned, disadvantage has both a generic component and an 
evaluative component. The generic component discussed so far might identify 
the ‘natural fact’ of relative positions of individuals when comparisons are 
made, but then an evaluation is made of the goodness or rightness of that 
relationship. The tendency to conflate these two aspects (it is suggested) has 
allowed the separate issue of fairness to become conflated in many accounts 
of disadvantage (including Wolff and de-Shalit’s). If so, it would be 
unsurprising that they have chosen to focus upon the practical issues to the 
detriment of the theoretical underpinnings. 
 
3. The Normative Character of Disadvantage 
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Whilst the OED definitions provide a reasonable starting point, they do not 
address all of the relevant features of disadvantage. The previous sections 
have indicated some of the shortfalls and complexities at issue, and the 
difficulties that these present to the identification of disadvantage. The reason 
for these difficulties is that an important component of disadvantage has been 
missed: the connection with fairness, and as later argued, with the will. Whilst 
the OED have avoided conflating the issue of fairness with disadvantage 
(their definitions have no indication of the rightness or goodness of these 
situations) there are further relevant features of disadvantage that must be 
included. These turn on the normative nature of the term, inasmuch as 
disadvantage indicates ‘acceptable’ levels of welfare, resources, or liberty.  
Statements that prescribe how things ought to be arranged, or how 
one ought to act, are normative inasmuch as they relate to a standard that is 
to be applied or achieved. Those statements that presuppose a conception of 
the good or the right are also moral statements in that they contain an idea of 
how things ought to be arranged to make a life go well, or at least better. 
Such statements are evaluative against the normative standard. It is therefore 
easy to run a normative statement into an evaluative one, thus conflating an 
account of a state of affairs into the evaluation of whether this is right or good. 
The term ‘disadvantage’ lends itself to this error. The conception of 
disadvantage compares a particular state of affairs with another, yet insofar 
as ‘disadvantage’ is a negative characterisation, suggests that one is better 
than the other. Whereas the term ‘disadvantage’ describes a particular 
relational position, it is the negative characterisation that perhaps leads one to 
Chapter Two – The Meaning of ‘Disadvantage’   
S. Magee                                     June 2012 53 
conflate this description with a notion of unfairness. One can be fairly 
disadvantaged, or unfairly disadvantaged, but the term is commonly used to 
suggest that disadvantage is bad in itself. 
Take the example of disability, where the ‘disabled’ person does not 
consider her condition to be disadvantageous: the case in point (raised in the 
previous section) being the deaf parent who might choose to have a deaf 
child. This parent would perhaps see the lack of a sense of hearing, not as a 
problem that resides in the child, but one of social relations and attitudes of 
others that come into contact with her. The problem is external to the child 
and not something ‘wrong’ with the child. This example illustrates the two 
distinct ways in which the normative character of disadvantage is displayed: 
in one way the deaf person is compared with a species norm model of 
disability, but then an evaluation is applied to suggest that the person ought 
not to suffer the condition. Putting to one side the appropriateness of any 
particular model, let us take it for the sake of the argument that it is possible 
to identify a ‘correct’ model of disability. The evaluation of the goodness or 
rightness (whether one ought not to suffer that condition) can then be made 
by the individual concerned, or by members of the wider community. Although 
the normative comparison (in the first way) with the model standard is a 
matter of natural ‘fact’, and as such can be accurate or inaccurate, the 
normative evaluation (in the second way) is not a matter of accuracy, but of 
appropriateness. In the first way, the normative comparison would be 
inaccurate if that comparison suggested that there was a deviation from the 
standard model (in this case the species norm) when there was not. Even if 
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the first normative comparison is ‘factually’ correct, (inasmuch as it judges an 
accurate correlation) the second normative evaluation could be inappropriate 
if the model standard is subjective, disputed, or otherwise inaccurate 
(inconsistent with a social norm). Appropriateness under these conditions is 
then dependent on the evaluation of the goodness or rightness of the 
circumstances under assessment.  
Disadvantage as a generic concept is thus a separate issue from the 
assessment of the fairness of the circumstances. Yet whenever relations 
between persons are analysed, it seems inevitable that the matter of fairness 
is also brought into the discussion. It is at this point that the notion of fairness 
slips into the conception of disadvantage. Once the generic conception of 
disadvantage is applied to the relations between persons, then the conception 
changes, and becomes normative in the second way. Whereas the generic 
conception merely compares conditions against a standard, when social 
relations are introduced there arises a tendency to apply a second standard 
of goodness or rightness to the conception of disadvantage. The term now 
relates to social disadvantage, not the generic conception.  
In our example it can be taken for the sake of the argument that 
deafness falls outside of the species norm, and that therefore there is no 
inaccuracy in the first normative assessment. Even so, the evaluation might 
still be inappropriate in that it misjudges the goodness or rightness of the 
condition. That such usage might well be inappropriate may be because the 
individual person is not consulted in relation to the assessment of 
disadvantage. Since the evaluation of appropriateness can be made both 
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externally to the person affected (by the wider community) and by that person 
herself, any evaluation of disadvantage that did not include the individual 
concerned has missed an important (perhaps the most important) component 
of that evaluation. As will be discussed in chapter six, consultation with the 
individual is essential to the proper evaluation of disadvantage. From the 
disabled person’s perspective, she might not consider herself disadvantaged, 
but from the point of view of others, she may well be. The assessment is thus 
contextually dependent. The term ‘disadvantage’ is not being applied 
inaccurately in comparing the existing condition with the model condition (this 
is the generic use of the term), but it is being used inappropriately when an 
evaluation is made that such a condition is necessarily bad, or unwelcome. 
Both the disabled person, and the person external to that individual, are using 
the same generic concept in this case, but assessing the outcome differently: 
the generic assessment is not disputed, but the evaluation is under dispute. 
The generic conception of disadvantage says nothing about the 
rightness or goodness of the circumstances, but the negative associations 
with the term are often taken to infer that disadvantage cannot be right or 
good. Notice for example how often the word ‘suffer’ is associated with 
‘disadvantage’, suggesting a necessary, or at least clichéd, link. Yet if one 
voluntarily accepts a disadvantage, for example, by giving a competitor in a 
race a head start, then it is plausible to say that they are not unfairly 
disadvantaged. To use the phrase ‘I am putting myself at a disadvantage’ 
might accurately describe a condition of disadvantage, but it is not neutral in 
this regard. It still says something about the fairness. Since the disadvantage 
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is volunteered, and provided that it is not coerced in some way, this negates 
any ascription of injustice or unfairness. The very idea of a handicap in horse 
racing, or golf, depends upon circumstances in which disadvantage is 
accepted as being right or good in some way. These examples relate to 
games, however, so it might be objected that social and political relations are 
not quite the same. Nevertheless, it is suggested that if disadvantage can be 
so easily distinguished from fairness in these trivial examples, it is very likely 
that the disadvantage ought to be distinguished from fairness in the more 
serious circumstances too. 
That this is the case is supported by the use of such a phrase as ‘I am 
putting you at a disadvantage‘: this would be to impose an unfair condition 
unless some reason is given that the subject of that disadvantage would 
assent to, or at least could not reasonably reject. Such a phrase can be used 
in social or political contexts, and if the disadvantaged person accepts (or 
cannot reasonably reject) such an imposition, then the resultant conditions 
would be fair. As Scanlon would point out, assent is not necessary, but 
understanding and reasonableness is required.14 A coerced disadvantage for 
reasons that the subject and others would reasonably be expected to reject 
would thus appear to be unfair. On the other hand, an imposed disadvantage 
to which one might not necessarily assent could sometimes describe a 
condition whereby involuntary disadvantage is suffered, but not necessarily 
unfairly.  
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Take the example of ‘lifeboat etiquette’ and the common expression 
‘women and children first’: the man who must wait his turn may not assent to 
such a restriction, but might not be unfairly disadvantaged. Fairness would 
depend upon the will of the individual, and the identification of 
reasonableness, which in turn might vary with the social and cultural norms of 
the times. This idea was discussed earlier in relation to the two-way 
normativity of disadvantage, and the possibility of inappropriate evaluation. In 
the previous example of the deaf person, the point of view of the deaf person 
was the telling locus for the evaluation of goodness. Yet in the current 
example the locus of the evaluation need not rest so firmly with the 
generically disadvantaged person. The man might reject the principle of 
‘women and children first’ and express his objections against such a view, but 
if the cultural norms of the time are overwhelmingly against him, then that 
individual would be considered as being selfish, or unreasonable, and cannot 
claim to be unfairly treated. He is disadvantaged by this cultural procedure in 
virtue of his being male, but this would not be considered unfair even if he 
were compelled against his will to comply. At the risk of getting ahead of 
ourselves, this shift of locus for the appropriateness of the evaluation of 
fairness would also suggest that the will of the disadvantaged individual is 
wider than the adversely affected person alone. 
So far, it has been argued that imposed and coerced social 
disadvantages to which one might reasonably reject are nearly always unfair, 
although what counts as reasonable may be culturally dependent. The caveat 
‘nearly always’ is used in recognition that it would be reasonable for the 
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subject of certain imposed or coerced disadvantages to reject them without it 
being unfair for that reason alone. The imprisonment of offenders is a case in 
point, indicating that our investigation is still incomplete. It is important to state 
at this point that this thesis will not be concerned about fair disadvantage, 
other than as it affects the conception of unfair social disadvantage. The 
reasons why fair disadvantage must be restricted within these limits will now 
be explained.  
In general terms, it would be an inadequate moral position that claims 
that it is justifiable to ignore perhaps extreme involuntary hardship. Even 
those who might be said to deserve their disadvantage, such as the 
profligate, or reckless, are still entitled to the respect that must be afforded all 
persons in virtue of their humanity and equal moral standing. To fail to have 
concern for such persons, at least to a certain minimal level, would be to 
undermine the dignity and standing that we all share. To suggest that it is just 
to allow persons to suffer (other than voluntarily) would put such a principle of 
fairness into the perverse position of protecting the process ahead of what it 
is supposed to protect, that is, the human being as the subject of justice.  
Some final remarks will now be made which will hopefully clarify the 
relationship between fairness and disadvantage. At the risk of getting ahead 
of ourselves somewhat, the importance of voluntary choice must be stressed 
here, and this leads to the notion of will. Recall that a person might voluntarily 
accept a disadvantage without it thereby becoming unfair. The will of the 
individual can thus trump the circumstances of disadvantage. Yet when a 
person’s will has been impaired then that person is likely to have been treated 
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unfairly. This likelihood will increase if some are able to exercise unimpaired 
will whilst others are not. However, something is still missing: one’s will might 
be directed towards ends that are not compatible with mutual societal 
relationships (for example, the will of a racist). A will that is not compatible 
with such mutuality could not be accepted as reasonable by all members of 
society (particularly by those towards whom hatred is directed). Since it would 
not be reasonable to allow the full exercise of such aims within a society of 
mutual equals, such wills can be restricted without this amounting to unfair 
disadvantage. Although the matter of valuable ends will be explored later, at 
least we can say that the will thus plays a significant role in the determination 
of the fairness of disadvantage.  
The term ‘disadvantage’ then, if it is to be appropriately applied, refers 
to the circumstances (the lack of welfare, resources, or liberty) plus a 
‘consultation’ modifier. This consultation modifier, it is suggested, is the role of 
the will. The term ‘consultation’ indicates that the person affected by those 
conditions must be involved in some sort of two way relationship between her 
own autonomy and the society in which she happens to live. This relationship, 
through such things as culture, upbringing, religion, and other societal norms, 
seem to create the experience of will in the individual, and in return the 
cultural and societal norms are created by the interactions of the person 
within that society. It is this relationship that determines the normative 
assessment of reasonableness.  
Any person suffering unfair social disadvantage has not been 
‘consulted’, that is, they have not volunteered to accept those conditions, and 
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the requirements of reasonableness have not been met. This builds upon the 
idea that Derek Parfit calls the ‘Consent Principle’: that “It is wrong to treat 
anyone in any way to which this person could not rationally consent”.15 Such 
an individual, in not being consulted, loses control over the way in which her 
life will go. At best they become merely the passenger carried along in a 
direction determined by others. At worst they become a target of another’s 
malice, or the collateral damage of someone else’s will. In either case they 
are dismissed as an irrelevant moral concern. I will take such treatment to be 
stipulatively a violation of the principle of equal moral concern that the idea of 
fairness requires.   
It is the conditions that are significant here, even if the individual is 
responsible in some way for those conditions arising: the person may have 
chosen to take a risk, but this is not the same as volunteering to accept the 
conditions (more will be said on this point in chapter six). In not having a say 
on this imposition, she has not been treated as a moral equal by those 
bringing about those conditions. As such she has not been treated with the 
basic Kantian requirement as an end in herself, and thus has not been 
accorded the necessary consequential requirement of human dignity. It is the 
criterion of fairness that is modified by the will of the person, therefore without 
having the opportunity to accept or reject those circumstances, imposed and 
unreasonable conditions are unfair.  
This provides an answer to the question of when disability might be 
considered unfair: if the ‘sufferer’ has had a decisive say in the assessment of 
                                            
15
 Parfit, D., 2011a, p. 181 
Chapter Two – The Meaning of ‘Disadvantage’   
S. Magee                                     June 2012 61 
the disability as a disadvantage, then it is not unfair, but where she has no 
such autonomy, then the condition would be an unfair social disadvantage. 
This will almost always require a positive acceptance of the circumstances on 
the part of the affected person, since the remaining members of the 
community are unable to inform the criterion of reasonableness. For example, 
a deaf person might accept the condition and deny that it is a disadvantage. 
For those persons, they have exercised their will over the physical conditions 
of their disability (they have thus been ‘consulted’) and although it may meet 
the circumstances of disadvantage it is not an unfair disadvantage. It 
becomes fair because voluntarily accepted. The normative assessment of the 
variation from the species norm is made in the first way, but the best person 
to rule on the appropriateness of the normative assessment of the goodness 
or rightness of that variation (the normative evaluation in the second way) is 
the person with the condition.  
Nevertheless, there is a danger here that the disabled person might be 
retrospectively asserting positive acceptance of her condition and confusing 
this with voluntariness: it might thus be a coping mechanism; a way of 
claiming control when no such control existed. Take the example of a deaf 
person refusing to recognise her condition as a disability. Such a person 
might claim that she would freely have chosen to be deaf, or even prefer it, 
had she been given the opportunity. The attempt of the deaf person to assert 
control could then be seen as an apologistic position: it could almost be 
saying ‘do not feel sorry for me, I like it this way’. Yet the suspicion remains 
that the person is being disingenuous, particularly if that person has become 
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deaf in later life rather than being born that way. Alternatively, the assertion of 
voluntary preference for deafness could be perceived as an aggressive act of 
defiance to reject outright the concerns of other hearing persons. 
Nevertheless, these considerations present more of a practical difficulty than 
a theoretical one. The practical difficulty relates to the assessment of 
voluntariness, whereas the theoretical requirement for the existence of 
voluntariness remains unaffected. The test of wholeheartedness might then 
be applied to voluntariness to ensure that any such acceptance of a condition 
is warranted. Such a test would also entail consultation. Furthermore, if the 
evaluation of the goodness or rightness of a set of circumstances can be 
made both by the individual concerned, and by the wider society in which she 
lives, then consultation with the individual in isolation is not sufficient. As will 
be discussed in chapter five (when the nature of the will is discussed) the will 
of the individual is to be conceived in such a way that it is extended into one’s 
culture and environment. By this understanding of the will, the evaluation of 
the goodness or rightness of social disadvantage necessarily includes both 
an individual and societal component. Such a view would insulate the 
individual somewhat from the misrepresentation of a disadvantage as 
voluntarily accepted when the individual is only ‘putting a brave face’ on 
things, perhaps as an adaptive preference or other such coping mechanism. 
 
4. Conclusion 
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‘Disadvantage’ is a normative term, but it is normative in two distinct ways. In 
the first, it describes certain conditions relative to another set of conditions. 
This is the generic conception of disadvantage. In the second, these 
conditions are evaluated either positively or negatively. The evaluation of 
relative conditions between persons refers to social disadvantage. It is the 
negative characterisation of disadvantage that causes the problematic 
conflation with unfairness. It is suggested that fairness requires the treatment 
of all persons as moral equals. Disadvantage relates to the circumstances, 
but it is the will of the individual and the idea of reasonableness that connects 
this with fairness. Unfair social disadvantage thus describes those 
circumstances whereby one person or persons has relatively less of 
something compared to others, but only if that person has not been treated as 
a moral equal in the arrangements that caused that state of affairs to come 
about. It is the recognition of the unfairness that gives the ‘oughtness’ that 
something should be done to correct that situation. 
In the next chapter the appropriateness of this ‘something should be 
done’ idea will be discussed. This is the concept of social justice. The ideas of 
welfare egalitarianism, resource egalitarianism, and libertarianism provide the 
main positions in this debate. Once the conception of social justice has been 
introduced, these main positions will be explained as a grounding for the 
position taken by this thesis. It is suggested that the conception of social 
disadvantage as the unfair impairment of the will would provide a common 
ground within which all of these main positions would be compatible. 
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Chapter Three 
Social Justice and Disadvantage 
1. Introduction 
Social disadvantage, then, refers to the notion of generic disadvantage paired 
with an evaluation of the goodness or rightness of that situation. This coupling 
raises a serious challenge: is social disadvantage a proper subject of justice? 
The first part of this chapter will answer that question in discussing the debate 
surrounding the concept of social justice and its implications for those 
disadvantaged within the arrangements of the state. The second part of the 
chapter will develop the framework of the debate as a three-way argument 
between welfare egalitarianism, resource egalitarianism, and libertarianism. 
This will be presented as a literature review of the main positions. Together 
with the next chapter on capabilities, this will set the grounding for the position 
on social disadvantage that will be adopted within this thesis.  
 
2. Social Justice  
 
The pairing of the word ‘social’ with ‘justice’ suggests that justice has a 
bearing on the fairness, or rightness, of the arrangements of the state to meet 
some other concern, such as the flourishing of its citizens. As such social 
justice is usually associated with the distribution of some good, be it welfare, 
resources, or liberty, in order to meet a requirement of well-being. Yet the 
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concept of social justice is disputed, particularly by right-libertarians.1 For 
holders of these views, the idea of coupling ‘social’ with ‘justice’ is invalid. 
They assert that justice has nothing to do with social concerns. 
For right-libertarians, it is the intervention into the affairs of individuals 
in the name of justice that is problematic. Libertarians such as Robert Nozick, 
Friedrich Hayek, and Antony Flew, would invoke the rights of individuals to 
oppose the argument for social justice. On this view, the role of the state is to 
protect the interests of its citizens, and to this extent that view is held in 
common with supporters of social justice. However, for libertarians, these 
interests are narrowly conceived. They consider it to be in the interests of all 
citizens that the state does not interfere in private transactions unless this is 
to secure the liberties to conduct those transactions, or to enforce contracts. 
This claimed right to non-interference is a moral right, dependant upon the 
moral arguments of libertarianism, and would remain a moral rights claim until 
enshrined in the legal apparatus of the (minimal) state. This view will be 
explored in more detail in a moment, but first let us look at the ‘pro’ social 
justice position. 
Supporters of social justice (as an appropriate coupling) include John 
Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Scanlon, Martha Nussbaum and Amartya 
Sen. They agree that the role of the state is to secure the interests of its 
citizens, but deny that this entails protecting private transactions regardless of 
the impact upon the least well-off. Interests are now conceived much more 
widely, and are taken as referring to the well-being of all persons within the 
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state. Those that agree that the distribution of certain social goods are a 
proper concern of justice argue that fair treatment imposes responsibility upon 
the state to protect the interests of the least well-off, and those who cannot 
protect their own interests. One must also bear in mind that not all libertarians 
deny the validity of the social justice coupling: ‘left-libertarians’ such as Hillel 
Steiner argue that the protection of private transactions would require that the 
least well-off are also protected, since they have evidently had their 
entitlement to fair shares violated and would therefore warrant recompense 
from ‘over appropriators’.2 This distinction will be discussed further in Section 
Three. 
The argument thus appears to turn on the concept of well-being and 
interpretations of rights, interests and entitlements. This is not to suggest that 
well-being, or rights, or interests and entitlements, are master values or 
foundations for justice. Attention is merely drawn to these points of difference 
between the major positions. Social justice thus concerns the distribution of 
the components of well-being between all members of a society, and the 
arrangements of society to achieve a fair, or right, distribution. However, it 
must be emphasised that the idea of well-being in this sense is not intended 
to imply support for a utilitarian position: well-being is to be understood in its 
widest possible sense to mean how well a person’s life is going, regardless of 
the means that might be used to assess that condition. 
For advocates of social justice, the entitlement to fairness from others 
gives rights to have certain needs fulfilled or protected, be they for resources 
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in the case of Rawls and Dworkin, or welfare in the case of Sen. Even those 
who would deny the conception of social justice, such as Hayek and Flew, 
must still protect claimed rights to liberty. Any state founded on the advocated 
system must therefore implement the means to enforce those rights, or at 
least make arrangements to ensure compliance. In doing so, they must 
invoke moral arguments to justify their positions: typically based upon a duty 
towards others, or a simple assertion that it is the right thing to do. Yet in 
achieving those arrangements, the status of the moral argument must be 
elevated to an imperative. It would not be possible to realise the advocated 
system whilst also allowing others to opt-out. To do so would undermine that 
state, changing its identity away from the advocated model. Yet, the required 
elevation of the moral argument to an obligation is to invoke the idea of a 
moral right, and this too is problematic. 
The coupling of the term ‘moral’ with ‘right’ suggests that the moral 
argument alone can provide the necessary force to make a right. Yet moral 
arguments must remain as ‘oughts’ unless supported by some form of 
coercion or imperative condition. The conception of social justice depends on 
this move from moral argument to the establishment of rights to fair treatment, 
and would require that the ‘is-ought’ gap is filled.3 Even the libertarian claim of 
a right to equal liberty is a moral claim, and is thus faced with the same 
problem.  
There are two positions that can be taken on this problem: either the 
acceptance or denial that the is-ought gap can be filled. If one accepts that it 
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can, perhaps through the acceptance of the social framework in which 
persons must act, then the moral basis upon which the conception of social 
justice must rest is also secured: morality is as real as the human 
relationships, reactive attitudes, and interactions in which we cannot but help 
engage.4 On the other hand, if one denies that this gap can be filled then the 
basis of morality is nothing more than a relativistic social construction. Social 
justice would then be a variable conception depending upon the society and 
culture to which the concept is applied. Yet those who deny that the gap can 
be filled can still accept the conception of disadvantage, but must then regard 
this as being no more than a culturally dependent view. Nevertheless, and to 
avoid being side-tracked into this argument, so long as one accepts that 
morality is real for us (regardless of its foundations), then disadvantage is one 
amongst many of our moral concerns.  
This in turn suggests at least two types of right: those that are 
supported by coercive force, and those that are supported by an imperative 
condition. Rights that derive their compulsive force from the threat of coercion 
tend to be legal rights, whereas rights that derive their force from imperative 
conditions tend to be moral rights. Then again, certain other relationships 
such as the rights of a parent to punish their child, perhaps by imposing a 
curfew or withdrawal of privileges, might also be regarded as coercively 
enforced moral rights. The form in which rights might take is therefore 
important to the concept of well-being and social justice. 
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Leaving aside for the moment the relationship between rights and 
duties, it must suffice to say for now that many claim-rights place 
corresponding duties upon others.5 Although this ‘correspondence’ theory is 
not without dispute, the subtleties of the debate surrounding the nature of 
rights are beyond the scope of this thesis. Despite these reservations, some 
discussion will be necessary since the conception of rights is intimately 
associated with the conception of liberty. It is therefore pointed out that 
although rights often correspond with duties, this need not always, or 
necessarily, be the case. As H.L.A. Hart observed, two persons 
simultaneously finding a bank note in the street can both have a right to pick it 
up whilst neither has a duty to let the other do so.6 Therefore a right might not 
always correspond with a duty. Even in the reverse direction, the 
‘correspondence’ theory might not always hold. Alan White points out that a 
judge’s duty to pass sentence does not confer a right on the criminal to be 
punished.7 However, in either of these examples it might be suggested that 
the duty is merely owed elsewhere. Thus the right of either person picking up 
the banknote corresponds with a duty to hand it in to the police, or the duty of 
the judge (being owed to the state) corresponds with the state’s right to 
punish and not towards any right that the criminal might possess. 
Nevertheless, regardless of these subtleties, where a claimed moral right is 
asserted it must rely upon the recognition of others that they have a duty to 
comply with that claim. Without such recognition, the asserted moral claim 
must fail.  
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Legal rights holders are not vulnerable to the recognition of duty by the 
person subject to that claim. They can simply point to the authority of the 
granting institution, and even if the person against whom the claim is made 
does not recognise the duty or the authority of the institution, they can still be 
legally forced to comply. Legal rights are therefore considerably more robust 
than moral rights. Nevertheless, an interesting distinction from moral rights is 
that many legal rights can be relatively unimportant. As Michael Hartney 
points out, “there are no unimportant moral duties”, and the concept of social 
justice is wholly dependent upon these.8 Furthermore, even legal rights are 
underpinned by the moral duty to obey the law, regardless of the moral 
content of any particular law. Despite the increased motivational force, 
importance alone does not elevate a moral concern into a moral duty to 
comply with, or recognise, a claimed right. 
There are three ways in which a moral rights claim might acquire the 
compulsive force necessary for the advocated system of social justice to be 
implemented. These are the deontological argument (the argument from duty) 
the appeal to rationality (that it is the right way to behave) and the teleological 
argument (the promotion of a desired end). Yet each of these arguments 
merely postpones the justification of compulsion. If it is thought to be a matter 
of duty that one ought to conduct one’s actions in a certain way, it is not clear 
how this leads to a substantive enforceable right. Similarly, if it is thought to 
be rational that one behaves in a certain manner, it is again unclear how this 
can give the compulsive force of a right. If it is a matter of rational agreement 
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to a hypothetical contract, as John Rawls argues, just because one ought to 
agree does not give the necessary force to compel. As for the promotion of a 
desired end, then why should someone’s desire force anyone else’s 
behaviour? If one cannot enforce the required arrangement for social justice, 
that is, one cannot claim a right to do so, then all of these arguments remain 
insufficient. 
This move from an ought to an is, and the justification of the coercive 
force of a moral duty, is the Achilles’ heel of the concept of social justice. 
Although the libertarian argument must also rely on the move from an ought 
to an is, it is less vulnerable to the problem of coercion because the 
consequences of the advocated system (other than the left-libertarian 
conception) is one of minimal coercion. For the same reason, the system that 
advocates the greatest extent of coercion would be the most vulnerable to 
criticism. It is therefore the claimed moral rights in the name of social justice 
that are especially vulnerable. In particular, it is the distributive aspects of 
social justice (those that advocate coercive redistribution of goods) that come 
into conflict between claimed entitlements to goods, and claimed rights to 
remove and redistribute these goods. It is this perceived weakness that is the 
pressure point of libertarian arguments against redistribution. Nonetheless, as 
will be argued, the pressure upon the status of a moral right is misguided. It is 
founded upon the failure of the libertarian to recognise that they too rely upon 
the moral claim of equality of liberty. If the moral foundation of other 
egalitarian conceptions of social justice is inadequate, then the same 
weakness would also affect the libertarian argument. The reader is asked to 
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bear in mind the suggestion made in the introduction that a perfectionist view 
of humanity can provide a suitable moral basis.  
Turning now to the libertarian position, in which the pairing of the terms 
‘social’ with ‘justice’ is disallowed. For libertarians, such as Hayek, Flew and 
Nozick, rights follow from the conception of self-ownership and consequent 
individual entitlements to conduct one’s affairs without interference from 
others. As self-owners, persons are also owners of their labour and provided 
that they only acquire an initial fair share of natural resources, are also 
entitled to the products of that labour. Any trading that is done between self-
owners is then allowed to lead to inequalities since if goods are fairly 
transferred, then their can be no injustice.9 Since distributive justice would 
require the compulsory removal of some of these goods, the very idea of 
redistribution, and calling it ‘justice’ is an anathema to the libertarian: to be 
forced to contribute towards others would in itself be an injustice.  
Hayek regards the term ‘social justice’ as the product of “primitive 
thinking”.10 For Hayek, naïve thinkers saw the patterns produced by market 
forces, and attributed these patterns to some sort of willing agency that ought 
therefore to be subject to moral rules. It was then a matter of association that 
collective processes, such as market forces or other joint actions of persons, 
came to be attributed as fitting subjects for justice. Hayek regards such an 
account as understandable, but mistaken: 
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As primitive thinking usually does when first noticing some 
regular processes, the results of the spontaneous ordering of 
the market were interpreted as if some thinking being 
deliberately directed them, or as if particular benefits or harm 
different persons derived from them were determined by 
deliberate acts of will, and could therefore be guided by moral 
rules. This conception of ‘social’ justice is thus a direct 
consequence of that anthropomorphism or personification by 
which naïve thinking tries to account for all self-ordering 
processes.11 
 
Hayek thus regards the idea of social justice as an abuse of the word justice. 
He sees justice as the foundation and limitation of all law: as such, it is the 
safeguard of individual liberty. If justice is about the rights that an individual 
holds against others, then the idea of social justice is an oxymoron.  
Antony Flew upholds Hayek’s view that “social justice could not be 
justice”.12 Flew finds it bizarre that people should be more concerned by 
inequalities in health and inequalities in wealth than with ill health, or poverty, 
as absolutes.13 Flew looks to Aristotle for support, pointing to his view that 
justice requires that like cases should be treated alike, not that all should be 
treated equally.14 Flew would thus disregard any idea of disadvantage as a 
concern of justice, since this would be to confuse the conditions of poverty 
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with the circumstances by which those conditions came about. For Flew, 
neither the inequality nor the poverty is a concern of justice, so long as the 
rules applied to the transactions that led to this state of affairs was just. This 
only requires that persons are entitled to the holdings that they trade, and that 
such transactions are voluntarily made.15  
Yet the authority of Aristotle can also point the other way: “by doing the 
acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or 
unjust”.16 This would suggest that the outcome of those transactions, and not 
just the process, is a matter of justice. Since the question in dispute relates to 
the place of justice in the distribution of goods, Aristotle seems to be clearly of 
the view that both transactions and the outcomes are appropriate subjects. 
One could thus have an assessment of the justness of a transactional 
process, an assessment of the justness of the resultant distribution, and an 
assessment of the justness of the persons involved.  As Martha Nussbaum 
points out “the Aristotelian account insists that the good of a human being is 
both social and political”.17 The idea of social justice thus seems entirely 
consistent with Aristotelianism. Although Flew wants to restrict justice to the 
transactional aspects alone, he cannot successfully use Aristotle to support 
his assertion that ‘social’ is not a proper coupling with ‘justice’. 
Robert Nozick is a little more comfortable with the pairing, but argues 
that social justice is not about distribution at all: it is about entitlement. He 
gives the example of ten Robinson Crusoes, each working alone for several 
                                            
15
 Flew, A., 1986, pp. 31-40 
16
 Aristotle, 1980, p. 29 (NE Book II, Sec.1) 
17
 Nussbaum, M., 2007, p. 86 
Chapter Three – Social Justice and Disadvantage   
S. Magee                                     June 2012 75 
years on separate islands, and asks a rhetorical question: if they 
simultaneously found radios that allowed them to communicate with each 
other, and discovered that some lived better than others, would the 
awareness of the differences now make them a suitable subject of justice?18 
Nozick suggests that any claim of unfairness would be misplaced. Indeed, it 
would be an injustice if goods that one person has created by his own efforts 
were taken away to give to someone else who had done nothing to earn 
them. However, since our discussion here relates only to the conception of 
social justice, further details of Nozick’s argument must wait for a moment, 
but it would certainly appear that Nozick has a case. 
So what is justice? Flew criticises Rawls for assuming that readers will 
understand what it is, although he asserts that Rawls does not offer any 
explanation.19 Flew therefore says that the title of A Theory of Justice is 
misleading because Rawls does not look at justice, but only at one of its 
subsets.20 In his defence, Rawls does equate justice with fairness, although 
he does not then go on to explain what he means by fairness.21 As a Kantian 
constructivist, the idea of treating all persons as moral equals (together with 
the requirement for impartiality that underpins the use of the veil of ignorance) 
can be taken as the basis for Rawls’s conception of fairness.22 This being the 
case, it is suggested that Flew over-eggs his assertion: fairness is not a 
subset of justice, it is foundational to justice. 
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Although the legitimacy of the terms ‘social justice’ and ‘distributive 
justice’ remain the subject of debate, this appears to be disputed only by 
those who wish to prioritise liberty. As Amartya Sen points out, these 
objections rest on a failure of libertarians to recognise that they are 
themselves egalitarians: but that their libertarianism advocates individual 
liberty as the good that is to be distributed equally.23 Social justice to the 
libertarian can therefore be interpreted as the view that individuals are entitled 
to equal liberty, and that those persons denied such liberty have been treated 
unfairly. 
The advocacy of equality of liberty is a moral view, just as it is for 
equality of resources, or equality of welfare. As moral views, they each make 
a judgement of fairness. Without making the commitment that justice is the 
same thing as fairness (this argument has not been made) it is reasonable to 
say that when a person has been treated unfairly, then they have suffered an 
injustice. Equality of liberty is thus a normative position too: it gives a 
standard for which liberty is to be applied to all persons, that is, equally, and 
upholds this position as a good to be pursued. So, if an individual has been 
denied equality of liberty as a moral equal by another person or persons, then 
that individual has been treated unjustly. If such an injustice is the 
consequence of the arrangements of a particular society, then one can say 
that the person has suffered a social injustice. It will therefore be accepted 
that ‘social’ and ‘justice’ is an appropriate pairing of these two terms. 
Nonetheless, even if we accept this pairing, it still remains to identify which 
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aspect (welfare, resources, or liberty) ought to be prioritised, if any, in the 
description of disadvantage. It is this question to which we turn next. 
 
3. Distribution of What? 
 
It is commonplace within political philosophy, particularly where distributive 
justice is concerned, to label certain authors as ‘welfarists’, or ‘resource 
egalitarians’, or ‘libertarians’, or other such term based on their favoured 
priority. Thus Nussbaum, and Sen (along with the classical utilitarians) are 
labelled as welfarists, Rawls and Dworkin are labelled as resource 
egalitarians, and Hayek, Flew and Nozick, are regarded as exemplars of 
libertarianism. Each label is intended to simplistically identify which of the 
three aspects is favoured. However, such labels imply that these three 
aspects are somehow incommensurable, or that the unfavoured aspects are 
less important, or that prioritising just one aspect will also address 
inadequacies in the other dimensions.  
The use of labels in this way is too simplistic, and does not accurately 
reflect the views of any of these authors. For example, Nussbaum allows 
certain freedoms and resource possessions in her list of vital goods; Sen 
incorporates liberty into terms such as ‘well-being freedom’ and ‘agency 
freedom’; Rawls includes space for liberty and welfare; and Dworkin allows a 
compromise of resource distribution to account for bad brute luck, thus 
incorporating elements of welfare.24 Even libertarians recognise that persons 
                                            
24
 Rawls, J., 1999, p. 54; Dworkin, R., 2000, pp. 73-83; Nussbaum, M., 2001, pp. 223-5; 
2011, pp. 33-34; Sen, A., 1995, pp. 49-53 
Chapter Three – Social Justice and Disadvantage   
S. Magee                                     June 2012 78 
with disabilities, or those in abject poverty, need to be supported although 
they usually rely on charitable giving or philanthropy as the preferred means 
of addressing this, rather than as a requirement of justice (‘left-libertarians’ 
excepting).25 
In the following section (subdivided into three parts) the main positions 
on distributive justice will be discussed. These ‘traditional’ positions prioritise 
either the distribution of welfare, resources, or liberty. The section will be 
presented as a review of these positions in which it will be shown that, 
although each view expresses something important about disadvantage, each 
is ultimately unsatisfactory. They are unsatisfactory because none of these 
‘monist’ views can express social disadvantage in a sufficiently 
comprehensive way: in prioritising the favoured position they necessarily 
neglect the other aspects. This would suggest that there is something more 
fundamental by which disadvantage can be assessed. The subject of welfare 
will be taken first. 
 
3.1 Distribution of Welfare 
Broadly speaking, the term ‘welfare’ refers to the intrinsically valued aspects 
of a person’s life. These are things that persons might regard as important for 
their own sake, such as pleasure, satisfaction of preferences, good health, 
happiness, loving relationships, leisure, living without fear, and such like. This 
may even include liberty, but the advocate of welfare distribution would 
typically consider liberty to be a contingent variable, rather than as a 
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fundamental component of well-being. These items may be judged by the 
individual concerned, or by an external (supposedly objective) set of values, 
or a combination of internal and external judgements on how a person’s life is 
going. Welfare can include some, or all of these components, but may also 
refer to one aspect to be promoted independently of the others as a means by 
which to pursue the good life.  
The main theory of social justice as the promotion of welfare is 
utilitarianism. Classical utilitarianism, such as advocated by Jeremy Bentham 
or J.S. Mill, conceives utility as the maximisation of happiness, but variations 
are also possible, such as the maximisation of preference satisfaction, or the 
promotion of rules or acts designed to have that effect.26 All such theories 
evaluate the good (and the degree of goodness) according to the 
consequences that follow. Thus utilitarianism is a type of consequentialist 
theory: an act is good or right if it results in the most benefits for the most 
persons, that is, utility is a good to be maximised. Nevertheless, difficulties 
arise when one must adjudicate between extreme benefits for a few, say, or 
negligible benefit for a large number, given that both situations express the 
same overall utility increase. 
This maximisation principle can be achieved in two distinct ways: one 
might adopt the principle so as to always act in such a way as to produce the 
most good, or one might work out a system of rules to be applied with the 
view that following such a system will produce the most good overall. The two 
main forms of consequentialism thus depend upon which principle is 
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considered to be fundamental: actions, or rule-following. Act-utilitarians claim 
that the rightness of an act depends upon whether or not it increases utility.27 
Rule-utilitarians claim that the rightness of an act depends upon the terms of 
the rules selected for their utility.28  
There is also a third possibility, which incorporates a normative 
standard into the consequentialist approach (this is not to suggest that the 
previously discussed conceptions were not normative). By this view a 
standard, or average, or ideal, is used as a comparator for the application of 
the utilitarian rule. Thus one might act so as to move the maximum number of 
persons above some standard level of benefit. Dworkin calls such a view the 
‘objective’ conception of welfare.29 
Despite these variations, the problem for those least well-off under any 
utilitarian scheme is that it is less concerned with the individual than it is with 
the quantification. Thus even severe disadvantages might be allowed to 
persist so long as sufficient numbers of others are satisfied. Even widespread 
mild social disadvantage might be offset by extreme happiness for a few. As 
Rawls puts it “[u]tilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between 
persons”.30 They are reduced to numbers: mere vehicles upon which a 
calculation of satisfaction and dissatisfaction is made. There is a moral 
disconnection between the individual and the system to be applied. The idea 
of fairness towards an individual that might be suffering from disadvantages is 
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thus divorced from the assessment of fairness as applied to the society as a 
whole (with fairness assessed in terms of utility). 
Whichever principle is chosen, each is assessed according to 
psychological benefit and the degree to which this is achieved. Ronald 
Dworkin thus categorises welfare theories as either “success theories”, 
“conscious state theories”, or “objective conceptions”.31 Yet such 
categorisation does not fit neatly into the ‘act’ or ‘rule’ models of utility. 
Success in fulfilling preferences, or achieving happiness, might be gained by 
following either an act or rule consequentialist principle. Likewise conscious 
state theories might be described in terms of either approach too, although 
objective conceptions would lend themselves more to rule-consequentialism.  
Given that the search here is in regard to the conception of 
disadvantage, the act/rule distinction is not as helpful in this matter as the 
distinctions that Dworkin uses. This is because an analysis of disadvantage 
which is dependent upon the conception of the consequentialist principle by 
which it was measured would not be analysis of disadvantage at all: it would 
be an analysis of consequentialism. For example, if disadvantage were 
measured by a happiness metric, in an act-utilitarian society one could be 
described as disadvantaged if one had less happiness despite following the 
utilitarian policy. This must therefore be offset by the greater happiness in 
others, and the individual’s misfortune is of little concern unless some other 
act could result in a superior overall position. In a rule-utilitarian society, the 
individual’s unhappiness would again be of no concern unless a policy rule 
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had not been followed. In either case justice would not be a matter of 
individual concern, but a matter of structural adherence. The act/rule 
distinctions between various forms of welfare theory are more frequently 
encountered, but do not emphasise the role of the individual quite as well as 
Dworkin’s characterisation. The Dworkinian characterisation will therefore be 
adopted here. 
Success theories recommend that a person has equality of success in 
fulfilling his preferences, goals and ambitions. Distribution should therefore be 
carried out until no further transfer can decrease the extent to which people 
differ in such success. Dworkin further subdivides success theories into i) 
political preferences (about goods and resource distribution) ii) impersonal 
preferences (those preferences not directed towards an individual’s own life, 
for example, the preservation of great works of art, or the promotion of 
scientific achievement) and iii) personal preferences (about the individual’s 
own situation). Equality of success can therefore be expressed in terms of 
these three preferences. 
 Conscious state theories hold that distribution should leave people 
equal in some aspect of their conscious life, such as happiness, pleasure, 
freedom from pain, and so forth. Dworkin uses the terms ‘enjoyment’ and 
‘dissatisfaction’ to cover these variants.32 Conscious state theories can also 
be expressed in the same three forms as success theories regarding the 
source of enjoyment or dissatisfaction. 
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 Dworkin only briefly discusses objective conceptions and quickly 
dismisses these as overly paternalistic, unreliable, and being of questionable 
objectivity. Dworkin points out that such conceptions judge welfare against 
some supposedly ‘objective’ metric, adding that these conceptions of welfare 
will depend on the availability of knowledge about how others are doing. This 
raises problems of changing preferences over time, and the ‘factual status’ of 
a supposedly objective measure of welfare. Although cultural circumstances 
will affect a person’s internal judgement of their own well-being, these 
circumstances will also impact upon external (objective) assessment of those 
welfare components of well-being. Thus any individual will have many of their 
own preferences, pleasures, leisure requirements and so forth determined by 
the culture in which they live, or are raised.  
The attempt to determine external measures of welfare may also be 
affected by the cultures of those setting the criteria for welfare. This is not to 
suggest that there might be any attempt on the part of those who might set 
such assessment criteria to deliberately disregard objectivity. One cannot 
stand outside of one’s experiences, or outside of one’s culture and 
background. Given that all persons are immersed in their own cultures, it 
seems inevitable that any attempt at objectivity will itself be pervaded by the 
assessor’s cultural ideals.33 Furthermore, since many aspects of welfare may 
be psychological, it seems unlikely, or at least difficult, to convincingly show 
that a ‘pure’ objective judgement of welfare is possible. 
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 Despite these concerns, Dworkin’s dismissal of objective measures is 
too swift. Although the terms used to describe welfare have limitations and 
distortions caused by differences in individual expectations, some objective 
measures might still be employed to gain a representation of these attributes. 
Such measures might include longevity, infant mortality, adult literacy, leisure 
time, illness, and crime rates. These are measures used by the UN Human 
Development Index.34  Even though personal objectives may change over 
time as Dworkin suggests, and taking into account the caveat regarding 
cultural impact upon welfare judgement criteria, objective measures such as 
these have remained generally consistent over time and across cultures. 
These might at least express a core of fairly stable interpersonal indicators of 
objective welfare.  
One form of personal success theory presents a particular problem for 
welfare egalitarians. This is the well-known “expensive tastes” problem.35 
Equality of welfare would require that persons with less welfare than others 
receive additional resources to compensate, or raise welfare to the same 
level that others enjoy. Dworkin takes such a view to be committed to doing 
so regardless of the cause of the shortfall, and regardless of the responsibility 
of the person suffering that shortfall for any actions that led to it. Thus 
someone who acquires expensive tastes should receive extra resources, 
regardless of whether this expensive taste is acquired deliberately or 
accidentally. If Dworkin is correct, this has the potential to compromise or 
contradict the views of those who would recommend a principle of equality of 
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welfare, since it seems committed to redistribution from the poor to the 
wealthy, when the motivations of egalitarianism would prefer the other way 
around.  
Dworkin offers the example of Louis, who would like to cultivate his 
expensive tastes. He has the following options: a) keep his present resources 
and do without the tastes he wants to cultivate, b) keep the resources he has, 
cultivate his expensive taste, but enjoy less overall welfare, or c) expect 
others to give up some of their share to allow him more resources so that he 
can have his expensive tastes and the same overall welfare as everyone 
else. It seems wrong that option c) is permitted because it would require the 
previously fair shares of everyone else to be reduced.  
So why should Louis not be allowed to choose the path that he 
believes will make his life go better for him? On the other hand, it does seem 
that deliberately cultivating a taste for plovers’ eggs, or fine claret (Dworkin’s 
examples) is a reckless choice that could easily have been avoided, without 
any penalty for Louis’s welfare. If so, then why should other persons be 
expected to pay for Louis’s inconsiderate or irresponsible behaviour? Even if 
he had not deliberately chosen to acquire his expensive tastes, but just simply 
had them, Dworkin suggests that the distinction between voluntary choice and 
natural propensity is not as significant as some might think: rarely are such 
deliberate choices voluntary “all the way down”.36 Assuming that equal overall 
success is the aim, if a claim for extra resources is to be accepted, it must be 
because Louis’s previous shares were founded on a mistaken assessment of 
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his needs. Louis has reflected on his life and recognised that something is 
lacking. He therefore asks for a readjustment. This view of equality in welfare 
must therefore discourage people from reflecting on their lives in ways that 
might leave them dissatisfied.37 Dworkin believes that this is embarrassing for 
adherents of equality of welfare success because it suggests that it should be 
founded on a principle of efficiency, rather than the claimed ideal, otherwise 
those who advocate equality have no option but to compensate for expensive 
tastes. The consequence of discouragement of experimentation in tastes 
would then produce a very dull, monotonous and unattractive community. 
Dworkin then points to a further difficulty by offering the example of 
Jude, a person with simple tastes who gets just as much enjoyment from life 
as others with much larger shares of resources. If Jude becomes interested in 
a more expensive lifestyle, how can we reasonably refuse? He is not asking 
for any more than anyone else, yet Jude’s taste could be just as expensive. 
The only way, Dworkin says, that this can be explained is by an appeal to 
equality of resources:  
 
Louis asks that more than an equal share of social resources 
be put at the disposal of his life, while Jude asks only that 
something closer to an equal share be put at the disposal of 
his. We need the idea of fair shares (in this particular case the 
idea of an equal share of resources) in order to express the 
force of this difference.38  
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In summary of Dworkin’s argument, he claims that welfare understood 
as an objective conception can be rejected, even though it has been 
suggested that this may not be the case. He then concentrates on success 
theories of welfare, and claims that they too can be rejected because they 
would be unable to meet the problem of expensive tastes. It will now be 
shown why this objection is not fatal to welfarist views (although it must be 
emphasised that it is not intended to advocate welfare conceptions within this 
thesis). 
Dworkin’s suggestion that equal success in impersonal preferences is 
committed to potentially outlandish expenditure does not necessarily follow. 
Dworkin’s statement regarding how he shall understand liberty, that is, in 
negative terms only, leads him to consider equal opportunity to welfare as 
simply “equality of welfare under another name”.39 His argument is that 
personal choice, subject to both option and brute luck, is fundamental to 
questions of distribution, responsibility for choice, and entitlement. Equality of 
opportunity, then, is about ensuring that bad brute luck is compensated, but 
not option luck. The attempt to isolate option luck would always be 
unsuccessful, as the earlier “all the way down” comment suggests.40 Dworkin 
therefore concludes that equality of opportunity is a form of equality of 
compensation for option luck, and would thus be susceptible to the same 
problems. However, equality of opportunity only requires that the procedural 
choice component remains equal, not the outcome. Thus if a person chooses 
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to expend effort on training to achieve a certain career, and so long as others 
have also had the same opportunity, one cannot claim compensation for not 
getting the job without putting in the necessary effort. The choice to train is 
then an aspect of option luck inasmuch as certain consequences would be 
expected to follow from that choice.  
Dworkin asserts that the welfare egalitarian is committed to 
compensating those for whom only expensive goods give average welfare, or 
for whom cheap goods no longer give average welfare. This commitment 
arises, he suggests, because success theories of welfare are insensitive to 
personal responsibility and ambition. Yet this commitment only follows when 
liberty is defined negatively, as Dworkin specifies in Sovereign Virtue.41 By 
Dworkin’s account, Louis is disadvantaged since he is not at liberty to escape 
his condition: his welfare is thwarted not by his expensive tastes but by the 
actions of others in preventing him from meeting his ‘needs’. However, when 
liberty is conceived positively, Louis is not disadvantaged at all by his 
expensive tastes so long as he is as free as everyone else to seek to satisfy 
his personal tastes. Louis’s welfare is only thwarted if he is not prepared to 
sacrifice other aspects of his life to pursue those tastes (such as foregoing 
other luxuries, or taking on extra work, or using savings). If he simply cannot 
afford those expensive tastes, then his lack of liberty is not a welfare issue at 
all. The welfare egalitarian, in its success variation, can be sufficiently 
sensitive to personal responsibility simply by ensuring that each person has 
an equal opportunity for success.  
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For Dworkin, it is the idea of luck that gives the necessary connection 
between responsibility for one’s choices, and the actual distributive pattern. 
Take Louis’s example, before he decides to cultivate his expensive tastes, he 
has average welfare, and at a low cost to satisfy that level of welfare. At the 
moment he decides to cultivate his expensive taste, his welfare goes down to 
below average because he is now dissatisfied, although his costs remain low. 
What has happened here can now be seen to be the result of option luck, 
rather than brute bad luck. So long as he has had the same sort of options as 
everyone else, opportunity, conceived as a component of liberty, is not 
committed to compensating bad option luck.  
Similarly in the case of Jude, before he decided to demand the same 
resources as everyone else, his welfare was average, but his costs were low. 
Once he makes the decision that he wants more, he becomes dissatisfied 
and his welfare falls. Yet this too is now a result of his choice, and therefore 
constitutive of option luck. Under the revised form of liberty in which it is the 
process of opportunity which is important and not the outcome, the welfare 
egalitarian would not be committed to compensation on these grounds alone. 
Nevertheless, this may still be ‘embarrassing’ for welfare egalitarians since it 
would advocate denying Jude a more equal share. This may not be a problem 
since all that is indicated is that Jude is not entitled to more welfare on the 
grounds of option luck, but he may nevertheless be entitled to more according 
some other principle, such as the claimed ‘rightness’ of the principle of equal 
welfare, or even the principle of equal concern that Dworkin advocates for 
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resource egalitarians. Welfare egalitarians need not discourage persons from 
reflecting on their circumstances.  
What might remain embarrassing, on the face of it, is that the person 
born with expensive tastes would still merit compensation (although this might 
still be a defensible position). If Louis was now so miserable from being 
deprived of plovers’ eggs and fine claret that he no longer saw his life as 
worthwhile, he might perhaps become severely depressed or even suicidal. 
This would suggest that not only is Louis unable to satisfy his expensive 
tastes, but that his whole life is set on achieving them. This one-dimensional 
view of a person’s life is rather far-fetched: does he have no other interests? 
Can he not put up with the inability to satisfy this aspect of his life by pursuing 
other, cheaper interests? If things are that bad from a failure to succeed in a 
personal preference, then this is so far out of the normal range that it must be 
considered to be a mental health issue. If he does suffer severe depression, 
then welfare egalitarians are still committed to help, but not necessarily by 
satisfying this particular preference.  
Nevertheless, the aim here is not to defend welfare egalitarianism, it is 
merely to point out that Dworkin’s objection is not necessarily fatal, and that 
welfare might therefore still be a valid means of assessing disadvantage. 
However, we can agree with Flew that it is embarrassing for egalitarians that 
success theories care more about positional arrangements than suffering, 
and agree with Dworkin that equality of welfare may have problems in relation 
to  compensating for ‘natural’ expensive tastes.  
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Yet Dworkin’s turn to the distribution of resources does not exhaust the 
alternatives: his arguments against welfare do not impact upon a perfectionist 
reading of humanity. The idea of perfectionism will be discussed further in 
chapter six, and can accept that the person with expensive tastes could be 
disadvantaged (in the traditional sense), but not unfairly. Since such tastes do 
not align with a perfectionist view (they do not contribute towards mutually-
dependent self-realisation) they do not warrant compensation. Furthermore, if 
one accepts that what is important is that people have enough, not that they 
have the same (as Frankfurt suggests) then Dworkin’s attack on welfare 
egalitarianism simply becomes further support for that position.42 
Unfortunately for Dworkin, that same Frankfurtian position would reject the 
resources egalitarianism that he favours (as will be discussed in chapter 
seven). 
We have now described some of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
welfare view of social justice. It has been suggested that the distribution of 
welfare does identify some important aspects of social disadvantage, but that 
it is not sufficiently flexible to answer all of the objections, or encompass all of 
the relevant features. Let us now examine social justice in the form of the 
distribution of resources to see if this can do any better. 
 
3.2  Distribution of Resources 
The main advocates of resources as the appropriate subject for distributive 
justice are John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. Rawls suggests a list of primary 
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goods that comprise the resources that he suggests are necessary to define 
the least advantaged persons. These goods, along with the principles of 
justice, are chosen by representative persons behind a veil of ignorance 
about their eventual place in the society.43 The primary goods determine “the 
various social conditions and all-purpose means that are generally necessary 
to enable citizens adequately to develop and fully exercise their two moral 
powers, and to pursue their determinate conceptions of the good”.44 These 
two moral powers are the capacity for a conception of the good, and a 
capacity for a sense of justice. The list of primary goods contains all those 
things necessary for persons to thrive according to their self-determined 
autonomous choice of the good, that is, in accordance with the development 
and exercise of will within a framework of the good (so conceived). Rawls’s 
list in its final form: 
 
(i) The basic rights and liberties: freedom of thought and liberty 
of conscience and the rest […] 
(ii) Freedom of movement and free choice of occupation against 
a background of diverse opportunities […] 
(iii) Powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of authority 
and responsibility. 
(iv) Income and wealth, understood as all-purpose means 
(having an exchange value) generally needed to achieve a wide 
range of ends whatever they may be. 
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(v) the social bases of self-respect.45 
 
The addition of the social bases of self-respect to the list blurs the distinction 
between resources and welfare, since self-respect might more readily be 
considered to be an aspect of welfare rather than a resource. Similarly, the 
addition of various liberties blurs the distinction between resources and 
liberty. Only item (iv) directly relates to resources in terms of material things. 
In fact the first three items refer to liberties, or components of liberty. Even the 
final item, self-respect, is dependent on the achievement of the first three 
items, rather than item (iv): it is quite possible that a person can have self-
respect without wealth, but it would be much more difficult to achieve self-
respect without items (i) to (iii). Rawls’s list of primary goods can thus be said 
to be intrinsically dependent on the realisation of the priority of liberty, and 
that therefore the proper conception of liberty is a vital concern to the 
distribution of resources.  
Rawls suggests that these primary goods are to be distributed 
according to two principles of justice.46 These principles have been refined 
somewhat since the first version of A Theory of Justice, but the basic 
implication towards those disadvantaged within the arrangements of the state 
has remained the same: persons cannot become increasingly wealthy without 
also ensuring that the least well-off also benefit in the process. Rawls calls 
this ‘the difference principle’. The final form of the two principles of justice are: 
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(a) Each person is to have the same indefeasible claim to a fully 
adequate scheme of equal liberties, which scheme is compatible 
with the same scheme of liberties for all; and 
(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two 
conditions: first they are to be attached to offices and positions 
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and 
second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-
advantaged members of society (the difference principle).47 
 
Notice that Rawls requires that the least well-off benefit to the greatest extent 
possible by the activities of those better off. Here at last is a theory of social 
justice which puts the socially disadvantaged at the centre, if only those least 
well-off could be identified, and if only the wills of those individuals affected by 
such conditions could be better taken into account (a shortcoming that this 
thesis hopes to address).  
We can agree with Rawls that the term ‘resources’ refers not only to 
physical materials, such as money, property, and wealth, but must also add 
knowledge, skills, and access to recreational activities. It can even include 
such intangibles as education, natural talents, or the availability of assistance 
that might result from personal friendships or mutual co-operation. What 
makes all these things resources is that they are necessities to achieve the 
individual or group’s own self-identified ends.  
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Yet these intangibles further blur the distinction between resources and 
welfare. Take the lack of natural talents, or lack of knowledge, for example: 
although one’s abilities are a resource accessible mainly to oneself (coercion 
aside), they are wholly under the control of the will of the individual and need 
not only be seen as means to certain ends. Thus a person with a natural 
talent for running may take up jogging for the enjoyment of the exercise, 
without experiencing that talent as a resource to some other end. Likewise, 
education for its own sake can be considered as a matter of welfare, rather 
than resources. Thus persons wishing to take non-vocational courses might 
do so for the pleasure of the experience and the enjoyment of the subject. 
However, in both situations it seems that individual choice is an important 
factor in determining whether such a talent, or possession of knowledge, is to 
be regarded as a resource or welfare issue. This would suggest that the will 
can have a decisive role upon whether a lack of such intangibles ought to be 
considered as resource or welfare deficiencies. When we consider the 
implications for the conception of disadvantage, this would cast doubt on the 
adequacy of either of these categorisations to fully capture what it means to 
be disadvantaged.  
Furthermore, the exercise of intangible resources for their own sake 
nearly always provides additional resources to that individual without 
diminishing the resources available to others. Thus the provision of education 
for enjoyment can enhance the abilities of the individual in other areas (such 
as mental concentration, problem solving abilities, organisational skills and so 
forth) which may then be useful additional resources. Similarly, the enjoyment 
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of jogging can enhance the individual’s stamina, muscle tone, speed, and 
such like, which may then become additional resources that the individual 
may draw upon when physical demands are made of them. In either situation 
the increase in resources might even become indirectly apparent in the basic 
structure of the society (for example, if the workforce voluntarily took up 
regular exercise, became fitter and more productive, and suffered less 
sickness absence as a result). Since such increases in resources would make 
no direct difference to the least well off, the difference principle would be 
impossible to apply in these cases (unless a zero is accepted as meeting the 
‘greatest benefit’ requirement).  
Perhaps for these reasons Rawls does not specify such other items, 
although each of these items might be included in the list of primary goods in 
view of the contribution each makes towards an individual’s self-respect. 
Other intangibles might also be added, such as friendship, or access to 
leisure, but it would seem odd to only include such things inasmuch as they 
might contribute towards another individual’s ego. Again this would be to 
consider friendship or leisure as being valuable only instrumentally. Likewise, 
knowledge could only be considered to be a primary good if it adds to self-
respect, choice of occupation, or powers of office. Knowledge that is sought 
for its own intrinsic value cannot thus be considered as primary, even if it 
might also contribute towards the individual’s two moral powers. The author 
would therefore agree with Rawls’s justificatory criteria for items to include on 
the list of primary goods, but would add the social and educational 
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contributors that assist in the development of the individual’s two moral 
powers (even though the difference principle could not be applied).  
Let us turn next to Ronald Dworkin, the other main advocate of 
resources as the appropriate metric for distributive justice. Dworkin suggests 
that the market place for goods and services must be at the centre of any 
principle of equality of resources.48 Even so, it would not be fair to share 
resources without regard for each person’s preferences, choices, and 
willingness to work. He therefore suggests an ‘envy test’ in order to determine 
fair division across a spectrum of time, choices, abilities, effort and luck: 
equality is when no one would rather have anyone else’s bundle of resources, 
conceived as a total across this spectrum.49  
Under equality of welfare, according to Dworkin, people decide what 
sort of lives they want independently of how much their choices will cost 
others. Under equality of resources how much people pursue is set against a 
background of available resources and the effect of choice of lifestyle upon 
others.50 Dworkin proposes a hypothetical auction to mimic the function of a 
market place, but with a long drawn out process in which all goods, or part 
lots, are subject to an auction, and in which persons can choose to exchange 
bundles at any time. The fair distribution has been reached when no one 
would prefer anyone else’s bundle to their own.  
To overcome the problem of bad brute luck, Dworkin makes another 
suggestion: an insurance market to run alongside the auction. This will allow 
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future consequences of the auction to be assessed. Since some persons will 
become more skilled at producing goods, some will be better than others as a 
result of better natural endowments and post-auction fortunes. So when 
bundles are conceived diachronically, including the effort and sacrifices that 
the skilled producer may have made, perhaps such a bundle would not be 
envied. Dworkin suggests that an insurance premium that guaranteed a high 
level of income (despite lack of talents, or laziness) would be too expensive to 
be worthwhile, therefore insurance would only be reasonably purchased if the 
guaranteed level of income approached that which could be reasonably 
expected, that is, a moderate income. Still, there is a potential conflict 
between talent and equality: 
 
On the one hand we must, on pain of violating equality, allow 
the distribution of resources at any particular moment to be (as 
we might say) ambition sensitive. [It must reflect the choices to 
work hard, or save, or squander]. But on the other hand, we 
must not allow the distribution of resources at any moment to be 
endowment-sensitive, that is, to be affected by differences in 
ability [given the same ambitions].51  
 
Can a compromise be reached? Dworkin suggests that taxation can form a 
suitable stand-in for the hypothetical insurance scheme, suitably weighted so 
that those on the higher income pay more tax than those on lower incomes. 
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Taxation is both ambition sensitive and appropriately endowment sensitive. 
Endowment sensitivity is appropriate when it makes a distinction between 
talents and handicaps. Talents do not simply differ as a matter of degree: we 
do not say that someone without the skill of Wayne Rooney is therefore 
handicapped.52 Talent and handicaps both emphasise the genetic and luck 
components of natural endowments, but the relationship between skills and 
ambitions must also be accommodated in any taxation scheme.  
We might ask what level of insurance a person might have bought 
against not having been born with a certain level of skill, in much the same 
way as it is commercially possible to insure against a child’s being born with a 
handicap. This is further complicated because a person may be born with a 
talent that has little prospect for employment, for example, the talent might be 
as a contortionist, or playing the kazoo. Just knowing that persons will have 
different talents does not give an accurate account of how much income they 
may expect to receive from it. Yet it might still be possible to generalise, given 
sufficient information on the range of talents available, and expected 
economic value.  
Dworkin borrows the ‘veil of ignorance’ from Rawls, albeit in a 
gossamer-thin version, to suggest that although people are aware of their 
talents, they have no way of predicting how valuable such a talent might be to 
others in the marketplace.53 For Dworkin, this veil is not a device of 
representation, but is in recognition of how an actual state of affairs might be 
used to predict a social outcome. Dworkin suggests that if all the relevant 
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data, such as tastes, ambitions, attitudes and so forth for each individual, 
together with information regarding available raw materials and technology, a 
computer might be able to calculate a projected income structure.54  
Insurance might then be bought to guard against poverty, paid for from future 
earnings after the auction.  
In many ways, this is similar to placing a bet, but since the chances of 
not ‘winning’ are reasonably high (not being a top earner) so will be the cost 
of the premium, paid in the form of taxation. The argument becomes stronger 
for those near the bottom of the earning pile, and since those with the lower 
incomes (or same as or equal to the mean) will be the vast majority, the 
argument to pay insurance when the outcome is not known (behind Dworkin’s 
own veil of ignorance) will be compelling. Then again, as the actual income 
drops, so the penalties of losing the bet become less significant, therefore, 
the lesser the required premium, that is, lower incomes should be taxed at a 
lesser rate than those at a higher income.  
Unfortunately for Dworkin, the distinction between brute luck and 
option luck is not ‘clean’ inasmuch as both are blurred by the choices that 
persons make. If I choose not to buy insurance, and do not suffer bad luck, 
then I am better off than someone else who did purchase the insurance. If 
things had gone the other way, then the person buying insurance would have 
been better off. Therefore my choice has a bearing on the outcome 
independently of the actual occurrence of bad brute luck. Kasper Lippert-
Rasmussen makes a similar observation in relation to two farmers choosing 
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to insure against the loss of their crops: one chooses to insure against flood, 
whilst the other against drought.55 The actual occurrence of drought would 
mean that one person’s option luck becomes another person’s brute bad luck.  
Perhaps the most telling objection against the prioritisation of 
resources, applicable to both Rawls and Dworkin, is that such a focus is 
misdirected. It prioritises those aspects of life which are merely instrumentally 
valuable rather than intrinsically valuable. This is the charge levelled by the 
advocate of welfare conceptions of social justice. Resources are not valuable 
in themselves: they are only important inasmuch as they give access to the 
things we actually value. The claim of the welfare egalitarian is therefore that 
we should focus on those aspects of life that are important, such as 
happiness or other such valuable constituent of well-being. Even freedom can 
be framed as being of only instrumental value in this way, but when 
conceived as a resource, such conceptions are both misdirected and 
inefficient. As Sen puts it “[t]o judge equality […] in the space of primary 
goods amounts to giving priority to the means of freedom over any 
assessment of the extents of freedom”.56 Such a misdirected conception 
leads to the regard of the pauper and the wealthy as having an equal liberty 
to sail around the world, when one has only a formal freedom whilst the other 
also has the effective freedom. We will explore this issue further in chapter 
four.  
In summary of this section, it has been shown that neither Rawls, nor 
Dworkin, have been able to demonstrate that the prioritisation of resources is 
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sufficient to produce an adequate account of disadvantage. Indeed, Rawls 
even admits this problem. Furthermore Rawls’s attempts to produce a 
comprehensive list of primary goods is a compromise: these goods can only 
be considered to be ‘resources’ when stretching the meaning of that term. 
Rawls thus counts aspects that one would normally regard as liberties or 
welfare within his account of resources. This in itself is a tacit admission that 
resources alone are inadequate as a metric to describe the situation of the 
least well-off.  
Yet despite Dworkin’s intention to favour some form of resources 
egalitarianism, he is still unable to answer the welfarist’s accusation that such 
resources are only instrumentally valuable. Rawls is less vulnerable to this 
criticism since he does include welfare elements as primary goods. 
Nevertheless, both are vulnerable to the accusation of the libertarian that they 
are more fixated on procedural matters of inequality than the suffering itself. 
Let us see if the argument for the equal distribution of liberty fares any better. 
 
3.3 Distribution of Liberty 
For libertarians, the principle of distributing goods such as property and 
wealth is to ignore claims to legitimate possession, and assumes that all such 
goods begin as collectively owned. As Flew argues: “for if they are not, then 
by what right is this contracting collective to redistribute these goods – and 
exclusively amongst themselves at that”.57 In Robert Nozick’s example, sports 
fans willingly pay extra into a separate fund to watch Wilt Chamberlain play 
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(Chamberlain was a famous basketball player during the 1960’s).58 Nozick 
points out that this will lead to Chamberlain’s accumulation of considerable 
wealth, without anyone else’s rights being violated. Nozick then asserts that 
any attempt by some external body to redistribute Chamberlain’s wealth more 
evenly would be a violation of liberty. If this example is accepted, Nozick 
suggests, then any imposed pattern of distribution, such as recommended by 
resource egalitarianism, will be disrupted by liberty. So long as the resources 
have been accumulated fairly, then no one may object to the distributive 
pattern that results. 
By this view, the role of the state is simply to enforce the conditions for 
fair exchange and to protect those persons from external threat.59 The 
minimal state does not oblige its members to make provision for the welfare 
of others, but it does protect the conditions for members to make their own 
living if they are able to do so. This then is the only justification for the state to 
govern a society, since anything more will be to infringe individual liberty.  
The implications for those suffering social disadvantage are serious. 
There are no justifications to compel the able-bodied or well-off to distribute 
any of their resources to the least fortunate so long as they have accumulated 
their own wealth legitimately. Such a position condemns the disadvantaged to 
the good will and charity of others. Nevertheless, Nozick does allow some 
forms of redistribution: he accepts that those goods which have been 
accumulated unfairly (the possession of goods to which the claimant is not 
entitled) can be legitimately redistributed. This would cover such illegitimate 
                                            
58
 Nozick, R., 2003, p. 160 
59
 Nozick, R., 2003, pp. 10-53 
Chapter Three – Social Justice and Disadvantage   
S. Magee                                     June 2012 104 
transfers as might result from theft, or coercion. He is not suggesting that an 
injustice done to some person’s distant ancestors can result in compensation 
being due to any person existing today. This would require too complex an 
analysis, but he does accept, in principle, that illegal transfer warrants 
rectification. However, Nozick is unclear as to the justification for the 
bureaucratic body that would be necessary to monitor and enforce all such 
private transactions within this ‘minimal’ state. 
It is the question of legitimacy in the case of over-appropriation which 
has led to a challenge from ‘left-libertarians’ such as Hillel Steiner. Typically, 
left-libertarians regard natural resources as held in common. Persons may 
appropriate only an equal share, and if they appropriate any more, then they 
owe everyone else compensation, usually paid in some form of redistributive 
taxation. To be left-libertarian is, to this extent, to accept the idea of self-
ownership and to accept that everyone has a right to an equal share of 
unappropriated natural resources, but it is also to accept the principle of 
justified redistribution.  
In Steiner’s view, there are four ways of justifiably owning property: 
appropriation, production, voluntary transfer, and redress. Of these, only the 
last two are redistributive. Voluntary transfer is non-mandatory, but redress is 
usually compulsory and serves to undo unjust transfers. Since appropriators 
of more than an equal share are also engaging in redistribution, though 
unjustly, they owe under-appropriators redress. The amount owed is an equal 
share (or equivalent recompense) to the undeveloped raw materials that they 
would otherwise have had. Steiner uses an example of twelve acres of land 
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shared by two persons: then a third comes along, then a fourth, and much 
later a fifth – but now the land has all been appropriated and developed.60 
According to Steiner’s left-libertarianism, those persons for whom 
unappropriated land is not available are to receive redress to the value of an 
equal share of what the undeveloped land would be worth.  
Steiner goes further, however, and suggests that people too are part of 
those natural resources. For Steiner, since all persons have natural rights to 
self-ownership, they also have ownership of their labour, and the fruits of that 
labour. So far his position is indistinguishable from Nozick, but Steiner then 
makes an important development: since “all persons are themselves the 
products of other persons’ labour” they cannot be fully entitled to all of the 
products of their labour.61 They must surrender the unencumbered rights to 
what is produced since one of the resources they are using is the parental 
germ-line information. Given the Lockean proviso that ‘enough and as good’ 
is left for others, and since conceiving children “involves the appropriation of 
natural resources” then parents owe everyone else a share in the value of 
those resources.62 The redistribution of wealth under a Steinerian left-
libertarian scheme is then simply a matter of giving people fair shares of the 
resources that children represent. Steiner suggests that the widespread 
global inequalities amount to evidence of unjust over-appropriation and would 
thus warrant compensation through a ‘global fund’ differentially paid into by 
the over appropriators, and tapped into by the under appropriators.63 
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Unfortunately, this still leaves Steiner with the problem of what to do 
about persons with disabilities, particularly the severely disabled. Whilst he 
can support their getting a fair share, as Sen points out, many disabled 
persons require extra resources merely to enjoy the same amount of welfare 
as everyone else.64 Yet a doctrine based upon self-ownership cannot endorse 
giving extra resources to those unfortunates that cannot convert resources 
into welfare, or are unable to participate in a mutual system of cooperation. 
Steiner might use the ‘germ-line’ argument to justify unequal 
distribution of material goods in favour of the disabled, but in doing so leaves 
himself open to a significant problem. Since a healthy person has inherited 
‘good’ genes, these represent appropriated natural resources. The disabled 
person has not had the opportunity to appropriate ‘as good’ genes, and 
therefore the healthy person has appropriated a more than equal share. The 
disabled person is thus entitled to compensation from the healthier ‘over-
appropriator’. Yet this is also a matter of degree: if the person is only mildly 
disabled (short sightedness for example) they would only be entitled to a 
small amount of compensation (such as a pair of spectacles). On the other 
hand, as Jonathon Quong argues, if a person’s disabilities are so severe that 
to fully compensate him would require all the resources of the world, then this 
must inevitably come into conflict with the idea of self-ownership for all others 
on the planet.65 Everyone else would become a trespasser on the severely 
disabled person’s world, and if they cannot move without permission, they 
cannot be self-owners. Steiner must therefore lose the commitment to self-
                                            
64
 Sen, A., 1995, p. 20 
65
 Quong, J., 2011, pp. 70-72 
Chapter Three – Social Justice and Disadvantage   
S. Magee                                     June 2012 107 
ownership, or follow Nozick and abandon the severely disabled to charitable 
giving. Of course he could simply deny that an equal share requires 
compensation for a person’s inability to convert resources into welfare. Yet if 
he takes the latter route, he must again condemn the severely disabled to 
relative inequality as compared with the identically placed able-bodied 
person. 
Whereas Dworkin, Rawls, Nussbaum and Sen agree that justice 
requires that all members of a society benefit from a fair distribution of either 
resources or welfare, they all differ in the best means for this to be achieved. 
Their disagreements are thus over procedure, justification, or implementation. 
Yet all accept that liberty is also an important good in its own right, and must 
therefore be incorporated somehow into their own respective schema. 
Conversely, Nozick rejects the idea that the distribution of welfare, or 
resources, is relevant to justice, but recognises that these dimensions are 
vital to well-being (although liberty takes indefeasible priority).66 Whilst each 
writer thus recognises the importance of each dimension of well-being, each 
adopts a position in which their own favoured dimension is fundamental.   
Yet what Nozickean libertarians fail to appreciate (as was pointed out 
earlier) is that they too are egalitarians, but in a different form. No one is to 
have more than equal entitlements to liberty in virtue of who they are, or what 
talents they might possess, or what luck they happen to meet, or how 
satisfied they are, or how many resources they possess. This latter aspect 
often results in greater freedoms in practice, but the libertarian would still be 
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committed to the view that other than purchasing power, it would be improper 
for greater wealth to purchase more than one vote in an election, say; or for 
the fact of greater wealth giving the owner a greater claim than anyone else 
on acquiring other property; or more freedoms under the law than anyone 
else. 
As a particular species of egalitarianism, it would thus be vulnerable to 
Frankfurt’s challenge. According to Frankfurt, there is nothing intrinsically 
moral about equality: what matters is that people have enough. If this is so, 
then the fact of equal entitlements to liberty should be unimportant, other than 
and inasmuch, as the pursuit of equal liberty ensures that each person has 
enough. Yet Nozickean libertarians seem to be so ‘fetishistically’ (to borrow 
from Frankfurt) concerned with the pursuit of equality of liberty that they 
overlook the dire straits of others. In denying any responsibilities toward the 
welfare of others just because they believe that assistance would violate the 
entitlement to equality of liberty, they confirm Frankfurt’s observation. The 
beggar has an equal liberty to the rich person to buy a yacht, but what he 
needs is not that particular liberty. He needs enough liberty, enough welfare 
and enough resources, not equality of all of them, and not equality in one at 
the expense of another.  
In summary, liberty too is inadequate as a distributive principle by 
which to meet the challenge of social disadvantage. It must either deny that it 
is a concern of justice, as Nozick asserts, or be faced with the compromise of 
self-ownership, as Quong points out. Nozick’s denial is simply to reject that 
libertarianism can be considered to be an egalitarian position. Steiner 
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recognises the needs of those persons disadvantaged by over-appropriators, 
and accepts the responsibility of left-libertarianism to compensate, but then it 
appears that liberty is inadequate as an egalitarian principle to meet that 
challenge. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
So far, the debate surrounding social justice has been characterised in terms 
of welfare, resources, and liberty. In each case, it has been demonstrated that 
the advocated position of each writer turns on the conception of well-being 
that they choose to prefer. Advocates of welfare egalitarianism conceive of 
the socially disadvantaged in terms of unhappiness or dissatisfaction, leaving 
them open to the problem of expensive tastes (as Dworkin accuses) or as 
detached from the person (as Rawls accuses). Advocates of resource 
egalitarianism conceive the least advantaged representative as lacking in 
goods, when in fact such things are only instrumental to what is really 
important (as Sen accuses). Furthermore, in a scheme in which justice is 
based upon the idea of social cooperation for mutual benefit, cases of severe 
disability do not quite fit. Such persons cannot cooperate, and are therefore 
set aside as too difficult. Advocates of libertarianism either abandon the 
socially disadvantaged to charitable institutions, or if they accept 
redistribution, cannot cope with severe disabilities without compromising self-
ownership. All three positions struggle with the identification of the least 
advantaged group.  
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Then again, each position does identify an important aspect of well-
being: an aspect that when lacking can be assessed as a form of social 
disadvantage. Yet in advocating just a single aspect, and expecting the 
prioritised aspect to be able to adequately encompass disadvantages in the 
other aspects, is to ask too much. It is therefore concluded that neither 
welfare, nor resources, nor liberty is fundamental, and that none of these 
views are sufficient to account for, or address, social disadvantage. In the 
next chapter, we will consider an alternative view in which well-being is 
conceived in terms of a person’s capabilities.  
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Chapter Four  
The Capabilities Approach 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the most influential alternatives to the ‘traditional’ view of social justice 
is the ‘capabilities approach’, as developed by Amartya Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum.1 This view is based upon what persons are able to be and to do, 
expressed as ‘functionings’ of the person.2 This chapter is more a literature 
review than a critique, partly because one could not adequately survey the 
field of social justice without dealing with capabilities, and partly because the 
capabilities approach is offered as the best practical means by which to 
assess disadvantage. The conception of disadvantage that is to be offered in 
chapter six (disadvantage as the impairment of the will) is to be seen as 
complementary to the capabilities approach inasmuch as it gives additional 
support for its application. It is suggested that this support is necessary 
because the capabilities approach assumes an unacknowledged ideal model 
of human flourishing, and because the will is a necessary but neglected part 
of that model. In assuming this ideal model of flourishing, it is also observed 
that the achievement of capabilities has parallels with the idea of self-
realisation. It is important to recognise though, that the capabilities approach 
does not refer to a single view: it refers to a family of views. With this in mind, 
the views presented by Sen and Nussbaum are described first.  
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The feature lacking from within the capabilities approach, one 
suggests, is a full recognition of the importance of the will of the individual to 
the proper conception of disadvantage. Although Sen strongly emphasises 
the importance of choice and agency freedom within the conception of 
capabilities, it will be argued that this does not quite cover the point that the 
will is fundamental and prior to agency freedom.3 Nussbaum also recognises 
the importance of choice, but does not go as far as Sen (suggesting that the 
notion of agency freedom adds little to the conception of capability) and thus 
further distances her view from the one advocated here.4 Yet Nussbaum’s 
emphasis upon combined capabilities and human dignity, it is suggested, 
need a stronger, more personal, foundation than the notion of agency can 
offer.  
The practical application of the capabilities approach as advanced by 
Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit is then explored.5 Wolff and de-Shalit 
acknowledge that the existence of uncertainty, risk, and vulnerability can all 
count as social disadvantages, but because they eschew a theoretical basis 
in favour of practical recommendations, cannot explain why this should be so. 
It is suggested that the once the role of the will is recognised within the ideal 
model of capability, then a reason for including uncertainty, risk, and 
vulnerability can be provided.  
 
2. The Capabilities Approach 
2.1 Overview 
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The capabilities approach evaluates a person’s quality of life or standard of 
living by asking what it is they are able to be or to do. This is not simply a 
question of their abilities: it is also a question of opportunities and freedoms to 
achieve certain ‘functionings’. It is important to note the distinction between 
capability and functioning here: the capability is the person’s freedoms and 
opportunities to live according to their own choices, whereas the functionings 
are the achievements of that person (her beings and doings). Typical 
functionings include such things as being well-nourished, or being warm. The 
corresponding capability to these particular functionings would be the 
freedom to access good health, achieved through access to an adequate diet, 
and the freedom to buy warm clothes or heat one’s home. In Sen’s view, the 
capabilities approach is based upon a “person’s freedom to achieve well-
being”.6 The capability is thus an expression of a person’s freedom, whereas 
a function is the actual achievement of the valued objective of well-being. As 
Nussbaum puts it “[f]unctionings are beings and doings that are the 
outgrowths or realizations of capabilities”.7 
Although the capabilities approach is not a comprehensive political 
theory of social justice, both Sen and Nussbaum are strongly influenced by 
John Rawls. Aside from the obvious difference that Rawls is offering a 
resources-based social contract approach, there are other significant 
differences (notably in relation to the priority of liberty, the exclusion of those 
outside the normal range in the choice of the two principles of justice, and the 
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role of primary goods).8 Nevertheless, Sen suggests that that the capability 
approach might even be read as an extension to Rawls, inasmuch as equality 
of capability might take the place of primary goods within the Rawlsian 
framework. Nussbaum agrees that the “central capabilities play a role similar 
to that played by primary goods”.9  
 Nussbaum and Sen present a view of social disadvantage in which the 
focus is upon the needs of the individual, or rather, those aspects that are 
necessary for each person as an individual to be able to thrive. This includes 
such things as food, water, shelter, the ability to be seen in public without 
shame, and other such aspects of well-being. By focussing on persons as 
centres of need, it immediately addresses the problem of justice towards the 
disabled. All persons are viewed as moral equals, but with perhaps unequal 
needs, rather than as units of production and distribution.  
Nussbaum follows Aristotle in isolating those aspects that she sees as 
essentials for human flourishing. As she explains in Women and Human 
Development, Sen had been working on functionings within the context of 
economic development prior to her collaboration on the concept. Yet the idea 
of functionings is a very Aristotelian term.10 It has parallels with Aristotle’s use 
of the word ergon, to suggest that the good of a human being lay in his 
purpose or function, that is, to live well or happilly.11 Since Nussbaum had 
been developing an Aristotelian approach to human development there were 
striking commonalities, and this is what led to their collaboration. Both had 
arrived at a similar idea but through different pathways. This difference in 
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origins has also led to differences between the interpretations and 
implications of their respective approaches. 
Sen’s approach is intended to provide a suitable ‘space’ within which 
comparisons can be made of each person’s standard of living.12 This shows 
the foundations of his thought in economics. Sen justifies this term by saying 
that this “spatial analogy, despite its demonstratively Cartesian pretensions, is 
a useful classificatory device […] to separate out the choice of focal variables 
(‘the choice of space’) from other issues in the assessment of inequality”.13 
Sen thus attempted to show how the least well off are blighted in more ways 
than just poverty, and was working on ways that this could be evaluated and 
measured.14 Whilst Nussbaum agrees that this is important, her focus upon 
an Aristotelian conception of what it means to have a good life makes this 
space more personal. She wants to “go beyond the merely comparative”, 
identifying capabilities in terms of threshold levels of functionings that are 
required for a good life.15  This approach has led Nussbaum to produce a list 
of central human capabilities, and the rejection of the priority of liberty in 
favour of the view that “all the capabilities are equally fundamental”.16 These 
central capabilities can be regarded as Nussbaum’s list of vital needs, each of 
which has a threshold level of adequacy. Nussbaum suggests that this list 
defines the basic essentials for a decent human life.17 That is, central 
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capabilities “support our powers of practical reason and choice, and have a 
special importance in making any choice of a way of life possible”.18  
Despite Nussbaum’s assertion that “Sen nowhere uses the idea of a 
threshold”, his position in this regard is not clear: it may well be the case that 
Sen is simply non-committal on the possibility. In clarifying what he means by 
‘basic capabilities’, Sen explains that the term “was intended to separate out 
the ability to satisfy certain elementary and crucially important functionings up 
to certain levels”.19 Such a comment, admittedly in a footnote, would suggest 
acceptance of some sort of threshold. That Sen is non-committal on the 
possibility of a threshold would be consistent with his later views of capability 
as a Nyaya approach: that it must be sufficiently flexible as a concept to 
accommodate a plurality of conceptions of realised justice.20 
Included on Nussbaum’s list of central capabilities are such things as 
life, health, bodily integrity, being able to use one’s senses, emotions, 
imagination and thought, and control over one’s political and material 
environment, amongst other things. Meeting the requirements of such a list 
will be necessary for the achievement of an acceptable quality of life. Since 
each of these elements must be met up to the point necessary to achieve 
acceptability, Nussbaum’s approach is sufficientarian. The precise point of 
sufficiency is variable, depending upon the specific item. Thus the threshold 
for meeting the first item on her list, life, is absolute, but the threshold for 
meeting the second item, bodily health, depends upon an assessment of 
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adequacy, and this will depend upon meeting that (less than absolute) 
threshold.  
Sen and Nussbaum both point out and reject the common view of 
disadvantage as poverty, which concentrates on the quantity of resources 
that persons may or may not possess.21 Regardless of the differences 
between their approaches, there is agreement that to assess poverty in terms 
of income, wealth, Gross Domestic Product, or Gross National Product is to 
focus on the wrong arena: at least insofar as poverty affects individuals. Such 
approaches may be sufficient for the purposes of economists (in that they 
allow the analysis of patterns at the macro level) but when one analyses what 
these measures mean to individuals, they are clearly inadequate. As Sen 
points out, the focus upon resources alone is to confuse means with ends. 
Whilst resources might be thought to improve the circumstances for persons, 
they are only instrumental: it is only when resources are converted into 
something of intrinsic value that circumstances are improved. The something 
of value is typically related to well-being: those aspects described as ‘beings’ 
and ‘doings’.22 These beings and doings mark the point at which resources 
and liberties are converted into well-being. 
However, Sen does not mean to suggest that well-being is to be 
directly related to the achievement of functionings. Rather, it is ‘well-being 
freedom’ that is important here.23 This distinction is important to Sen’s 
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emphasis on agency and individual freedom.24 Unlike Nussbaum, Sen 
recognises an elevated place for liberty within his version of the capabilities 
approach (Nussbaum accepts that liberty is important but holds that all 
capabilities, including liberty “are equally fundamental”).25 Even so, to 
concentrate on well-being alone would be to treat persons as passive 
recipients of welfare or resources, when what is important is to increase the 
available freedoms to achieve well-being in accordance with their own value 
sets. Thus a fasting monk may choose to forego food, although he may still 
have the freedom to choose to do otherwise. A simplistic well-being-as-
functionings view would misinterpret the importance of the monk’s agency 
and might suggest that he ought to be provided with food. Yet such a 
provision might even be a torment to the monk. Well-being is thus related to 
capability only inasmuch as it expresses a freedom to achieve functionings 
and expresses the achievements that result from a realisation of these 
functionings. Sen’s emphasis on agency recognises that the will of the 
individual is an important aspect of capability, although he shies away from 
using that term. 
The capabilities approach is not just about converting resources into 
well-being freedom, or agency freedom. If the objective of the approach was 
to simply raise the level of welfare of the least well-off by allocating sufficient 
resources, then it would be vulnerable to Dworkin’s objection that this might 
be unrealistically expensive.26 Take the example of a severely disabled 
person in a society with limited resources. Addressing her needs might 
                                            
24
 Sen, A., 1995, pp. 56-62 
25
 Nussbaum, M., 2006, p. 12 
26
 Dworkin, R., 2000, p. 48 and p. 59 
Chapter Four – The Capabilities Approach   
S. Magee                                     June 2012 119 
require enormous wealth to bring her up to a similar level of functioning as the 
average person. If this is wealth that the society simply does not have, then it 
may be expensive in more than just resources: it would require the lessening 
of everyone else’s quality of life in order to achieve that parity. By default, 
such a requirement would collapse into the lowest amount of equal welfare. 
This is the well-known ‘levelling down’ objection that will be discussed further 
in chapter seven. 
Sen emphasises that the need to consider all aspects would rule out 
excessive sacrifices of some in favour of the benefits to others: “it is not 
credible that a person can morally evaluate his or her actions without taking 
note of their effects on the well-being and agency aspects of others”.27 This 
would require a moral evaluation of both the disabled recipient of benefit, and 
the impact upon the wider community from whom sacrifices are required. 
Such an evaluative process would insulate Sen somewhat from Dworkin’s 
‘expensive tastes’ problem. Yet where the line is to be drawn between the 
pay-off for a few and the cost to the others is not clear. Neither is the basis 
upon which a determination of excessive sacrifice is to be made. Again, this 
would point to the need for further support, perhaps from some form of list of 
basic requirements, as Nussbaum advocates, rather than the vague notion of 
self-evaluated agency freedom and generalised development indicators that 
Sen must rely upon. Yet even a list of basic requirements would be arbitrary 
without further justificatory support. Alternatively, one could point to the 
achievement of capabilities as an aspect of self-realisation in which mutual 
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support of others is a central component. This alternative will be discussed 
further in chapter six.  
As Nussbaum points out, the capability approach operates in a number 
of spaces, not just welfare.28 Although Sen is less specific here, he defines 
capabilities in terms of freedoms to pursue functionings, and specifically 
includes resources as a means to achieve functionings.29 Welfare, resources 
and liberty are thus all encompassed within the conception of capability. As 
such, the availability of resources, the consequences to others, and efficiency 
constraints are also considerations. Furthermore, Sen emphasises that 
equality in one space may require the sacrifice of equality along another, and 
that individual diversity may justify specific variations in benefits. Capability 
transcends the spaces of welfare, resources, and liberty by recognising and 
building upon this diversity: “ignoring the interpersonal variations can, in fact, 
be deeply inegalitarian, in hiding the fact that equal consideration for all may 
demand very unequal treatment in favour of the disadvantaged”.30  
In his book Development as Freedom, Sen advises policy makers to 
aim at increasing the freedoms of people in poorer nations as a means to 
allow them to develop their own well-being, that is, to promote their agency 
freedom.31 The “expansion of freedom is viewed as both (1) the primary end 
and (2) the principal means of development”.32 He points out that measures 
directed at raising personal freedoms, such as education, have always tended 
empirically to promote such things as longevity, reduce reproductive rates, 
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and create more sustainable and prosperous communities.33 In contrast, 
measures to compel such things as reduced reproductive rates have not 
achieved anything like the success that has been achieved by educating 
women, in particular, in these poorer nations. Sen applauds democracy 
because that system encourages agency freedoms.34  
Whilst he does not commit himself to utilitarianism (he even tries to 
distance himself from the suggestion) this does suggest that he has in mind a 
conception of the human good to be maximised.35  To this extent, Sen is an 
advocate of welfare prioritisation. Nevertheless in his later work, The Idea of 
Justice, he admits that this may be only part of the answer.36 As an illustration 
of the efficacy of freedom in safeguarding the health of a nation, Sen points 
out that “no famine has ever taken place in the history of the world in a 
functioning democracy”.37 This is so even in the poorest nations. He argues 
that this is because a citizenry that has the effective power (agency freedom) 
to remove from office those in positions of authority ensures that those so 
authorised make swift and effective measures to mitigate any forecasted 
shortages.38  
Whilst famine relief is just one area where development as freedom is 
claimed by Sen to be the best long-term solution, it is also important to 
remember that it is not always the best solution to treat persons equally. 
Recall Sen’s point in regard to individual diversity: if equal bundles of 
resources are given to two people, they need not be converted equally into 
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well-being.39 Thus if it is decided to distribute identically sized bowls of rice as 
part of a famine-relief strategy without taking into consideration the individual 
circumstances of each person, it may not result in the equal satisfaction of 
everyone’s needs. Some individuals may have more, or less, efficient 
metabolisms; nursing mothers may need extra food; small persons will need 
less food than tall persons.40 Bundles of resources are merely means to well-
being, and are not constitutive of well-being, thus equal distribution of food 
will not result in equal distribution of outcome. If well-being represents 
functioning, the beings and doings of an individual, then capability is the 
freedom to pursue well-being, and represents the various combinations of 
functionings that a person can achieve. Yet the very idea of well-being, and 
the freedom to achieve well-being are both subject to the presumption of an 
ideal set of capabilities for the human condition. Sen is aware of this 
relationship, and states that “it may simply be ‘right’ that individuals should 
have substantial well-being freedom”.41  
In summary of this section, the capabilities approach has been 
characterised as a means of evaluating social justice by looking to what it is 
that persons are able to do or to be. It is about the freedoms that persons 
have to achieve these functionings. A person’s well-being is thus a matter of 
meeting a set of recognizably valuable capabilities. This, then, raises 
questions about how these valuable capabilities are identified. It is suggested 
that Sen’s comment regarding the ‘rightness’ of well-being freedom gives a 
clue to the missing support that the ideal model of the capabilities approach 
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requires: the conception of rightness (along with the idea that freedom is inter 
alia good) suggests a form of human perfectionism. It is this issue we turn to 
next.  
 
2.2 The Assumption of an Ideal Model 
Regardless of whether Sen or Nussbaum’s version of the capabilities 
approach is preferred, it is important to emphasise at this point that both 
depend upon an underlying ideal conception for humanity. The very idea of 
‘functioning’ which “gives the notion of capabilities its end point” asserts a 
model conception of well-being, and thus what is best for human flourishing.42 
One falls short in well-being when one falls short of the ideal model, that is, 
one cannot achieve the same capabilities (as opportunities to realise 
functionings) as other persons that do meet the ideal model conditions.  
Although Nussbaum recognises this claim, she denies that the 
capabilities approach might invoke an ideal conception of humanity.43 
Nussbaum asserts that the “Capabilities Approach is not a theory of what 
human nature is, and it does not read norms off from innate human nature”.44 
Yet Nussbaum’s Aristotelian beginnings clearly place her capabilities 
approach upon an ideal of human flourishing. However, Nussbaum goes on 
to say that the capabilities approach “is evaluative and ethical from the start: it 
asks, among the many things that human beings might develop the capacity 
to do, which ones are the really valuable ones”.45 Such an evaluation requires 
a standard by which to make comparison and ethical judgement. Nussbaum 
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readily points out that “some capabilities are trivial, and some are even bad” 
but does not explain how a moral judgement can be made as to which 
capabilities are bad ones without holding some background notion of ideal, 
good, or right capabilities.46 The use of a list of central capabilities, even 
though open to alteration, is itself an attempt to formalise some sort of ideal. I 
suggest that the standard by which human flourishing is judged amounts to 
an ideal model of capability. Despite her earlier denial, Nussbaum does admit 
that the capabilities approach “is not ideal in the sense of being unworldly or 
utopian”, thus implying that it might be ideal in a more practical way. 
However, in setting the question to one side “for future discussion”, 
Nussbaum makes a tacit recognition that the model exists.47 
Sen’s distinction between well-being freedom and agency freedom is a 
significant point of difference from Nussbaum. Well-being achievement is the 
outcome for persons in accordance with their realised capabilities, whereas 
agency achievement refers to the chosen options made under conditions of 
agency freedom. Agency freedom “refers to what the person is free to do and 
achieve in pursuit of whatever goals and values he or she regards as 
important”.48 It is thus an expression of a person’s freedom to determine goals 
according to her own value system. This distinction is an important aspect of 
Sen’s ideal model, albeit one that is dismissed by Nussbaum as unnecessary. 
Nussbaum’s reasoning is that this distinction adds little that cannot be 
“captured as aspects of the capability/function distinction”.49 Furthermore, 
Sen’s persistence with the terminology of well-being worries Nussbaum: the 
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term is often associated with utilitarianism, and she would “prefer to 
disassociate herself more strongly” from that tradition.50 In losing the 
distinction between well-being and agency, together with Nussbaum’s 
assertion that liberty does not warrant prioritisation over other capabilities, 
she further distances herself from the idea that the will of the individual might 
be central to the conception of disadvantage.  
In addition to well-being freedom and agency freedom, Sen identifies 
two other categories of interest here: well-being achievement, and agency 
achievement.51 Each of these is of interest because they frame Sen’s ideal 
model of human flourishing, and because (as will be shown) such a model 
requires an underpinning justifying principle in order to avoid circularity. In 
Sen’s case, such a principle could be one of utility (although he is non-
committal in this regard). However, it is suggested that perfectionism might 
provide a better basis, especially since Nussbaum so forcefully rejects 
utilitarianism.  
These distinctions together express the idea that human flourishing 
requires a self-determined choice, and this, I suggest, would be better 
captured in terms of the will of the person: it is not the agent as an objective 
conception who has well-being, or freedom, or achievement, it is the very 
personal circumstances of the individual. It is the idea of agency freedom (but 
only when considered as the exercise of will) that rules out choice under 
conditions of coercion or threat from counting towards the achievement of 
capability. We will return to the implications of this shortly, when the 
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relationship between capability and disadvantage is discussed. Yet the very 
possibility of self-determined choice depends upon the notion of personal 
freedom as a constitutive part of Sen’s ideal model of well-being, and thus for 
the ideal human capability. Indeed, Sen emphasises that “[t]he well-being 
aspect of a person must be seen in terms of freedom as well as actual 
achievement”.52  
It might be thought that to rely on that person’s own value system 
would suggest that an external metric of agency freedom would not be 
appropriate, but this is not so. As an illustration of the problem, consider the 
effect upon Sen’s own example of adaptive preference: a member of a lower 
Hindu caste might be described as having equivalent agency freedom as a 
Hindu of higher caste, even though the higher caste member has significantly 
greater freedoms and opportunities. The member of the lower caste may 
consider herself to only be due a limited range of freedoms and thus accept 
that limitation. Sen’s concept of agency freedom, relying as it does on self-
evaluation, would appear committed to the acceptance of both situations as 
equivalent. Yet agency freedom is just one example of capability, and 
although this particular capability is introspective, it must be applied in concert 
with other aspects of capability such as well-being achievement and agency 
achievement. An external assessment of these aspects is therefore both 
appropriate and necessary (such as through the application of the Human 
Development Indices).53 We will return to the idea of self-evaluation shortly, 
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as it has further implications when Sen’s view of disadvantage and freedom 
are discussed. 
If well-being is taken in its most general sense of expressing how well 
a person’s life is going for them, framing such a view in terms of capability 
has two distinct aspects: firstly, in the evaluation of capabilities that the 
person has achieved, or can achieve, and secondly, in the underlying belief 
that well-being consists in holding the freedom to achieve functionings, that is, 
capability. The ideal model of human flourishing (well-being) is thus framed as 
freedom to achieve functionings. However, It would then appear that ‘well-
being achievement’ is somewhat circular. Replacing the term ‘well-being’ 
within this phrase would produce the idea that capability (the set of freedoms 
to achieve functionings) is simply the achievement of the freedom to achieve 
functionings. As Nussbaum has already asserted, such a view would appear 
to add nothing that the conception of capability has not already captured. Sen 
denies such circularity, suggesting that this merely “force[s] us to see these 
concepts as mutually dependent”.54 Unless some form of independent 
support can be given for the relationship between well-being and capability, 
then the charge of circularity would appear to stick. 
Without explicitly recognising that such support is necessary, Sen does 
point to the role of freedom as a constitutive part of his ideal model of human 
flourishing: “the good life is inter alia also a life of freedom”.55 This would 
suggest that well-being is simply the attainment of an ‘acceptable’ level of 
capability because the freedom to achieve functionings is constitutive of a 
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good life.  As we have already seen, such a view is also supported by Sen’s 
implied acceptance of thresholds (as his “up to certain levels” comment 
suggests).56 Nussbaum’s sufficientarian approach would have no difficulty in 
accepting this point in her version of the ideal model of human flourishing.  
Nevertheless, once the idea of freedom to achieve functionings is 
taken as an objective (since constitutive of the good life), then the utilitarian 
language of maximisation of capability might gain a foothold. This is clearly a 
worry for Nussbaum, but Sen is less concerned and explicitly advocates the 
maximisation of capability. This is not to suggest that Sen’s capabilities 
approach is utilitarian, although it might be framed in that way. It is merely to 
suggest that the approach needs further support to justify its moral stance. If 
not founded upon the idea of utility, Sen must either give an account of why 
agency freedom and well-being freedom are goods to be promoted (not in 
terms of capabilities or functionings), or provide some other network of 
supporting conceptions (such as Nussbaum’s list). Simply suggesting that 
these ‘goods’ are necessary for human flourishing would either invoke 
circularity or acknowledge the existence of the ideal model. Once an ideal 
model is suggested, then this would need its own independent justification. 
Even broadening the support with a foundational network would still suggest a 
common set of perfect or ideal human qualities to be promoted or achieved. 
So, to draw this section together, it has been asserted that the 
capabilities approach depends upon an ideal model of human flourishing. Yet 
since the conception of capabilities is about freedoms to achieve functionings, 
this ideal model is not about species norms. This model is about self-
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determined choices to achieve well-being, and this notion of well-being is in 
turn dependent on the freedom to achieve functionings (conceived as 
capabilities). It is now suggested that such an account has remarkable 
parallels with the notion of self-realisation: an idea which formed the 
backbone of the British Idealists in the nineteenth century.57 This should not 
be surprising. Nussbaum admits that “[h]istorically, the approach is influenced 
by philosophical views that focus on human flourishing or self-realization”.58 
Briefly, the idea of self-realisation conceives the ideal person as striving 
towards the achievement of perfection (or in the language of capabilities, well-
being) through a process of self-determined choices.  Typically, the 
achievement of self-realisation by this account would allow the person to 
approach an ideal of perfect health, honesty, trustworthiness, caring for 
others, courageousness and so forth, that is, to achieve all of the ideal 
qualities, functionings, and capabilities of the perfect human being.  The idea 
of self-realisation will be discussed further in chapter five, but for now it is also 
pointed out that such a conception places the will (and thus freedom to 
achieve functionings) at the centre.  
However, as a conception of social justice, capability should deal with 
the wider society and not just the achievement of perfection for individuals. As 
Nussbaum points out, the important focus of social justice is rightly upon the 
lives of people, not upon wealth, productivity, or other such metrics.59 
Governments must therefore focus upon meeting the needs of its people, and 
not rely upon such abstract measurements of ‘development’. If the capability 
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approach is to successfully meet this challenge it must be able to identify 
those whose lives are not going well. In the next subsection we will consider 
how the capabilities approach might identify those disadvantaged persons.  
 
2.3 Capability and Disadvantage 
There is an assertion within the capabilities approach that one ought not to be 
denied any of the central capabilities (Nussbaum’s view), or at least must 
achieve those capabilities that allow a decent standard of living (Sen’s view). 
These entitlements to capabilities are in virtue of our status as human beings 
(Nussbaum would extend this notion to some animals too). Where one does 
not meet these ‘ideal model’ conditions, one has been treated unjustly, that is, 
unfairly. Aside from the difficulties with the justification of the assumption of 
unfairness, this gives rise to difficulties with the notion of agency, and thus 
with the place of the will within capability. In this section, the relationship 
between these terms will be described, starting with the conception of 
disadvantage as capability failure.  
For Sen and Nussbaum, differences in their derivation of the 
capabilities approach have significant implications for the conception of 
disadvantage. Sen’s foundations in economics lead him away from a personal 
conception of disadvantage in favour of comparative assessment. This leaves 
him open to accusations of vagueness in identifying the least well-off persons: 
such persons lacking in capability or functionings must still be compared with 
others, who may also lack different capabilities or functionings, thus making it 
difficult to identify who is the least well-off. Sen’s lack of discussion in regard 
to the possibility of a threshold merely adds weight to this accusation. In 
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contrast, Nussbaum’s Aristotelian beginnings look to the person, and the 
virtues and attributes that are necessary for a good life: this has led her 
towards the compilation of a list, thus opening the way for accusations of 
arbitrariness in identifying the least well-off, or acceptance of an underlying 
ideal model by which comparisons are made (with the consequent need to 
justify the application of that model).  
Although Nussbaum sees disadvantage as a failure to meet any of the 
central capabilities, Sen sees the possibility of disadvantage to be described 
as a failure of functionings and/or capability. This is because “in evaluating 
well being, the value objects are the functionings and capabilities”.60 Sen also 
states that  “even an exact ‘tie’ between two persons in achieved functionings 
may still hide significant differences between the advantages of the respective 
persons which could make us understand that one person may be really 
much more ‘disadvantaged’ than the other”.61  
There is however, a problem with disadvantage conceived as 
functionings failure: if functioning failure alone is sufficient to describe social 
disadvantage, then it must struggle with cases in which voluntarily choices 
are made to accept those failures. As an example, in choosing to fast, one 
has exercised will (Sen would prefer ‘agency’), but the person might still be 
hungry and lack nutrition. To that extent she does not hold the necessary 
functionings, but one would not want to describe her as suffering a 
disadvantage. As Nussbaum points out “problems of this type are avoided by 
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making capability, and not functioning, the appropriate political goal”.62 
Nussbaum suggests that the high value that the capabilities approach places 
on choice would allow the individual to evaluate that position, and this choice 
and evaluation (the exercise of practical reason) is itself a central capability. 
One might thus have a shortage in a particular functioning but an increase in 
central capability. Since the person possesses the central capability, the 
functioning failure would therefore not amount to a disadvantage. In contrast, 
the term ‘disadvantage’ for Nussbaum refers to a failure to meet the threshold 
for any particular central human capability (subject to the caveat of 
overlapping consensus on what constitutes an adequate threshold), and not a 
failure of a particular functioning. By this view, differences above the 
threshold of capability would not amount to disadvantage.  
Unfortunately, taking this position is also problematic. Capability failure 
alone might also be insufficient to describe disadvantage. As we have just 
seen, a person suffering a failure to achieve a functioning might still have the 
capability achievement without that person being disadvantaged. However, 
there are also circumstances whereby a person meets the capability, but 
would still count as being disadvantaged. For example, a person might 
achieve the capability of good health with a dour diet of water, boiled rice and 
vitamin supplements, but one would still want to describe her as 
disadvantaged in comparison with an equally healthy neighbour drinking fine 
claret and eating plover’s eggs. Both have the same capability (the 
opportunity for good health) but one has greater freedom than the other. Yet 
the former may still meet a threshold for nourishment. As another example, 
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take Nussbaum’s ninth central capability, play: “[b]eing able to laugh, to play, 
to enjoy recreational activities”.63 A child in Soweto, say, can meet this 
capability up to the threshold (and therefore not count as being 
disadvantaged) with a primitive toy car made from discarded cola cans and 
coat hangers. The child’s family cannot afford the sophisticated toys that 
children enjoy in the UK, or in wealthier parts of South Africa, yet one would 
still want to describe the Soweto child as disadvantaged in comparison. Even 
if a person meets the minimum threshold for all ten of Nussbaum’s central 
capabilities, one might  still describe that person as being disadvantaged in 
comparison with another person holding even greater freedoms. If the 
description of disadvantage can be applied to a situation in which capability 
failure has not occurred, then this too is an insufficient account. 
Sen criticises utilitarians for treating freedom as instrumental to the 
achievement of certain ends, and rightly emphasises that freedom to achieve 
ought not to be seen as instrumental in this way.64 Yet he does not make 
clear how his own implied conception of disadvantage is not vulnerable to a 
similar criticism. Even if capability includes the freedom to achieve 
functionings as an intrinsic component, this does not make clear how freedom 
is related to disadvantage. Presumably, disadvantage is both a lack of 
achievements relative to some normative standard, and a lack of freedom 
(that is, the opportunity) to achieve that standard. If disadvantage is 
conceived as a failure to achieve functionings, or the lack of opportunities to 
achieve functionings, then freedom can be seen as irrelevant to the 
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evaluation of those achievements rather than, as he claims, intrinsic to those 
functionings. 
As an illustration of this difficulty, let us return to the idea of self-
evaluation. Consider the possibility that a disabled person does not accept 
that she has a disability. Sen recognises this as the “agent-relative” position 
of evaluation, and endorses that viewpoint.65 If she has the freedom to 
choose such a ‘disability’, then she simultaneously has her capability 
enhanced by that choice whilst remaining disadvantaged by her supposed 
lack of functioning. Yet if she is denied the freedom to choose her disability 
status, then she would be both disadvantaged by that denial, whilst also 
remaining disadvantaged by her supposed lack of functioning. In other words, 
her freedom would be irrelevant if the evaluation of disadvantage is placed 
externally to the person affected. It would therefore seem that some form of 
substantive (and internal) conception of disadvantage is required, one that 
recognises the importance of positive liberty, in order for the capabilities 
approach to adequately meet these challenges.  
Sen does not give a substantive account of how disadvantage might 
be constituted: he merely describes the complexities of the various 
functionings, freedoms, and opportunities for their achievement. Perhaps this 
is to avoid the accusation that he is advocating a particular conception of the 
good. As has already been suggested, such a move is to fail to acknowledge 
that the capabilities approach holds an ideal model of human flourishing. As 
such, the failure to fully recognise this ideal model leads to the assumption 
that disadvantage (as a capability failure) is nearly always unfair.  
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The qualification ‘nearly always’ is in recognition that exceptions may 
exist. One notable exception is where capability has been enhanced by the 
exercise of choice. Even then, if the functioning failure persists Sen might still 
regard this as constituting a disadvantage. The problem here is that mere 
choice (or agency) is insufficient to capture the richer conception of capability 
that Sen requires. Sen’s preference for the neutral term ‘agency’ does not 
recognise that liberty can be a negative freedom from interference, or a 
positive freedom to make self-evaluated choices. Both Sen and Nussbaum 
place freedom and choice at the centre, but in their reluctance to allow the 
conception of the will to be the locus of that choice, somewhat dilute what that 
freedom and choice might involve. As an illustration of this difficulty, Wolff and 
de-Shalit point out that vulnerability to risk is a disadvantage in itself.66 The 
idea of vulnerability to risk is not covered in Nussbaum’s list, and unless the 
risk turns out badly, would not be recognised by Sen’s ‘realised outcome’ 
approach to capabilities either. The language of agency is insufficiently 
personal to encompass such notions as vulnerability. We will consider Wolff 
and de-Shalit’s practical approach to disadvantage and capability in a 
moment, but must first consider this important point here.  
Wolff and de-Shalit use Sen’s own example of honey collectors from 
forests in India, in which Bengal Tigers hunt. The honey collectors must risk 
entering the forest even though many are killed in doing so. An account of 
disadvantage that merely looked to the achievement of good health under 
conditions of freedom of choice as an ‘agent’ would be inadequate. After all, 
the honey collectors are formally free to choose not to enter the forest, but 
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would have to find some other way to support their families. However, the 
alternative means of support may not be available. As Wolff and de-Shalit 
emphasise, it is not simply the matter of risk, but the involuntariness of the 
risk that is important here, and voluntariness is more than a matter of agency 
freedom: it is personal, it is a matter of will.67  
If the capabilities approach turned on the will of the individual, as is 
suggested here, it becomes clear that the affected person must have control 
over the evaluation of her capability. A person might choose to accept risk: 
doing so can even enhance well-being, as the popularity of many extreme 
sports would suggest. Under these circumstances, the risk-taker would not 
suffer disadvantage by the exposure to risk alone. However, in the case of the 
honey collectors, this risk is not voluntary: it is chosen, but not 
wholeheartedly. The alternative use of the term ‘agency’ does not express the 
wholeheartedness required, and allows the evaluation of capability to be 
placed externally to the person. The agent is free, inasmuch as there are no 
restrictions preventing her from gathering honey, but she is not free inasmuch 
as she does not have the self-evaluated choice according to her own 
conception of the good. She might prefer to avoid the risk and choose a safer 
life if she could, but this would require that she can exercise her will to do so. 
Having the freedom to choose does not recognise that such a choice must be 
voluntarily made, and without any form of coercion or patronisation or 
constriction of circumstances. The evaluation of disadvantage cannot be 
made by an external assessment of achieved functionings or capability 
freedom: the proper placement of such an assessment must include the 
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affected person’s own internal perspective. This requires consultation and 
consideration of the will of that individual.  
Consider the famous scene from the Monty Python film Life of Brian, in 
which an ex-leper complains that Jesus cured him against his will: “One 
minute I'm a leper with a trade, next minute my livelihood's gone. Not so 
much as a by your leave. You're cured mate”.68 Aside from the comical 
absurdity of the scene, the ex-leper has a serious point. If he has chosen to 
accept his disadvantage, then it is no longer unfair, and the importance of the 
phrase ‘by your leave‘ becomes clear. The ex-leper has been denied the 
opportunity to exercise wholehearted freedom of choice. The absurdity of the 
situation does not suggest that he has had his will impaired, since the 
exercise of will is a much more complex issue than mere choice (as will be 
explained in the next chapter). Yet persons typically identify themselves and 
others by the occupations they hold or intend to pursue, so one’s livelihood is 
often a matter of will rather than a simple choice.  
Perhaps this situation is not as far-fetched as it first appears. There are 
many examples of persons who would be judged by outsiders to suffer from a 
disability (even with the best of intentions) and thus might be considered to be 
unfairly disadvantaged in a normative sense, when in fact the persons 
concerned do not accept that judgement. Gus Kahane and Julian Savulescu 
give a number of such examples (although their target is to undermine both 
the social and medical models of disability). These include: deaf parents 
wanting a deaf child; dwarf parents that want a dwarf child; and a body-
integrity-identity-disorder sufferer who wants to have a perfectly good limb 
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amputated.69 In each of these cases, the wills of the persons affected are at 
odds with the external judgement of disadvantage. The point exaggerated by 
the Monty Python team remains: we cannot assume that a disadvantage is 
unfair (even if this looks like a capability failure) without consulting the 
persons affected, and we cannot make an assessment of disadvantage 
without placing ourselves and others in relation to that person.  
Sen and Nussbaum merely suggest that a person’s agency freedom is 
to be weighed along with the achievement of secure functionings so that the 
assessor can then judge the meeting of an unspecified threshold of basic 
human capability or an equality of capability.70 It is suggested that this fails to 
recognise that the fundamental feature prior to agency freedom is the will of 
the individual. Since Sen shies away from advocating the capabilities 
approach as a system upon which to build a fair society (he merely offers it as 
a means of assessing disadvantage) he avoids commitment to any particular 
scheme. In doing so, he loses the theoretical underpinnings for fairness: he 
cannot advocate either equality of capability, priority of certain capabilities, or 
thresholds of capability.  
Sen rejects a “unifocal” view of equality, and consequently cannot 
identify a way of preferring one scheme of social justice over another.71 He 
recognises this difficulty as an inevitable consequence of social choice 
theory.72 This theory suggests that wherever individual choices are 
aggregated, arbitrariness and instability cannot be avoided: the identification 
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of ‘just institutions’ that accurately track the choices of individuals, or even the 
rational arguments of the designer of such a system, are thus bound to miss 
the mark. 
In contrast, Nussbaum’s version of the capabilities approach (which 
does advocate a threshold view) simply becomes just one scheme amongst 
others with no reason to prefer that either.73 It is suggested that the will can 
provide just such a unifocal view, and see the proper conception of social 
disadvantage as providing the missing theoretical underpinnings for the 
capabilities approach.  
Despite these misgivings, it might yet be possible to apply the 
capabilities approach towards practical issues in order to suggest solutions to 
many social and political problems. Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit take 
up this challenge, with a specific focus on the problem of disadvantage. Let 
us now look at their practical applications. 
 
3.  Wolff and de-Shalit 
 
In their stimulating book Disadvantage, Wolff and de-Shalit aim “to provide 
practical guidance to policy makers by providing a version of egalitarian 
theory which can be applied to actual social policy”.74 They suggest that whilst 
the many forms of egalitarianism give rise to disagreements on theory, the 
practical focus on how to proceed should overcome such objections. They 
call this a “consensual starting point” in which egalitarians agree that we 
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should “identify the worst off and take appropriate steps so that their position 
can be improved”.75 Although not as explicit as Nussbaum in regard to how 
‘consensus’ is to be understood, this is not a matter of compromise. They 
suggest a deliberate vagueness, and refer to a “general convergence” in the 
identification and prioritisation of those persons considered to be 
disadvantaged.76 Wolff and de-Shalit are thus asking the same question 
about the nature of disadvantage that this thesis also wrestles with but, 
although recognising the difficulties, they set these matters aside in favour of 
the broad consensus.77  
Wolff and de-Shalit quickly establish that disadvantage is not just about 
poverty: “redistribution of money cannot in itself end oppressive social 
structures”.78 They suggest that egalitarian views that concentrate on poverty 
or on social structures are misdirected, but argue that they can be 
accommodated within a pluralistic view. Those views which prioritise welfare, 
or resources, or other such goods are characterised as ‘monist’ inasmuch as 
they would suggest that all such goods can be compared and ranked in order 
of preference (or tied such that the person should be indifferent between 
them).79 Wolff and de-Shalit reject this view as false: it is simply not true (they 
claim) that where a person has to choose between taking a job and avoiding 
poverty, say, and thus severing ties with friends and family, that she might be 
indifferent between such a choice, or that she has a preference between 
them. These issues are not commensurable and pull in different directions. A 
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monist account does not reflect reality and so would guide governments to 
pursue policies which may have unacceptable social consequences for many. 
Disadvantage, they suggest, is clearly pluralistic as it calls upon multiple 
personal values.80 
 Unfortunately, in common with both Sen and Nussbaum, Wolff and de-
Shalit also confuse the ontology of disadvantage with its evaluation 
(inasmuch as they do not recognise a generic conception upon which an 
evaluation of fairness is subsequently made). Since examples of social 
disadvantage (as an outcome) can take multiple forms, they assume that the 
conception of disadvantage is not a single thing. They thus criticise ‘monist’ 
views as inadequate. Such views, they suggest, cannot adequately 
encompass all the different forms of disadvantage because they cannot 
compare like with like. This move is premature. It is perfectly reasonable to 
assess a person as being disadvantaged because she suffers poverty, just as 
it is reasonable to assess someone as disadvantaged because she suffers 
poor health. It is not quite correct to then take disadvantage to be a 
necessarily plural concept. It is suggested here that although the assessment 
of disadvantage can be conceived plurally, (as a deficiency of welfare, 
resources or liberty) the underlying conception of disadvantage remains the 
same. A person’s lacking in welfare, resources, or liberty can be stated as a 
naturalistic ‘fact’ without also applying an evaluation of that condition. It is the 
monist evaluation of the goodness or rightness of the generic conception that 
gives rise to the multiple forms in which unfair social disadvantage can be 
realised. The person choosing between poverty and severing family ties is not 
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indifferent precisely because she will remain unfairly socially disadvantaged 
whichever way the outcomes are assessed. 
The model of disadvantage used by Wolff and de-Shalit is pluralistic, 
and considers social goods, drawn together with material goods, within a 
capabilities framework.81 It is based on a modification of Sen and Nussbaum’s 
approach, but with acknowledgement of the other pluralistic ‘complex equality’ 
models of Michael Walzer and David Miller.82 This model is therefore 
focussed upon what it is that contributes to individual well-being. Wolff and 
de-Shalit point out that ‘goods’ also covers non-material aspects, and that 
redistribution is not always a matter of taking from some to give to others: 
some goods, such as being valued, can be redistributed by adding more to 
those with less at no cost to those with more. For Wolff and de-Shalit “any 
change in how people’s lives are going […] is to be thought of as 
redistribution”.83 The main modification to the capabilities approach:  
 
is the idea that what matters for an individual is not only 
the level of functionings he or she enjoys at any particular 
time, but also the prospects for sustaining that level. To 
put this in another way, exceptional risk and vulnerability 
is itself a disadvantage, whether or not the feared event 
actually happens.84  
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Thus someone in fear of unemployment is by that fact alone disadvantaged 
relative to another person secure in their work. This is an interesting 
observation, and entirely consistent with the idea of social disadvantage being 
defined in terms of the will. Fear is a psychological condition which does not 
lend itself to the assessment of disadvantage in relation to such things as 
resources or liberty, although it could be recognised when assessed in terms 
of welfare. As a psychological condition, such aspects are notoriously difficult 
to measure and evaluate. Such psychological disadvantage is a strong 
indicator of a more fundamental conception of social disadvantage than can 
be described by the traditional assessment. 
Yet Wolff and de-Shalit see functionings as being related to 
disadvantage in such a way that to be disadvantaged is to be unable to 
achieve functionings.  However, they take this further, “[b]y this we assume 
that functionings are, in a way, the opposite of disadvantages”.85 This 
suggests an equivalence which does not bear scrutiny: it would imply that to 
be able to achieve functionings is to be advantaged, and conversely that 
disadvantage is equivalent to functionings failure. This is to overstate the 
case. Being able to function, one suggests, is not to be advantaged but to be 
able to exert one’s moral equality as a person, and being equal in this respect 
is not a privilege or advantage that one can rightly have over another. 
Furthermore, as we have already discussed, if disadvantage is conceived 
merely as a functionings failure, it cannot recognise the role of voluntariness 
in accepting a lack of functioning.  
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 When identifying the least advantaged (or most disadvantaged) Wolff 
and de-Shalit have in mind the chronic unemployed, rough sleepers, teenage 
mothers and such like. Although such persons are rarely totally abandoned by 
the state, they are seen as hard, persistent and expensive to fix, so 
governments tend to focus on the short term unemployed and those they 
believe are most likely to result in quick and easy wins (or returns on the 
public investment). For the hard cases, “the cost of taking care of these 
people and bringing them above a certain threshold are said to be enormous, 
while the chances of getting satisfying results are slim”.86 This would tend to 
show against a sufficientarian view, such as the one that will be presented in 
this thesis, but sufficientarianism is not the target of Wolf and de-Shalit here. 
They merely point out that it is a common failing of public policy to focus upon 
the easy-to-fix problems to the detriment of those most desperately in need. 
 This leads Wolff and de-Shalit to question whether fair redistribution is 
simply a matter of ‘who gets what’ – they suggest that this is part of a 
profound issue, since redistribution that does not reach the very worst off is 
corrosive to social attitudes. In this respect Wolff and de-Shalit are in 
agreement with the sufficientarian. They point out that when we see 
increasing numbers of drug addicts, rough sleepers and such like, it seems 
fair to say that once the initial shock has been overcome, we become 
apathetic. This, they say, is “a matter of shame‘ and we should not allow 
ourselves to ‘get used to it‘”.87 Yet the corrosive effect may be even worse 
than Wolff and de-Shalit portray. There is evidence to suggest that the sight 
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of social deprivation and social neglect causes further damage. The ‘Broken 
Window’ Theory of James Wilson and George Kelling suggests that where 
visible signs of social neglect exist within a community (typified by fly-tipping, 
graffiti, and derelict buildings with broken windows), then this is rapidly 
associated with increased criminality and vandalism.88 Rather than becoming 
apathetic, a term which implies indifference, it may even be the case that we 
give up caring, or that such deprivation adds to our own sense of despair and 
encourages an escalation of neglect. Thus in a neighbourhood strewn with 
litter, one is more likely to drop litter; or where buildings are obviously 
neglected (having long unrepaired broken windows), the remaining windows 
are likely to become broken in the near future. It is as though the neglect of 
the neighbourhood becomes part of the identity of those persons living there. 
This effect is emphasised here because the role of our communities in the 
construction of the self plays an important part when we later come to discuss 
the extended will. 
 When taken together, the idea of disadvantage as plural and the duty 
of help towards the least advantaged leads to the problem of identifying who 
the least advantaged are. A pluralistic view by definition accepts multiple 
candidates, but then how is such an approach to identify the worst off? Are 
they the ones with poor health, or the ones with low income, or the ones with 
no freedom? Furthermore, a fair society must also be able to recognise when 
disadvantage has been rectified. The combination of these aspects they call 
the “realism constraint”.89 According to Wolff and de-Shalit, monist accounts 
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cannot meet this ‘realism’ condition since it assumes that a disadvantage in 
one area can be substituted or compensated by some other aspect in which 
benefits can be awarded.90 As already suggested, this is a problem of a 
failure to recognise the ontology of disadvantage: it is to confuse the norm of 
condition or circumstance with the evaluation of the (un)fairness of that 
condition.  
A second problem is that since social disadvantage is relative, an ideal 
account of disadvantage (they suggest) should be able to place each 
individual on a scale whilst also identifying absolute disadvantage. This is the 
“indexing problem”.91 The realism constraint pulls towards complexity whilst 
the indexing problem pulls towards simplification: the two aspects are thus in 
tension. Wolff and de-Shalit argue that this problem is both serious and 
unavoidable to the extent that it may be impossible to address. The indexing 
problem has already been encountered when the relative merits of theories of 
distributive justice based on welfare, resources, or liberty were discussed. 
These are the views that Wolff and de-Shalit regard as mistaken monist 
views. Whilst this thesis is in agreement with Wolff and de-Shalit to this 
extent, the view that this may be impossible to address is rejected. As will be 
argued, a better understanding of disadvantage may be able to meet this 
challenge. The indexing problem would only apply to the assessment of 
disadvantage, but when properly conceived in terms of the extended will, as 
will be argued in chapter six, the problem simply evaporates. 
                                            
90
 Wolff, J., and de-Shalit, A., 2007, p. 24 
91
 Wolff, J., and de-Shalit, A., 2007, p. 21 
Chapter Four – The Capabilities Approach   
S. Magee                                     June 2012 147 
 Wolff and de-Shalit’s practical approach meets the realism constraint, 
and side-steps the problem of identifying the least well-off, by observing that 
disadvantages tend to exist in clusters. Those suffering poverty also tend to 
be poorly educated, live in poor quality housing, have a shorter lifespan, have 
higher unwanted pregnancy rates, and so forth.92 In studying this observation, 
Wolff and de-Shalit offer an imaginative analysis of an ideal society: “a society 
of equals is a society in which disadvantages do not cluster, a society where 
there is no clear answer to the question of who is the worst off”.93 They 
therefore advise policy makers to identify patterns and concentrate on 
declustering as a means to address disadvantage.94 In practice, then, they 
suggest that we have no difficulty in recognising disadvantage, and therefore 
make a powerful case for a consensus approach towards identifying those in 
need of support.  
A further distinction is then made between “corrosive disadvantages” 
and “fertile functionings”.95 However, one must bear in mind Nussbaum’s 
criticism of this latter coupling: “I fear that alliteration has superseded 
theoretical clarity”.96 Nussbaum suggests that the distinction between 
functionings and capabilities has become blurred by this term, and that the 
term ‘fertile capabilities’ is more accurate. Nevertheless the focus upon 
practical ways to address disadvantage means that this lack of precision does 
not detract greatly from the ideas that are described. Corrosive disadvantages 
are those which lead to other disadvantages (for example, unemployment 
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leading to poverty and homelessness), whilst fertile functionings are those 
which, when secured, lead to the securing of other functionings (such as 
getting a job, leading to income security and housing). A link is thus 
established between the capabilities approach and the policy of declustering: 
the advice to policy makers is thus to promote fertile functionings whilst 
eliminating, or reducing the effect of, corrosive disadvantage.  Wolff and de-
Shalit are absolutely justified to bring the reader’s attention to this effect, and 
absolutely justified to focus upon the practical urgency in meeting the 
challenge of social disadvantage in this way. Even so, this practical urgency 
does not establish that all ‘monist’ accounts are theoretically inadequate. 
Having now described Wolff and de-Shalit’s position on disadvantage, 
one final comment must be made in order to clarify the position of this thesis 
within the views presented. It is supported that the monist accounts so far 
discussed are unsatisfactory, but not that all monist view must necessarily be 
inadequate. The argument is yet to be made that the will of the person 
affected by disadvantage is crucial to the determination of fairness, although it 
is taken to be so in this thesis. Wolff-and de-Shalit do not give sufficient 
attention to the conflation of fairness within their conception of disadvantage, 
although they recognise a role for the will in regard to voluntariness. This 
thesis will focus upon the role of the will, as it becomes pivotal in defining 
disadvantage, and thus in producing guidance on how best to address 
disadvantage whilst maintaining respect for the individual.  
It is always going to be difficult to arrive at the right balance between 
the fair consideration of the interests of the individual with the interests of the 
community (especially if the community is to be conceived as an entity rather 
Chapter Four – The Capabilities Approach   
S. Magee                                     June 2012 149 
than as the mere collection of individuals). However, as will be argued in 
chapter six, if the will is conceived in an extended sense, this balance is in-
built. Once the will is recognised as extending beyond the biological mind of 
the individual, then such things as culture, community, technology, and 
upbringing (amongst other things) become incorporated into the identity of 
each person. We are jumping the gun somewhat now, but these comments 
are merely intended to signpost the argument in relation to the capabilities 
approach. In extending this approach into its practical applications, Wolff and 
de-Shalit have hinted at the importance of individual voluntary choices. Given 
the strongly individualistic way in which the capabilities approach is applied, it 
is remarkable that the role of the will has been so overlooked.  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter we have considered what is probably the most significant rival 
to the traditional views on distributive justice: the capabilities approaches of 
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. Whilst it has been shown that the 
capabilities approach has a great deal in its favour, it is not complete. When 
seen from Sen’s point of view, the capabilities approach is about agency, and 
the freedom to achieve functionings. However, his reliance upon the notion of 
agency is insufficient to account for the conception of disadvantage. This 
becomes evident in his vacillation between disadvantage conceived as 
capability failure and functionings failure. From Nussbaum’s point of view, 
since she correlates disadvantage with capability failure, she must then deny 
that differences in freedoms of persons above a capability threshold might 
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count as disadvantage. Nussbaum is also concerned with what disadvantage 
means to the individual, but her reticence in relation to agency means she too 
overlooks the significance of will. Both fail to acknowledge the ideal model of 
human flourishing upon which the capabilities approach depends. 
Even though the capabilities approach has its shortcomings, it may be 
the best view by which disadvantage can be assessed. Sen’s evident 
frustration with Niti approaches in his later work demonstrates his recognition 
that this may be one of the shortcomings in his own view of the capabilities 
approach. I do not share this worry: if more emphasis is placed upon the role 
of the will, then this could resolve many of Sen’s concerns. 
 Wolff and de-Shalit have added to the debate on social justice by 
emphasising the practical urgency to address the problem of disadvantage. In 
this respect they are in concordance with the later Sen. Yet the emphasis on 
practicality leaves them short on theoretical underpinnings for the 
identification of social disadvantage. Whilst they do make comment that 
suggests recognition of a role for the will, they do not develop the idea. It is 
suggested that greater recognition of the wills of the persons suffering 
disadvantage can give a unifying validity to the conception. Once a full and 
proper identification of disadvantage has been made, this has the potential to 
provide a unifying view of social justice: one which does not then lead to 
some other Niti means by which to best address disadvantage. It is argued in 
the next chapter that the will of each person, when conceived as extending 
beyond the individual, can provide a better account of disadvantage than can 
capabilities or the traditional views alone.  
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Chapter Five 
What is The Will? 
 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the idea was introduced that a proper understanding 
of social disadvantage must include recognition of the role of the will. 
Furthermore, it was suggested that the capabilities approach requires a viable 
notion of the will since both Sen and Nussbaum already acknowledge the 
central place of self-determined choice within that conception. Yet a proper 
understanding of social disadvantage must do more than simply recognise 
the relevance of the will of those affected: it is now suggested that the will is 
fundamental to that conception. Before this argument can be made though, it 
is necessary to establish exactly how the will is to be understood, at least so 
far as the conception of social disadvantage is concerned. 
 The argument to be established in this thesis is that social 
disadvantage is best understood as the impairment of the will. Yet the 
conception of the will is a controversial subject. A thesis that appears to rely 
upon an outdated conception of a perhaps illusory entity would run the risk of 
a rather perfunctory dismissal. Nevertheless, such a dismissal would be too 
swift, and would throw away a powerful tool: especially since the idea of the 
will remains remarkably effective in explaining human behaviour and moral 
responsibility.  
Within the history of ideas, the will has typically been taken as positing 
the actual existence of a soul, or spirit, or elan-vital. This ‘substantive view’ of 
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the will (as it will be called) is not the view supported here. The alternative 
view is to deny the existence of the will as being anything more than an 
illusion. Nevertheless, it is argued that just because the will might be 
ultimately illusory, this is not sufficient reason to abandon the concept: the 
experience of will is real for us. It will be accepted that just as I experience 
having willed an action, other persons will have the same sort of experience 
in their own actions. However, the problem of ‘other minds’ will be set aside at 
this point as being outside the scope of this thesis.  
Whether one takes the will to be substantively real, or only as an 
experience, each position has implications for the conception of social 
disadvantage as the impairment of the will. For those persons that might 
support the substantive conception, the idea of disadvantage as the 
impairment of the soul, spirit or life-force should not present any difficulties. If 
a substantive soul is accepted, then it can also be accepted that it might be 
impaired in some way. A much greater challenge to my argument is 
presented by those who deny the existence of the will, or suggest that its 
appearance is illusory. Much more space will therefore be devoted to 
addressing this challenge than to the substantive view.  
In this chapter, it is argued that the will is to be understood in two 
ways: as extending beyond the individual, encompassing culture, technology, 
and other environmental circumstances; and as describing a real experience 
(without implying any substantive existence). The idea of the extended will is 
inspired by a Greenian conception in which the self can only achieve 
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perfection through recognition of others as part of that process.1 Thus one’s 
own will includes others in a mutually supportive ideal. This is combined with 
the arguments of Andy Clark and David Chalmers (that the extended will 
includes our environment, technology and culture) to give an account of what 
it is that might be impaired in describing disadvantage.2 The experience of 
will, so far as the conception of disadvantage is concerned, can be further 
subdivided as an experience of activity, or as experience of capacity. This is 
not to be understood as a direct apprehension of the experience of will by the 
agent. As will be explained shortly, the person does not perceive having 
willed, and then the event occurring: the experience is applied after the event. 
When one’s will is directed towards a particular end, it is an activity 
experienced as willpower. When experienced as a means of orienting oneself 
in relation to others, then it is a passive experience of capacity: it is the 
recognition of an action as belonging to the self, or as caused by another. 
Although the view of the will as an illusion is presented as being more 
plausible than the substantive view, the acceptance of the conception of 
disadvantage in terms of the will does not turn on this issue. If the will is a 
substantive concept, then the idea of its impairment is straightforward in its 
morally significant consequences. On the other hand, and as will be argued, if 
the concept of the will is illusory, then impairment of this illusion has the 
identical morally significant consequences.  When described in the round, and 
regardless of the view that one takes on the nature of the will, the conception 
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of social disadvantage as the impairment of the will can still be accepted 
either way. 
A clarification is necessary at this point to emphasise that the term 
‘illusory’ is not to be taken pejoratively: an illusion can be taken to be real 
inasmuch as it is experienced. Just as one might describe pain in terms of 
neurons firing, chemical reactions in synapses, or electrical disturbances in 
‘C’ fibres, this does not describe what it feels like to experience pain. One 
might assert that pain is illusory, or deny that it correlates with anything more 
than biochemical processes, but as Daniel Wegner puts it, “illusory pain is still 
pain”.3 Similarly the experience of will can be just as real, without positing any 
particular entity called ‘the will’. The experience of will might well correlate 
with biochemical processes in the brain in a similar way to the experience of 
pain, but this does not thereby devalue the experience for us.  
The idea of will as illusion goes back at least as far as Gilbert Ryle, 
who famously referred to the will as the “ghost in the machine”.4 His pupil, 
Daniel Dennett, recognised that even if ultimately illusory the conception of 
the will can still be usefully employed to predict and describe human 
behaviour. He called this perspective the “intentional stance”.5 In contrast, 
Jerry Fodor raised concerns that such views remove the self from discussions 
of human action and therefore weaken the idea of moral responsibility.6 Fodor 
suggests that without a morally responsible and substantive self, then any 
notion of desert or merit must be abandoned. However, the experience of will 
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is not the same thing as its actual substantive existence.7 It is therefore 
argued that there is room to accept an illusory will whilst maintaining the truth 
of moral responsibility.  
The argument will begin by examining the claim that the will is real as 
an experience. It is then suggested that the experience of will allows the 
possibility of moral responsibility without being committed to its substantive 
existence. This in turn leads to the matter of the location of the experience of 
will: if the will is not substantive, but one still wishes to say that it is 
experientially real, then where is this experience taking place?  
The first proposition to be considered is that the will is located within 
the mind of the subject. By describing some of the problems associated with 
such a delimited view of the will, it is suggested that this view is unlikely. If the 
will is not located just within the mind, then the alternative is to consider the 
possibility of an extended will. This argument looks at the role of our biological 
systems such as memory and senses, and suggests that there is no relevant 
difference from the way in which we access external sources of information.  
Furthermore, it seems reasonable to suppose that each person would not 
have the will that they did if they had been raised in isolation, or in a different 
environment. Since moral responsibility requires the existence of will in either 
a substantive or experientially real way, and since it is suggested that the 
individualistically limited view is both unlikely and committed to the 
substantive conception, the conclusion is drawn that the experiential view is 
compatible (in a mutually supportive way) only with the extended view.  
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Since this thesis places the will at the centre, and to avoid being 
unnecessarily drawn into the free-will and determinism debate, certain 
assumptions are made that are believed to be both justifiable and relatively 
uncontroversial. The first assumption is that the will is a conceptual part of 
personhood, which is at least intelligible in a practical, if not real sense. The 
second assumption is that one’s will in this limited sense appears free to 
choose between available alternatives as one sees fit.  
Since the libertarian in the free will debate claims that free will 
genuinely exists, she cannot object to these assumptions.8 Since many 
compatibilists argue for this position anyway, and those who do not still 
accept the plausibility of free will, they too cannot object.9 Those 
incompatibilists who accept the existence of free will (and thus argue that 
determinism is false) cannot object.10 Even the hard determinist has space 
available to deny the existence of genuine free will but accept that we do 
actually behave as though it were real.11 Those hard determinists should 
therefore have no difficulty in accepting my assumptions even if they believe 
that free will is ultimately false.  
It would therefore follow that the substantive or experiential view of the 
will makes little difference to the acceptance of the proposed conception of 
disadvantage. To those who conceive of the will as substantive, there would 
be no objection to the conception of disadvantage in terms of the will. For 
those who accept the illusory nature of the will, disadvantage in terms of the 
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will can still be accepted along the same basis as moral responsibility’s 
dependence on the reality of the experience of will. 
The distinction between the formal will and willing as such must be 
emphasised at this point. Formal will refers to such things as raising an arm 
‘at will’, whereas willing as such is an activity or ‘choosing’ to follow one action 
rather than another. Formal will is necessarily free. Formal will is about what it 
is rather than what it does. The matter under discussion in this chapter 
expands on the formal will; what it is; the person’s experience of control over 
her circumstances, and although it encompasses such things as raising an 
arm, it is the experience of control that is the significant feature. Although 
formal will might be impaired through physical restraint or damage to the 
central nervous system, such impairment is not relevant to social 
disadvantage unless it impairs the process of willing as such. It is the 
impairment of the exercise of will, willing as such, that will be the subject of 
the next chapter. 
 
2. The Concept of the Will 
 
The concept of the will has a long history. Aristotle suggested that voluntary 
actions depend upon the will of a causal agent, since without the existence of 
both a choice, and a willing agent, then the agent cannot be held responsible 
for his or her actions.12 Yet such a description seems to imply the possibility 
of an uncaused cause. Descartes regarded the will as synonymous with the 
soul, located in the pineal gland, and controlling the actions of the ‘I’ in the 
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self.13 Yet such a presentation suggests a homunculus residing in the mind, 
and for which the body is the vehicle. This would incur an infinite regression 
to explain how the ‘I’ comes to control the homunculus. More recently, 
Richard Double has suggested that the will is just the “sanction[ing of] 
assignments of moral responsibility”.14 Yet this is too simplistic, and says 
nothing about the processes involved in the exercise of will. Gilbert Ryle 
suggests (as will be described shortly) that the concept of volitions, and thus 
the will, is a fictitious “ghost in the machine” that deserves no place in the 
theory of the mind.15 Daniel Wegner also sees the will as illusory, but 
necessary for moral responsibility.16 He shows that the feeling of conscious 
will can come apart from an action that we believe we have caused, thus 
throwing doubt upon the idea that an agent, through willing, causes an event 
to happen.17 Wegner shows that the feeling of having willed is often created 
by the mind for acts done unconsciously, or even for actions done by others.18 
It thus seems that we are psychologically arranged to attribute actions to 
either the self or others, and that this creates the illusion of will. Why then, 
given the problematic history associated with the concept of the will, should 
this thesis seek to resurrect it now? The reason is simple: the will 
encapsulates a means of understanding our own behaviour and that of 
others. The will, it is suggested, provides a fundamental means to understand 
the proper conception of social disadvantage, combining as it does the idea of 
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relative comparison and moral assessment of the rightness of that 
relationship.  
The actual existence of a ‘thing’ called the will is unlikely, but as a 
conceptual device it is both readily accepted as an intelligible notion, and 
explanatorily effective. Furthermore, as George Ainslie observes, just 
because we speak about a unifying organ named the ‘self’, there does not 
actually need to be such an organ existing as a physical thing.19 Dennett sees 
this organising entity as a virtual construct arising as a consequence of the 
need for our ‘selves’ as agents to communicate with each other without 
revealing our motivations or intentions.20 This implies the possibility of truth 
and deception in our relations with one another, and introduces the idea of 
morality.  
So, does the term ‘the will’ describe a real substantive entity, or does it 
represent a sort of shorthand for the experience of conscious activity? In 
other words, is the will akin to soul-stuff as Descartes would suggest, or is it 
an illusion created by the brain? In the next two sub-sections we will look first 
at the substantive view of the will, and compare this with the conception of the 
will as illusory-but-experientially-real (this will be referred to as the 
‘experiential’ view). Once this analysis has been completed we will turn to the 
extended view of the will.  Although the argument will favour the experiential 
(and extended) view, regardless of how convincing the argument that the 
experience of will is illusory, in the context of social disadvantage this 
argument does not turn on this issue. Even so, as will be explained in the 
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second sub-section, this distinction does have a significant impact upon the 
consequences of the conception of social disadvantage as impairment of the 
will. If the will is accepted as being substantively real, then contrary to the 
standard claim that moral responsibility requires a robust notion of the self, it 
is argued that the connection with morality is somewhat weakened. This is 
because the substantive view of the will makes morality a matter of the 
individual’s self-centred relations with others, (often based on compliance with 
externally derived rules) whereas the extended will immerses the self within 
the framework of others in a synergy of mutual moral relations. Yet since the 
delimited view is likely only to be compatible with a substantive view, and 
since it is argued that this is implausible, then the extended view of the will is 
to be preferred. The compatibility of the extended with the experiential view of 
the will gives further reason for this preference. This is significant to the 
consequences of the conception of social disadvantage as impairment of the 
will, since it is through the acceptance of the extended view that the 
perfectionist development is made, and thus to the sufficientarian 
mechanisms of disadvantage that are supported in the subsequent chapters.  
 
2.1 The ‘Substantive View’ compared with the ‘Experiential View’. 
This subsection will first consider the proposition of the substantive view that 
the will represents an existent soul, immaterial spirit, or ‘mind’ that is 
synonymous with the self. It is suggested that the search for such an entity is 
to make a category mistake (as Ryle forcefully argues). The experiential view 
is then considered (which does not commit the category mistake) and it is 
shown that the experience of will can come apart from our actions in such a 
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way as to contradict the substantive view (as Wegner demonstrates). This 
would suggest that the experiential view is the more likely. These arguments 
prepare the ground for the second subsection in which candidates for the 
location of the will are considered. Since the substantive view is committed to 
locating the will within the brain alone, it is argued that this view is confronted 
with insurmountable difficulties. Since the experiential view is not so 
committed, it is also to be preferred as being the least problematic. This will 
produce the strongest conception of the will, and thus the form that the 
conception of disadvantage as the impairment of the will must meet. 
The substantive view of the will, as Ryle describes it, is part of “the 
official doctrine” of mind/body dualism that he traces back to Rene 
Descartes.21 Although the idea of a separate human soul has a theological 
origin, Descartes attempted to ‘prove’ the possibility of non-physical existence 
through reason in order to reconcile Christian belief with scientific method.22 
Descartes therefore sought philosophical congruence between scientific 
reasoning and the view that “the human soul does not perish with the body” in 
order to refute the arguments of infidels that might suggest otherwise.23 Such 
a view suggests that although the body occupies time and space, the mind 
occupies some other timeless spirit space. The physical world (including 
one’s body) is conceived as external, whilst the mind is said to occupy the 
internal.24 From this viewpoint, the self is supposed to have a privileged 
access to the goings on of its own mind (will, volitions and desires) but have 
no access to the goings on in the minds of others or the external world other 
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than through the perceptions of this inner world. Ryle describes this view as 
“absurd” saying “I shall often speak of it, with deliberate abusiveness, as ‘the 
dogma of the Ghost in the Machine’”.25 
Thus represented, we are left with the puzzle of how a mental activity 
in this spirit realm can cause a hand to move, say, or any other such action in 
the physical world. Aside from the difficulties of conceiving such an 
interaction, it also requires that the ‘self’ is an uncaused cause. The proposal 
would suggest that this non-physical soul possesses the power not only to 
cause physical entities to move, but also without having any external cause 
for doing so. If the soul is synonymous with the true ‘self’, and is expressed in 
terms of the will, then any resultant action would be causa sui.  
 The apparent advantage of such beliefs (which it must be admitted are 
intuitively very powerful, as evidenced by the widespread belief in a spirit 
world) is the explanation of morality as God-given laws. Yet even then, such a 
morality would suggest that an act is morally good just because some spirit 
entity said so, rather than that a morally good act is good in itself. 
Furthermore, the creation of the belief in a spirit world is also at the same root 
as the creation of the experience of our own will, as Wegner suggests and as 
will be explained shortly.  
Ryle starts the destruction of the ‘official doctrine’ by pointing out the 
“category mistake”.26 He does this with a series of illustrations starting with 
the example of a foreign student visiting Oxford or Cambridge. He is shown 
the various colleges, playing fields, libraries, museums and departments. 
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Having done so, the student asks ‘where is the University?’ since he was 
expecting that the term ‘university’ named another building of the same type 
as the others:  
 
His mistake lay in his innocent assumption that it was correct to 
speak of Christ Church, the Bodleian Library, the Ashmolean 
Museum and the University, to speak, that is, as if ‘the 
University’ stood for an extra member of the class of which 
these other units are members.27 
 
Notice that in this example, the mistake is in regard to which category the 
buildings are to be placed. Yet the category mistake can also apply to 
processes and activities rather than units. Ryle illustrates this in his example 
of a game of cricket in which a foreigner sees the bowler, fielders and wicket 
keeper and then wonders whose role it is to exercise team spirit. Ryle argues 
that the representation of a person as a ghost in the machine is to repeat this 
mistake. 
Such a representation of a non-physical self is thus at the root of the 
mistaken search for the location of the soul. This is the apparent puzzle of 
identifying where exactly the ghostly ‘self’ is located and how does this ghost 
work itself? According to Ryle, the first problem does not exist since it rests 
on the same mistake as the foreigner trying to locate the team spirit in a game 
of cricket. The second part of the question then simply disappears, but even if 
this is so, how it might work would still be problematic. If the soul represents 
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an immaterial ‘self’ controlling the physical body (which by definition is then 
‘not-self’) such a view is to posit a homunculus. The idea might then be 
extended to suggest that the homunculus itself might be controlled by another 
inner soul and so on to infinite regress.  
Nevertheless, even if the will is ultimately no more than an illusion as 
Wegner suggests, the will can still exist in a practical sense in much the same 
way that Dennett uses the ‘intentional stance’ to explain consciousness.28 In 
using this approach the observer makes an assumption of what the agent 
ought to do as a rational being with desires. Although the intentional stance 
can be applied to objects such as a room thermostat, this approach is most 
appropriately applied towards living creatures. Take Dennett’s example of a 
person calling in at a shop on his way home from work to pick up a bottle of 
wine.29 This event might well be explained from a physical stance by an 
omniscient being who was aware of all the biochemical and subatomic 
interactions that occur in the person; was aware of the weather and road 
conditions; could calculate the mechanical processes within the engine and 
transmission to predict that the car would travel reliably and in which 
direction; could calculate that another car setting off from the opposite 
direction would brake when a light bulb operated in a stop light at the 
crossroads, and so on. Even then, how would this being know that the person 
getting out of the car to go into the shop would get back into it again? The 
physical stance has extraordinary difficulty in accounting for this, yet the 
intentional stance can easily predict such activities: but is not an alternative 
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‘shortcut’ to the physical stance: it is a practical approach that recognises 
patterns of behaviour that are not available from the physical stance.  
Using this practical approach, one’s behaviours, beliefs and attitudes 
towards oneself and others can be interpreted using the concept of the will as 
a metaphor for what is actually going on inside our minds. The existence of 
the will may well be ultimately illusory, but the situation remains that we 
behave as though we have genuine will, we hold reactive attitudes towards 
one another as though we have genuine will, and that we can understand and 
interpret the behaviour of others as though we have will.30 Thus in a practical 
sense, there is no distinction between apparent will and genuine will. Even 
Ryle can accept the efficacy of our everyday use of the conception: he just 
denies that the concept is coherent as an explanation of how the mind really 
works.31  
Most of our actions do not involve the experience of will, and even 
those actions that are claimed to do so cannot really be apprehended. When 
one consciously focuses upon a particular action with the express intention of 
trying to experience ‘will’, the experience eludes us. An act of creativity simply 
pops into our heads without any awareness of how it got there. We still claim 
the credit for it nevertheless – after all, who else would we credit? We are 
always sensitive of the need to attribute authorship to actions. Even though 
the cricketer intends to swing the bat and hit the ball, such actions are not 
experienced as will: the bat becomes part of the batsman, he is ‘in the zone’, 
He might even explain the ‘six’ he scores in terms of noticing the bowler’s arm 
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movements, hand position, direction of spin, the moment of release and so 
forth, but the speed of such actions are beyond conscious apprehension, and 
are more likely to be the result of reflex. It would therefore appear that such 
explanations are applied afterwards.  
This tendency to apply explanations after the event appears to be 
commonplace, and represents the normal way in which we attribute reasons 
to our own actions. For example, take the challenge ‘why didn’t you ring’, or 
‘why didn’t you answer the phone’, made by a partner, friend, or colleague, to 
which your response might be ‘I was busy’. Whilst this might in fact be true, 
the reason is often applied afterwards to justify the action (or inaction in this 
case). Although this example relates to a commonplace but trivial scenario, 
such retrospective application of reasons is given for even the most serious 
actions: he murdered his wife, say, when he found her with a lover, but the 
retrospective reason of ‘crime of passion’ is applied. Although he may be the 
author of the crime, he cannot give an account of his experience of will at the 
time, and those in judgement are asked to accept it as reasonable that he 
would not be able to furnish such an account. 
Furthermore, the experience of will can easily come apart from the 
action in other ways: the ‘self’ can be fooled into believing that an action 
caused by another was in fact their own; or believe that their own actions 
were caused by someone else; or fail to experience one’s own actions at all; 
or to experience actions as willed when no action happens at all; or to 
attribute one’s own actions to the will of another. Daniel Wegner offers 
numerous examples of these effects involving such things as Ouija boards, 
phantom limbs, hypnosis, alien hand syndrome, dissociative identity disorder, 
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laboratory experiments involving other person’s hands, and automatistic 
effects such as dowsing, automatic writing and the use of the Chevreul 
pendulum in divination. In each case the experience of will is either claimed 
by the subject or attributed to some other real or imaginary consciousness. 
Thus in the Ouija board, will is attributed to ‘spirits’; phantom limbs are 
experienced as under the wilful control of the amputee; the hypnotised 
subject believes that she is under the control of the hypnotist; the victim of the 
alien hand has no experience of wilful control over the hand which is undoing 
a shirt button, and so forth. It thus seems that wherever a bodily action is 
observed, we are ready to assign some form of willing agent that has caused 
it. 
These examples are supported by the experimental research of 
Benjamin Libet, who noted that specific brain activity (the “readiness 
potential”) occurs 550ms before the subject becomes aware of an intention to 
act.32 This would suggest that ‘voluntary’ actions begin involuntarily, and thus 
the experience of will would be added after the action has commenced. Libet 
points out, however, that conscious functions might still control the outcome 
by vetoing the act, thus leaving a space for free will.33 Yet even the ‘action’ of 
the veto may itself start unconsciously, and would thus be accompanied by a 
readiness potential of its own, but since this would be an entirely 
unobservable mental ‘act’ it remains mere supposition. Notwithstanding that 
Libet’s findings are not conclusive, it would appear at least that the 
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experience of will occurs “at some point after the brain has already started 
preparing for the action”.34  
So, it would appear that in order for a person to report the experience 
of will, she must have a thought just prior to the action, although this thought 
is itself preceded by an unconscious process. In addition to this priority of 
thought, Wegner notes two further things necessary to the experience of will: 
consistency, and exclusivity.35 The thought must be just prior to the action, be 
consistent with the sort of action that occurs, and there must be no other 
agent that might also be credited with causing that action. Disrupt any of 
these and the experience of conscious will does not occur. Thus, for example, 
one might concentrate on a tree branch on a windless day and will it to move. 
If the branch moves immediately after the thought, one might be inclined to 
believe that the willing had caused the movement. If, however, the branch 
does not move until sometime after the thought, or if it moved before the 
thought, then one would not experience the feeling of having willed the action. 
If one had willed it to move, but instead it was struck by lightning, then the 
thought would not be consistent with the action and again the experience of 
will would not occur. Likewise, if one notices that it is in fact windy outside, or 
if a squirrel happened to walk along the branch at that time, then there would 
be a rival cause and the feeling of having caused the movement would not be 
experienced. On the other hand, if the movement occurs just after the 
thought, and there are no other reasons to disrupt the feeling of having 
caused it, then one is likely to experience having willed the action.  
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The importance of priority, consistency, and exclusivity have been 
borne out in a number of ingenious experiments such as Albert Michotte’s 
‘launching disc’, Wegner and Wheatley’s ‘I Spy Study’, and in the idea of 
‘attribution theory’ which attempts to give a psychological answer as to why 
persons infer causal influences to the behaviour of themselves and others.36 
Such processes would be consistent with the imagined telekinesis effect, the 
invention of spiritual causation, automatism, and the invention of God as “the 
ultimate imaginary friend”.37 The conclusion that Wegner reaches is that the 
brain is a device which produces the experience of conscious will so as to 
position the self in relation to the environment. This will is illusory, and 
displaceable, but provides a “compass” for the individual to negotiate her 
social and physical environment.38  
In negotiating this environment, each person must therefore behave in 
a framework of belief in their own conscious experience of the world as 
accurately reflecting a ‘reality for us’: each of us thus has an illusion of will 
that is experientially real. Although it will not be argued for here, the 
simultaneous operation of each person within this framework may also 
produce a belief in moral responsibility that can also be considered as being 
ultimately illusory, but in terms of the human experience is very real. The 
actual truth of morality as a construction (along with the truth of the 
conception of will) is therefore dependent upon the belief in the reality of our 
experiences and the way in which we respond to those experiences. As Peter 
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Strawson has emphasised, this is the ‘truth’ of our reactive attitudes.39 So, if 
moral responsibility and will are to make sense, they can only be defined in 
terms of this framework. The investigation into disadvantage thus applies to 
the context in which the will exists, not the matter of whether the will 
represents anything other than an illusion outside of this framework. The 
question as to the existence of the will is then akin to asking if moral 
responsibility exists outside of our social interactions. Clearly it does not, but 
that is not the same thing as suggesting that moral responsibility does not 
exist within our relations with each other. 
Such observations are thus of limited impact upon the conception of 
disadvantage as impairment of the will (although it will be argued in the next 
subsection that the consequences of this distinction are significant). If the will 
is regarded as real, then disadvantage can represent impairment of this 
substantive conception, but if illusory, then disadvantage can represent an 
impairment of the social means by which persons relate to each other. As 
Daniel Dennett suggests by the subtitle of his book Elbow Room, we have all 
the “free will worth wanting” at least so far as the conception of disadvantage 
is concerned.40 Even if illusory, the experience of will is real enough just as 
Wegner’s “illusory pain is still pain” comment makes clear.41 The way in which 
we relate to one another, and thus the conception of moral responsibility, is 
also, as Dennett and Wegner agree “quite real”.42 
To sum up this section, practical evidence has been offered to suggest 
that the will is an illusory creation of the mind. It allows us to orient a ‘self’ in 
                                            
39
 Strawson, P., 1962, pp. 1-25 
40
 Dennett, D., 1984 
41
 Wegner, D., 2002, p. 14 
42
 Dennett, D., 2003, p. 224 
Chapter Five – What is The Will?   
S. Magee                                     June 2012 171 
relation to others, to attribute actions and gives a foundation for moral 
responsibility. In contrast, the substantive conception of the will is confronted 
with perhaps insurmountable difficulties. The trump card for the substantive 
conception is the claim that only a truly free will can provide sufficiently robust 
foundations for the truth of morality. Yet even this claim, it is suggested, is 
mistaken. The experiential conception of the will, when combined with notion 
of the will as extended (as will be described next) makes an even stronger 
foundation than does the substantive view. 
If the will is accepted as experiential, or even if one still wants to hold 
on to the idea of a substantive will, the question remains as to its location. 
Notwithstanding Ryle’s suggestion that such a search would be to commit a 
category mistake, the intuitive belief is that the will (or rather the experience) 
exists somewhere in our heads, either in a specific area of the brain, or 
distributed across different functional areas. However, there is also a third 
possibility that the will is extended beyond the brain of the individual to 
incorporate one’s culture, technology and other environmental circumstances. 
This avoids Ryle’s ‘category mistake’ accusation in that the search is not for 
an entity as though it were a member of a set of physical components or 
activities. It would be akin to looking for Oxford or Cambridge universities by 
looking to the collection of buildings as a whole as well as the people, 
functions and activities that give the university its identity. It is this argument 
that will be addressed next. 
 
2.2 The Extended Will 
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This next sub-section will be in two parts. In the first part, it is argued that the 
will is not delimited just within the mind of the individual. It is suggested that 
such a view is only compatible with a substantive view of the will, and that this 
view is met with perhaps insurmountable difficulties. Since the substantive 
view has already been shown to be rather unlikely, it is far more plausible to 
suppose that the will describes an illusory-but-experientially-real concept. The 
second part will complete the argument that the extended will is to be 
preferred due to its compatibility with the experiential view of will and 
incompatibility with the notion of substantive will.  
It would even seem that the conception of the will as a useful illusion is 
becoming the mainstream position.43 It is now almost universally accepted 
that Cartesian dualism is unsustainable. The argument against such dualism 
is partly practical and partly philosophical: neuroscience has been unable to 
locate any single area of the brain that might contain such an influential 
‘thing’. Despite extensive research into mapping distinct functional areas, and 
studies into the effect of brain injury upon conscious experience, there has 
been no success in locating a single area responsible for our experience of 
consciousness.44 Nevertheless, consciousness is not synonymous with the 
experience of will (the exploration of the nature of consciousness is beyond 
the scope of the thesis and will not be undertaken here). Yet it must be borne 
in mind that without consciousness one cannot have will, so if a seat of 
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consciousness cannot be found it would also entail that a seat of will cannot 
be found either. 
Even if such an area could be located, it merely postpones the search 
for the source of the will. It would be vulnerable to further subdivision to find 
exactly which part of that area represented the controlling ‘self’, and so on in 
an infinite regress. It would therefore seem that no such single point exists. 
Even so, it does appear that some form of executive control takes place in the 
frontal lobes, but as Wegner points out, “this sort of evidence tells us little 
about where the experience of will might arise”.45  
This gives rise to the possibility that the will is an epiphenomenal effect 
produced by the distribution of functional components across the entire brain. 
It would be akin to a circuit board model of the brain in which different 
processors handle different sources of data. Yet if the will is distributed over 
the various parts of the brain, then where is the self? As Jerry Fodor puts it “if 
[…] there is a community of computers living in my head, there had also 
better be somebody who is in charge; and, by God, it had better be me”.46 
Fodor’s objection to the distributed ‘self’ points out that regardless of the 
functional construction of the brain, it still needs to have a ‘controlling mind’ 
identified as the ‘self’. It thus seems to be committed to the existence of a 
substantive and localised will. Although we should not get drawn into the side 
issue of the theory of mind, such a view would be consistent with Fodor’s 
advocacy of the realistic view of the propositional attitudes (beliefs and 
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desires).47 Just as Fodor argues that these attitudes represent actual brain 
states, the experience of will would also be representative of a brain state 
capable of causal relations to actions.48 
Yet the idea of a ‘controlling mind’ does not entail that the controlling 
mind has to be understood in a substantive sense, although this is how Fodor 
takes it to be. The search for the source of the will confuses the ontological 
existence of the will with the experience of willing as such: It is, as Ryle points 
out, a category mistake to place experiences within the same group as 
physical materials. Nevertheless, and regardless of whether one is a realist, 
instrumentalist, or eliminativist in this matter, one cannot deny the practical 
usefulness of such a conception in explaining and predicting behaviour. 
Perhaps though, it might be possible to conceive of a distributed, but 
ultimately illusory will? In such a model, one would take the ‘inputs’ of various 
sense organs, and of the multiple other inputs distributed around the body 
(such as proprioceptors, thermoregulatory sensors, balance and so forth) and 
process these inputs within different parts of the brain. These would then 
somehow produce a collective experience of an illusory will. Unfortunately, 
this would seem to require that somewhere in the brain, these various 
distributed processors would need to be brought together collated and 
controlled within a single area of the brain (such as the frontal lobes) in order 
to produce this experience. Such a view must either return to the substantive 
will (and thus be vulnerable to either Fodor’s objection to the location of the 
distributed self, or to the infinite regress of the homunculus if localised) or 
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accept that each one of these ‘inputs’ is as much a part of the experience of 
self as any other. The existence or otherwise of a collating and controlling 
area is not then synonymous with the self, it is merely another part of that 
experience. Thus if we had different ‘inputs’, such as different memories, 
feelings, seeing things from a particular angle, and so forth, we would have a 
different experience of self. This would be regardless of any controlling or 
collating centre, and therefore this would not be the locus of the will. 
Nevertheless, although the conception of disadvantage as impairment 
of the will has yet to be explored, if the will is conceived to be substantive, 
then one would be disadvantaged relative to others if one could not exercise 
will on equal terms with others. However, the connection with other persons 
would be somewhat weakened. The basis for morality would then be either an 
individualistic and atomistic matter of ones relations with others, or as 
obedience to rules provided by a lawgiver (such as a God’s commandments).  
This, it is suggested, is an impoverished view since it loses the notion of 
intrinsic ‘rightness’ in a morally good act, and would reduce relations with 
others to grounds of rationality and interests rather than respect for others as 
moral ends or moral equals. Although it might be objected that the 
substantive view of the will does not make the commitments suggested, 
without being drawn into the debate surrounding the nature of morality, it is 
merely observed that in order to avoid these commitments (and thus accept 
that a moral act can be intrinsically good or right) one must move towards an 
extended view of humanity. 
To sum up this part of the argument, it would appear that if the will is 
substantive, however unlikely this appears, then it could be located only in the 
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brain. The substantive view of the will is unlikely because it has not been 
found to be localised within any particular area of the brain, and a distributed 
view would be vulnerable to Fodor’s objection. Yet the localised view is both 
committed to the substantive will and vulnerable to the problem of infinite 
regression. This would suggest the falsity of the idea of the will as being 
entirely located within the brain. 
 Let us look now to the second part of the argument: that the will ought 
to be considered as extending beyond the individual mind. The inability to 
locate an area of the brain responsible for the experience of will now adds 
weight to this argument. Similarly, the incompatibility of the experiential view 
of the will with the delimited location becomes a strength of the extended 
experiential view. When the notion that the current ‘self’ would not be the 
same ‘self’ as might exist under different cultures and environments is taken 
into account, the argument for an extended will seems far more plausible than 
the bodily delimited version. How then might the ‘self’ exist outside of the 
confines of the individual body? 
 If the will is not ‘found’ to reside at any particular place within the brain, 
then where is the ‘self’? An interesting solution to this ‘identification’ problem 
is the idea of the extended will. This solution suggests that the will of the 
individual is not in fact located just within the biological boundaries of the 
person: it is widely distributed across the community, the culture, the 
environment, and the technology that the individual is able to access and 
make a part of her identity. The extended view of the will is supported by 
authors such as Andy Clark, David Chalmers, Philip Pettit, and Daniel 
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Dennett.49 These writers are not looking for a metaphysical perfectionist ideal 
for humanity however: they are merely looking for a rationalistic approach to 
the experience of will. Nevertheless, Dennett and Pettit recognise that the 
extended will can be considered as foundational to morality, and so to this 
extent are also discussing metaphysics.50 
Clark and Chalmers argue that there is no material difference between 
having a notepad to record information, or having it stored in biological 
memory.51 Clark develops this idea to suggest that the person with a cochlea 
implant who can now hear sounds beyond the pitch of normal hearing will 
soon identify such hearing as being part of their own ability, or that the person 
with an enhanced prosthetic arm will soon become accustomed to what they 
can and cannot now lift.52 The person does not regard natural biological 
memory as other than herself, or her hearing as a separate sensory organ 
that the self uses, or judge her lifting ability separately from the self that does 
the lifting. As Clark puts it, “it seems less and less clear where what ‘I’ know 
stops and what ‘it‘(the plug-in) makes available starts”.53 
Although these scenarios involve enhancements to an individual’s 
body, it might also be the case that we use the memories, skills and abilities 
of other people as part of our own resources and identity. This is precisely the 
idea of the social context of the extended will. Whilst no further comment will 
be made as to the locus of cognition, or the nature of neuroscience in relation 
to the mind, it is simply noted that the idea of disadvantage as the impairment 
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of the will is not threatened by such concerns: on the contrary, in comparison 
with a substantive will, the conception of disadvantage as impairment of the 
will is facilitated by the extended view (as will be explained shortly). Concerns 
relating to cognition and neuroscience are beyond the scope of this thesis in 
any case. Even so, the much less ambitious claim is made that the will of the 
individual cannot exist as part of the same self when taken out of context. The 
individual willing human being would not, and perhaps could not, will in the 
same way without having the community, culture, technology and social 
structures to provide the necessary framework. As such the will is embodied 
within one’s environment and creates that environment in return. 
Disadvantage as impairment of the will can thus relate not only to the 
individual person, but to any of the pathways and circumstances of her 
environment that isolate her from those social interactions.  
To put this view of the will into the context of the capabilities approach, 
we can now say that when a person is denied the opportunity to achieve 
certain functionings, she is unfairly disadvantaged because her will is 
impaired from achieving a valuable objective. This valuable objective is one 
that all persons would expect to be able to attain as moral equals in that 
particular community, that is, one that aligns with (or at least progresses 
toward) the ideal model of capability within the means of that community to 
facilitate such ‘goods’. The term ‘certain functionings’ would thus refer to 
those beings and doings that comprise the essential aspects of human well-
being, such as might be specified in Nussbaum’s list of central capabilities, for 
example. The denial of the opportunity to achieve these valuable functionings 
as a moral equal is paradigmatically unfair. Although impairment of the will 
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can relate to both the beings and doings of the capabilities approach, the will 
is more directly impaired when doings are obstructed (which then fail to be 
realised as beings). Take for example the functioning of being well nourished. 
This is not normally considered to be an act of will (although its opposite, the 
choice to fast most definitely is). However, as the contrast between the 
person achieving this function through eating boiled rice and the person 
eating plovers eggs demonstrates, how one achieves this functioning (the 
doings) is an act of will and can therefore be impaired or not. 
Since agency freedom is an expression of the opportunities to achieve 
functionings, agency freedom is the practical description and assessment of 
the impairment of the will. There is a normative comparison between the 
circumstances of the person’s situation (comparison with the ideal capabilities 
model) and the goodness or rightness of that condition (the moral 
assessment of the fairness). The goodness or rightness of the will in seeking 
to fulfil particular functionings is then informed by the social context of the 
extended will such that the objective is accepted as being valuable by the 
individual and by the greater community in which she lives.  
In contrast to the substantive view, then, disadvantage conceived as 
impairment of the extended will makes our relationships with each other 
central. In doing so the framework of our interactions with each other 
becomes intrinsically a matter of morality. Unlike the substantive view’s 
individualistic approach to our moral interactions, the extended view makes 
disadvantage a concern of unity, rather than division: it is not a matter of the 
‘haves’ versus the ‘have nots’, but a social concern of all of us. Whereas the 
capabilities approach has hitherto been presented as a set of conditions that 
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an individual must be able to access (which positions the self apart from the 
wider community) capabilities can now be seen as a set of conditions for 
which all persons must participate in meeting as moral equals. This 
conception lends itself to the perfectionist ideal for humanity by recognising 
the intimate relationship between morality and the community as a whole, and 
treats the person not as an observer looking in, but as a part of that 
framework. 
A final comment must now be made to counter a possible objection. It 
has been claimed that the will is as real as the experience of pain. It has also 
been claimed that the experience of will might correlate with biochemical 
processes in the brain, in a similar way to which the experience of pain arises. 
Yet if will is experienced entirely within the brain, then how can the will also 
be extended outside of these processes: it would be akin to suggesting that 
pain can be external to the body?  
The answer to this objection is threefold: firstly in the distinction 
between the biochemical processes and the experience, secondly in pointing 
out the category mistake, and thirdly in the application of the experience after 
the event. The first part of the response points out that the experience of will 
is more than just the biochemical changes. These changes might be a 
necessary part, but they are not sufficient. One also requires (as Wegner has 
pointed out) that an external event takes place in the right way, at the right 
time, and with no rival causal factors. Whilst this might seem to posit a 
mysterious metaphysical entity that makes up the missing internal 
components for the experience of will, such a move would be to commit the 
category mistake to which Ryle drew attention. The objection would thus 
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make the mistake of assuming that just because an individual’s brain might 
undergo certain biochemical processes (that are then taken to ‘produce’ the 
experience of will) that these processes are identical with the will: it would be 
akin to assuming that ‘team spirit’ is located in the biochemical changes in the 
brains of each one of the players on the team. The third part of the response 
is to point out that the experience of will seems to be applied after the event 
(so to speak). The biochemical processes would therefore occur in response 
to external stimuli, and these are then experienced as will. In other words, the 
mind draws together all of the components parts that comprise the person’s 
will, and then produces the experience of will. This must include those 
component parts that are external to the biological brain of the individual: the 
biochemistry might be internal, but the experience of the will includes the 
external. It is therefore consistent with this view that the experience of will can 
be extended to include external components. 
Furthermore, it is also pointed out that the biochemical processes that 
might give rise to the experience of pain can also have an external source, at 
least so far as emotional distress is concerned. Take the example of grief: the 
loss of a loved-one might cause biochemical changes in the brain which are 
then experienced as distress. The source of such distress is external and as 
such is an intrinsic part of the pain experienced as grief.  
Given the importance of the framework of social interactions to the 
conception of the will and moral responsibility, we can now proceed with the 
investigation into disadvantage with a conception of the will understood as 
being real enough, at least in a practical sense.  
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3. Conclusion 
We are not causa sui: we are not self-initiators of uncaused causes, although 
that is certainly how it feels. The experience of will is thus different from how 
things might actually be. As Wegner has demonstrated through examples of 
phantom limbs, hypnosis, dissociative identity disorder, laboratory 
experiments involving other person’s hands, and automatism, the experience 
of will can easily come apart from action. The ‘self’ can thus be falsely led to 
believe that one has willed an action to come about, when in reality the 
feeling of conscious will might just be our organism’s means of attributing 
authorship after the fact: a means of identifying that ‘I did that’ rather than 
someone else or no one at all. 
 Yet if this is so, then what is this ‘I’? Where does the self appear? This 
is Jerry Fodor’s concern, and one which Wegner answers in terms of the 
experience: the self is merely the locus of the experience of an illusory will. 
Just because the will is illusory, this does not make the experience any less 
real. The question then turns to the locus of this experience, and where that 
might be located. Andy Clark answers this in terms of the extended will. One 
cannot find a place where the experience of will is located any more than one 
might find Ryle’s university somewhere in addition to the buildings. Instead 
the will must be conceived holistically, as relating to the individual and her 
cultural, technological and environmental circumstances.  
So, in answer to the title question of this chapter, the will is the 
experience of our authorship or control over our circumstances (actions, 
thoughts, desires, wants, and choices) even if that authorship or control is 
ultimately illusory. As a capacity it is the recognition of authorship, but as an 
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activity it is the exercise of control. The experience is real, as is the morality 
that comes from that experience. It is extended to encompass our cultures, 
technology and circumstances in such a way that they are experienced as 
part of the identity of the self. Even though the experiential view of the will 
accepts that this experience is ultimately illusory, it is as real as pain, or as 
real as the conception of a university. Just as it makes sense to say that pain 
has been blocked, or that the role of the university has been impaired, it 
makes sense to say that one has been disadvantaged by the impairment of 
the will. In the next chapter, we will look at the implications of this view to the 
assessment of disadvantage. 
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Chapter Six  
Unfair Disadvantage as Impairment of the Will 
 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter, it is argued that impairment of the will is decisive to the 
assessment of unfair social disadvantage. It is about the impairment of willing 
as such rather than impairment of the formal will. If the affected individual has 
not been consulted or considered in the imposition of disadvantageous 
conditions, then that person has been denied the opportunity to exercise will, 
and has therefore been unfairly disadvantaged (provided that the impaired will 
is towards a valuable end, as will be explained). Such persons have been 
denied the ability to control their lives as equals and this lack of control 
relative to others, aside from any vulnerability from being the subject of 
control themselves, makes them unfairly disadvantaged.1 It is incumbent upon 
others to ensure that the wills of each individual are taken into account and 
given due weight as moral equals. This will be called the ‘consultation’ 
requirement. Conversely, it is argued that where will has been freely 
exercised, then any subsequent disadvantage is not unfair. The existence of 
social disadvantage alone does not show unfair impairment of the will, 
although it might usually be the case.   
It will then be argued that the exercise of will is necessary to individual 
self-realisation, or at least for progress towards that ideal, assuming that all 
individuals with the potential for self-realisation would wish to achieve it. This 
leads to the conception of ‘will-egalitarianism’: the idea that all persons ought 
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to have an equal opportunity to exercise their wills in progressing towards 
self-realisation. It follows from this idea that where a person has been denied 
the opportunity to exercise will (directed towards self-realisation) under 
circumstances that have neglected her moral equality, she has been unfairly 
disadvantaged. 
 
2. Preliminary Remarks and Assumptions 
As Don Ross comments, “the conceptual image of the will and the self that 
has been characteristic of western culture for several centuries is paying 
diminishing returns”.2 Given this difficulty, why then should a new thesis give 
the will such a prominent place? As Ross points out, these diminishing 
returns are not because the conception is useless or wrong, but because the 
will has been mistakenly taken to identify a real rather than a virtual concept.  
 This thesis does not make this mistake and takes the experience of will 
as the de facto will. As an experience it is real to the subject. Just as the 
experience of pain is pain, the experience of will is will. Furthermore, it is real 
in the most direct way: a way which makes it particularly relevant to the 
evaluation of disadvantage. Given that it would be rather an imaginative 
stretch to even conceptualise a fully functioning person without her having the 
experience of will, one must accept that the will is a necessary part of what it 
means to be a person. Without a notion of the will, persons must be 
considered as automatons, or zombies, blindly following a predetermined 
sequence of events in which any experience must be regarded as 
inconsequential. Yet such experiences, even if ultimately illusory, are not 
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inconsequential. They have consequences for us: they are felt as pleasure or 
pain, and such things matter just because they are experiences. It is notable 
that pain is important to all persons simply because of the negative 
experience it causes. Likewise, disadvantage is important to persons 
inasmuch as it causes a negative experience. After all, pain matters to us in 
just the same way as poverty, misery, oppression, stress, anxiety, and other 
such disadvantages matter to us: they matter for the negative experiences 
they impose (dysfunctional extremes aside).  
This is not to assume that pain is always bad in itself. There are 
circumstances where pain forms an important role in allowing us to become 
aware of harm, and thus to take action to avoid its source, or mitigate its 
effects. Similarly disadvantage is not always bad in itself. Thus, for example, 
the application of higher tax rates to the richest compared with lower taxes for 
the least well-off causes disadvantage (but not unfairly) for those persons 
well-off. Recall the distinction made in chapter two that disadvantage is 
normative in two distinct ways. Disadvantage is not always unfair since it can 
be compared with a model standard, and then evaluated as being either right 
or wrong; good or bad. 
The conception of social disadvantage is primarily about fairness: it is 
therefore a moral issue. The social connection between the extended will and 
morality avoids taking an overly individualistic perspective that the idea of the 
will has a tendency to lead. By recognising that the will of the self 
encompasses factors external to one’s physical body the moral importance of 
the will to unfair social disadvantage is revealed. One cannot plausibly object 
that impairment of the will does not matter because the will is only illusory 
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(and therefore that an impaired illusion has no consequences) because the 
will is a necessary part of what it means to be a person. The experience itself 
makes it important, and the extension of the will to incorporate the way in 
which we experience other things around us (persons, culture, technology et 
cetera) also matters.   
The term ‘unfair impairment’ might suggest that it is possible to impair 
the will fairly in some circumstances. One must reject this possibility 
inasmuch as the will is conceived formally. Nevertheless, when conceived in 
relation to moral action, the will can be fairly impaired as long as the affected 
individual is treated as a moral equal, or if the impaired will would not align 
with that individual’s self-realisation. This is the source of the ‘consultation’ 
requirement, and would allow the prevention of the satisfaction of harmful 
desires (unless wholeheartedly pursued and within the boundaries of self-
realisation).3 What counts as ‘self-realisation’ and how this is set will be 
discussed shortly. When the experiential and extended nature of the will is 
considered, such ‘fair impairment’ must be considered as no impairment at 
all, and so the question of fairness does not really arise. 
Yet it is possible to impair the development of the will, even when 
conceived formally. Such processes and techniques as indoctrination, and 
‘brainwashing’ are examples (although it will be left open as to where the line 
between education, indoctrination, and brainwashing lays).4 This is always 
unfair as it necessarily involves a failure to treat the person as a moral equal. 
It would follow from this that any consequent disadvantage caused by 
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external human agency that prevents the development of the will (and so 
prevents the possibility of self-realisation) must also be unfair.  
Although the acceptance of the concept of the will necessarily 
presupposes the question of its freedom, these two aspects are distinct. This 
requires further clarification in regard to impairment since this could relate to 
either the impairment of the will itself or to the impairment of its freedom. Thus 
to suggest that a person’s will is impaired could mean that the person is 
incapable of will perhaps as a result of brain injury. On the other hand, 
perhaps impairment could include a lack of natural capacity (which might then 
raise questions of personhood). Alternatively, it could mean that although the 
person is in possession of all her faculties, she is prevented from exercising 
them.  It is the latter account that is particularly significant to social 
disadvantage. 
When the term ‘impairment of the will’ is used, it refers to the 
impairment of the freedom of the will and thus to the opportunities available to 
the person, not to the conceptual part of personhood (unless specifically 
stated otherwise). Despite this distinction, these aspects are closely related, 
and for people with certain mental disabilities it may well be the case that the 
conceptual possibility of a will is not an appropriate assumption.5 Under these 
circumstances, the matter of personhood becomes questionable. Even so, it 
is not the intention within this thesis to address the conceptual requirements 
of personhood, so this matter is put to one side. The reader is simply 
                                            
5
 See Kittay, E., and Carlson, L., 2010, pp. 1-3, and chapters by Singer, P., and McMahan, J., 
pp. 331-369 of that volume. 
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reminded that it is the aim of this thesis to provide an account of social 
disadvantage as it applies to persons. 
Furthermore, it is also emphasised that the phrase ‘impairment of the 
will’ is only to be understood in relation to significant actions. It is thus only 
concerned with the wholehearted pursuit of valuable ends. Even though the 
ability to raise an arm on command can be described in terms of willing the 
arm to move, impairment of the will does not apply to such circumstances. 
Willing an action is only significant to the conception of disadvantage if the 
action willed is restricted in some way in which the person is treated as less 
than a moral equal in the process of that restriction. The will that is impaired 
must prevent or obstruct self-realisation to some extent.  
 
 
4. The Will and Self-Realisation 
 
Although self-realisation is an idea that formed the backbone of the British 
Idealists in the nineteenth century, the conception of an ideal model of a 
valuable human life has enjoyed something of a resurgence in the idea of 
capability. Capabilities theorists such as Sen, Nussbaum, Wolff and de-Shalit 
all accept that there is an ideal capability implicit in the conception.6 In this 
chapter, it is argued that all persons (as equal moral agents) are entitled, in 
virtue of their moral equality, to the same opportunities for self-realisation as 
everyone else. Self-realisation in this sense is the achievement of the full 
                                            
6
 Sen, A., 1995, pp. 46-9, and 2009, p. 233; Nussbaum, M., 2001, pp. 223-225, and 2006, p. 
12; and Wolff, J., and de-Shalit, A., 2007, pp. 36-40. All acknowledge some set of ideal 
capabilities or ideal model of human capability necessary to live a valuable life, so conceived. 
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attributes for ‘perfect’ personhood: a condition which represents an 
impossible ideal. This ideal is to be understood in the widest sense, and not 
just in terms of the attainment of valuable functionings (as the capabilities 
theorist would hold).7 Nevertheless, the attainment of such functionings would 
still be included as a necessary component of self-realisation. Unlike 
functionings however, self-realisation is not to be taken as an individualistic 
notion, or one that can be achieved in isolation from others. Since the will is to 
be understood as extended, and in alignment with a perfectionist ideal, the 
self-realisation of the individual necessarily encompasses the self-realisation 
of others in a mutually supportive and interdependent synthesis. 
 Self-realisation, then, is the attainment of ultimate well-being: it is the 
achievement of human perfection. However, the meaning of well-being in this 
sense is not self-centred: it recognises that for a person’s life go well for them 
to the greatest possible extent requires consideration for the needs of others. 
Well-being is a social concept. Even the acceptance of help from others can 
contribute towards one’s own and the assistant’s well-being.  The attainment 
of functionings, and the opportunities to achieve them, are thus socially 
dependent and necessary attributes of self-realisation. 
As a moral entity, perfection would entail that one acquires the 
character and virtues of a morally perfect or saintly being. Although such a 
conceptual being is an absurdity, to suggest that one should strive towards 
such a state is not absurd: it is merely to recognise the ambition. Self-
realisation would then be specific to each person, but hold in common with all 
persons the generic qualities of perfection, that is, that perfection would entail 
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 Sen, A., 1995, p. 49 
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virtues as opposed to the perfection of immoral attributes. These attributes 
must, of necessity, align with the extended wills of others within the 
community. This is because the virtues and vices are dependent upon 
(though not necessarily decided by) the societal norms for that particular 
community, and therefore virtues would be compatible whereas vices would 
not. 
Yet even the non-perfectionist might accept that a person can become 
a better or worse human being through the choices and actions that she 
makes. The language of personal development, continuous professional 
development, the significant number of publications on well-being, even the 
existence of religion and the commonly reported search for meaning in our 
lives, all point towards it being in our nature to seek improvement. The 
process of self-realisation might therefore be acceptable to those who are not 
convinced by a perfectionist ideal. The process of becoming might in itself be 
sufficient for this thesis (as will be described shortly) provided that one also 
accepts the notion of moral goodness. 
The interconnectedness of morality and the will is evident within the 
context of a community in which all persons seek mutual self-realisation. The 
essential conditions for the achievement of this ideal include such things as 
dignity, self-respect, access to a loving and nurturing environment (especially 
during childhood) and such like. Rawls’s two moral powers (the capacity for a 
sense of justice, and the capacity for a conception of the good) can also be 
Chapter Six – Unfair Disadvantage as Impairment of the Will 
   
S. Magee                                     June 2012 192 
considered as essentials in this respect.8 The perfectionist element relates to 
the attainment of an ideal in which the will is directed towards this end.  
It is the role of community that is particularly important to the 
conception of self-realisation, inasmuch as we are looking at the problem of 
social disadvantage. It is the community in which one lives that provides the 
opportunities for self-realisation, determines to some extent what that entails 
(practically more than spiritually), and so determines what social 
disadvantage is in relation to that community. Yet it does not seem strictly 
necessary to require the achievement of full self-realisation in order to obtain 
a working tool to define disadvantage. Although self-realisation is regarded as 
the attainment of a state of perfection of the self, such a metaphysical 
conception may only define the limits of the term: it may not be necessary in 
practice. One can hold onto the theoretical model of an ideal self whilst 
recognising that here and now, within the circumstances that one finds 
oneself and the materials one has to work with, that the aim should be to 
achieve a more limited view of optimisation rather than ‘perfection’.  
This view of self-realisation as optimisation will of course depend on 
the prevailing circumstances, such that in ideal circumstances full self-
realisation would align the optimum with the ideal, but in less than ideal 
circumstances, the best self that could be realised is also less than ideal. 
Thus in a state with restricted resources, say, the optimal self may be further 
from the ideal than in a state with plentiful resources. Yet many of the 
attributes of the ideal self are independent of such things as the availability of 
resources. For example, the achievement of the ideal self includes an 
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 Rawls, J., 2003, p. 114 
Chapter Six – Unfair Disadvantage as Impairment of the Will 
   
S. Magee                                     June 2012 193 
awareness that the good of the self aligns with the good of others. Therefore 
even in times of severe restrictions of resources, this would require that 
whatever scarce resources are available, that they should be shared 
equitably. This does not necessarily mean equally. As Sen has pointed out 
(and as discussed in chapter four) persons are not all the same: they might 
be different sizes; might be pregnant; have different metabolisms; or 
otherwise have unequal needs that may require unequal distribution.9  
Notice though, that one does not become unfairly disadvantaged in a 
community if all members of that community are in such dire straits that all 
are driven by circumstances of austerity. That is, in a community in severe 
poverty say, or where no one has a greater opportunity to exercise will than 
another, then no one is unfairly disadvantaged. Then again, such persons 
may be regarded as severely disadvantaged in comparison with other 
wealthier communities in which such choices are available. Although this has 
implications for global justice, this thesis is concerned with the role of the 
state in meeting the challenge of unfair disadvantage: the focus must 
therefore be on citizens as members of that state, not ‘persons’ or ‘individuals’ 
generally. The state’s responsibilities must be to ensure that all of its 
members are treated fairly by the arrangements of the state. Considerations 
of global justice are beyond the scope of this thesis and will not be explored 
further here. Nevertheless, they could form the basis of further research in the 
future. 
Recall however, that the will can relate to the formal will, or the act of 
willing as such. Whereas the formal will is necessarily free, at least in a social 
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context, the exercise of will need not be.10 The relationship between the 
formal will and the exercise of will is not symmetrical: One can develop one’s 
will through its exercise (inasmuch as one can refine a conception of the 
good, recognise which actions align with that conception, take stock of one’s 
beliefs and ensure consistency between them by adjusting one or the other) 
but one cannot attain moral perfection, that is achieve self-realisation, through 
that route alone. Thus an ill-defined will can become stronger and more 
focussed through its repeated exercise. Yet its exercise does not improve the 
moral rightness or goodness of that will. The phrase ‘power corrupts’ 
illustrates the problem of an excessive opportunity to exercise will, but a will 
that is constrained by regard for others is less exposed to this danger. Only a 
good will, that is, one in which the self both recognises the existence of others 
as moral equals, and recognises that as aligning with one’s own good, can 
possibly attain self-realisation since only then can the ‘constraint of others’ be 
considered as a liberating element of one’s own perfect self.  
The extended will is a moderating factor in this achievement since 
such a conception is both created by and creates the social norms of the 
community in which one lives. A will which merely accepts the constraint of 
the recognition of the equal rights of others could perhaps be regarded as 
morally neutral, inasmuch as those constraints are taken to be a pragmatic 
solution to the problem of Hobbesian competition.11 The view of self-
realisation of an extended will requires a moral conception of the good in 
                                            
10
 As an analytical conception, the term ‘will’ includes the conception of freedom since it 
would be meaningless without it. However, no commitment is made here in regard to 
deterministic freedom. 
11
 See Hobbes, 1998, pp. 507-8 
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which the good of the self aligns with the good of others not as a constraint, 
but as a liberation. It is an active embrace by the self as a part and product of 
one’s community. 
Since perfectionist self-realisation requires the extended will to be 
unimpeded, any impairment of the will towards that end would be manifested 
as disadvantage relative to the achievement had the will not been impaired. 
Yet when we are considering multiples of persons, and where impairment is 
caused through human agency, such impairment will be manifested as the 
disadvantage of the person relative to others. Such other persons might then 
be further towards their own state of self-realisation (with the caveat that one 
cannot progress far without realising that one’s own possibility of perfection 
depends upon the success of others towards their own self-realisation). 
Disadvantages that might occur in the absence of human agency, such as 
from natural disasters, or accidents of birth, are not in themselves examples 
of social disadvantage. It is how we relate to such persons and events that 
makes them social disadvantages, rather than simply disadvantageous 
circumstances.  
When such disadvantage is through human agency then the 
impairment of the will (towards self-realisation) is nearly always unfair. The 
exception to this is where conditions are so limited that no one can progress 
toward self-realisation. Still, given that a perfectionist ideal is unachievable in 
practice, it is the matter of progress towards self-realisation that is important. 
Since the treatment of others as ends is part of one’s own self-realisation, 
then it will not be possible to have unequal progress without some degree of 
unfairness for some. Therefore, any substantial inequality in progress towards 
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a person’s self-realisation through the actions of another will almost always 
be unfair.   
Yet the structures and arrangements of the societies in which we live 
can profoundly affect the opportunities for self-realisation, and thus the 
achievement of each person’s due as a moral equal. Furthermore, it is not 
only each person’s due as a moral equal that is affected: it is also their 
chances for moral development. This would suggest that the less equal a 
society is in terms of welfare, resources, or liberty, the more likely it is that 
persons within that society have had their wills unfairly impaired. Such a 
mechanism does not suggest that the inequality is objectionable in itself, but 
locates the objection in the fact of disruption to the wills of some members of 
that society relative to others. Wilkinson and Pickett are thus correct to point 
out that an unequal society is a dysfunctional one, but could not explain why 
equal societies perform better in terms of such things as unwanted pregnancy 
rates, social mistrust, physical and mental health, crime rates, obesity, and 
other such social measures.12 The idea of impairment of the will can give an 
account of why this should be so without resorting to the “rather shabby” 
comparison between what some people have relative to others (as so 
annoyed Frankfurt).13 Unequal societies simply tolerate unfairness and permit 
the impairment of the wills of some persons relative to others: they thus 
ensure the suppression of moral development for the socially disadvantaged, 
and perpetuate the socially undesirable traits that Wilkinson and Pickett 
identify. Unequal societies prevent persons from recognising that their own 
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 Wilkinson, R., and Pickett, K., 2010, pp. 173-184 
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self-realisation depends on the facilitation of others and so perpetuates a 
Hobbesian outlook for society. Conceived as the impairment of the extended 
will, unfair disadvantage is not to be regarded as a shortage of a particular 
object or property: it is a disruption of our standing as equal moral persons.  
The connection between substantial inequality and fairness is therefore 
close, but not quite a necessary relationship (at least in the short term). There 
are two aspects that determine this relationship: degree of inequality, and 
duration. It is suggested that a large discrepancy over anything other than a 
very short term, or a moderate discrepancy over a long term, would almost 
certainly entail the unfair impairment of the will for those who are adversely 
affected.  
Taking the former aspect first, substantial inequality might result from 
natural disaster, and would not by that account amount to the unfair 
impairment of anyone’s will. However, if this inequality were sustained, that is, 
our response to the suffering of others allowed the resulting inequality to 
persist, then this would necessarily involve the unfair impairment of the 
opportunities for self-realisation of the victims by the inaction of those 
unaffected. It would necessitate a failure in those unaffected by the disaster to 
recognise that their own self-realisation depends upon assisting those in 
need. If such persons are able to assist and do not do so, they are 
necessarily treating the victims unfairly.  
In the second aspect, some moderate inequalities would be inevitable 
as persons will progress towards self-realisation at different rates. What 
would count as ‘moderate’ will be dealt with in the next chapter, but relates to 
a range of acceptability between upper and lower threshold levels of the will. 
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The existence of moderate inequality would not be unfair in itself, but since 
progress towards self-realisation requires the rendering of assistance to 
others, if any groups or individuals fail to make progress over a sustained 
period, then it is likely that they have had their wills unfairly impaired. Any 
specified timeframe would be arbitrary, it would therefore be reasonable to 
make such a judgement on a case by case basis. As an indicator however, 
persistent moderate inequality that adversely affected a group or individual 
might be measured in decades rather than generations. Any moderate 
inequality that persisted across generations would almost certainly be unfair 
by this account. This is because those better off in that society have failed to 
treat such persons as moral equals: they have failed to allow them access to 
an equal opportunity for self-realisation. Note however, that voluntary action 
to forego welfare, resources, or liberty is an exercise of will and therefore not 
unfair. Thus the persistence of poverty, say, in a monk who rejects 
materialistic concerns would not amount to unfair social disadvantage. When 
taken together with the idea of different rates of progression towards self-
realisation, and the idea of upper and lower thresholds of acceptability, some 
degree of general moderate inequality (not attributable to specific groups or 
individuals) could persist without being necessarily unfair. 
Returning now to the conception of self-realisation, this must describe 
the successful satisfaction of the will. This can take different paths to achieve, 
within limits of social acceptability (as will be explained in a moment). If 
someone’s self-realisation means that they need to become a doctor, or 
lawyer, or footballer, or window-cleaner, or carpet seller, they ought to have 
an equal opportunity to do so. Since the path to self-realisation can be 
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mutable over time, these opportunities must also remain open to such 
changes. 
Yet errors of judgement and human fallibility might cause individuals to 
mistake what is actually necessary for self-realisation. Where this is the case, 
the will is not going to be successfully satisfied. The self will not identify with 
the options available and so self-realisation will not be possible. The path to 
self-realisation will vary, depending upon the individual’s own conception of 
the good. It is this variability that makes it possible that persons might not be 
sufficiently self-aware to accurately identify their own needs and so may 
accept compromises, or make errors of judgement. For example, over-
ambition might cause individuals to mistake what is actually required for self-
realisation, leading to frustration of the will and disappointment.  
How then might the state fulfil its role of facilitating the self-realisation 
of its citizens when they are perhaps prone to error? This question will be 
addressed in more detail in chapter eight, but raises some relevant issues to 
unfair disadvantage that must be described here. If the state were obliged to 
facilitate all persons to achieve self-assessed and misguided attempts at self-
realisation, then this could be both wasteful and costly. The impositions upon 
the individual members of that state would also be excessive if not impossible 
to meet fairly. It would therefore seem that the state cannot meet all that is 
self-identified, and ‘affordability’ must be taken into account (though not 
simply conceived as resources). However, one must remember that it is the 
other members of the particular society that are the source of moral 
accountability, and thus the ultimate source of the self-realisation of the 
individual.  
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Furthermore, since only that which is good contributes towards one’s 
self-realisation there falls no obligation on the state to facilitate claims that do 
not actually contribute. Therefore those who identify with the bad as being for 
the time being their good cannot claim the assistance of the state to realise 
that ambition. The state cannot therefore assist in acts of vengeance on 
behalf of victims of crime, say. Similarly for those who have destructive 
tendencies, such as criminals and those with psychological dysfunctions. 
They too cannot claim assistance from the state to meet what they might 
mistakenly identify as their self-realisation. Those who would seek to profit by 
anti-social behaviour, or self-inflicted disadvantage, or deliberately wasteful 
behaviour, need not be allowed to become parasitic upon other members of 
the community since such behaviour does not actually contribute towards 
their own self-realisation. 
Recall from the previous chapter that the will can be either a capacity 
when passive, or an activity when exercised. As a capacity, it relates to the 
recognition of authorship: the placing of the self relative to a set of 
circumstances and accepting that ‘I did that’. This is the aspect of the will that 
produces moral responsibility when social interactions with other persons 
takes place. It is this aspect that is particularly sensitive to the social norms of 
the particular community, and is therefore the aspect that can most readily be 
envisaged as extending into the community in a two-way relationship. It is the 
aspect involved in the identification of valuable ends. Yet it is the will as an 
activity that is involved in the wholehearted pursuit of the valued activity. This 
idea of wholeheartedness is also used by Joseph Raz in his discussions of 
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well-being.14 As Raz puts it, “only valuable activities contribute to our well-
being”, and even laid-back inactivity, if chosen as a life-style, would also 
counts as wholeheartedness.15 Thus the will as activity, when taken together 
with the will as recognition of authorship makes possible the idea of self-
realisation. 
The notion of self-realisation of all persons within a society, each 
having their own mutually dependent interests, requires the idea of 
interconnectedness and compatibility between person’s ends such that no-
one’s will can fairly dominate or override anyone else’s. This idea will be 
called ‘will-egalitarianism’. It is this idea that we turn to next. 
 
5. Will-Egalitarianism 
In this next section, the idea of will-egalitarianism will be discussed, along 
with some of the implications that follow from this conception. Will-
egalitarianism is described as a principle of fairness and control over one’s 
choices and opportunities. So conceived, this allows will-egalitarianism to 
meet what is perhaps the greatest challenge to egalitarianism: the “levelling 
down” objection.16 This is the view that “society would be better, in one 
respect at least, if each person’s condition were reduced to that of the worst 
off individual”.17 This claim would suggest that in a world of blind persons, for 
example, if the only sighted person were to be blinded that this would be 
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better in a way, since fairer.18 Will-egalitarianism is not vulnerable to this 
objection. 
Will-egalitarianism is the idea that all persons ought to have the equal 
opportunity to exercise will. It is thus a principle of fairness. Since unfair social 
disadvantage is to be considered as resulting from the impairment of the will, 
this would suggest that a fair society is one in which all persons have an 
equal opportunity to exercise will within a scheme of equal opportunities for 
others to do likewise. Furthermore, the requirement of perfectionism (that 
individual self-realisation requires that others are also able to progress 
towards self-realisation) is more than simple reciprocity: it is interdependent 
mutuality.  
Yet it can also be regarded as a principle of control over the 
circumstances of one’s life. It is thus a matter of personal autonomy within a 
framework that sets limits to the exercise of that autonomy. As Daniel Dennett 
suggests, this is exactly what we want in order to be free: “we want to keep 
our options open, so that our chances of maintaining control over our options, 
come what may, are enhanced”.19 Will-egalitarianism adds to this experience 
of control by introducing a scheme whereby each can express control over 
their options on an equal (and mutually supportive) basis. 
 One is unfairly socially disadvantaged where one’s choices are 
restricted relative to others such that the person cannot progress towards 
self-realisation. In practice, such disadvantage would entail that any choices 
that exist do not carry significant moral responsibility, that is, significant 
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choices for which one might be held accountable, and not just trivial matters. 
This would require that the state pursue policies of empowerment to 
individuals, and to enable citizens to exercise control over their 
circumstances.  
Unfortunately, the existence of some disadvantages (such as physical 
disability) cannot be eliminated as a matter of state policy. Even so, the 
effects of such conditions can be eased or removed by facilitating the 
exercise of will. Yet where such disadvantages persist, if the will has been 
exercised in the wholehearted acceptance of those circumstances, then the 
disadvantage can no longer be regarded as unfair. This is not to say that the 
psychological acceptance of a less than ideal lot is sufficient to suggest that 
this would now be fair (this is the problem of adaptive preference). The 
exercise of will must also align with the perfectionist ideal of self-realisation in 
a mutually supportive way. Although an individual may be expressing will as a 
way of coping with an unfair burden, this does not make it suddenly become 
fair. Yet if one is willing to accept conditions that others would reject, whilst 
refusing to accept that they are in fact burdens, then such circumstances 
might truly be described as contributing towards her self-realisation. Such 
circumstances would therefore no longer count as unfair. This is what is 
meant by ‘wholehearted acceptance’. The business of the state should 
therefore be directed not at the elimination of social disadvantage, but at the 
elimination of unfair social disadvantage, and this will entail the equalization 
of opportunities for all citizens to exercise will in directing it towards their own 
self-realisation. The implications for the role of the state will be discussed in 
chapter eight. 
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Nevertheless, a potential misunderstanding with the term ‘will-
egalitarianism’ must now be addressed. This will clarify the sort of actions or 
choices that count for the purposes of will-egalitarianism as carrying moral 
responsibility: The term ‘will-egalitarianism’ does not claim that all persons 
ought to be equally able to realise their will, just that the opportunity for the 
exercise of will ought to be equal to the point that allows practical self-
realisation (a term which allows only actions for which one can be held 
morally responsible as contributing towards a perfectionist ideal).  
It might be objected that persons need more than just an equal 
opportunity to exercise will: they must be able to exert will equally. If only the 
opportunity were equalised, then it would be possible for luck, or skill, or 
natural ability to gain an inroad into an unfairly superior position. Take the 
example of a penalty shot in basketball: one could line up several people and 
allow them each one shot. Each person has thus had an equal opportunity, 
but if one person is seven feet tall, whilst another is only four feet, the taller 
person has a significant advantage. Another person might be blind, or another 
born with no arms, or another might slip, whilst another simply throws a lucky 
shot. It would therefore seem that equal opportunity alone is insufficient to 
address unfair disadvantage.  
Despite this apparent difficulty, the objection can be answered both 
conceptually and practically. Conceptually, this would not really be a problem 
to will-egalitarianism since the lucky, or gifted, must still recognise that the 
good of others is part of their own. They would thus recognise that it would be 
wrong to abuse their superior position to exploit the unfortunate or less 
talented. In a practical sense, those who do not recognise that the good of 
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others is part of their own would be harming their own development and must 
be prevented from doing so. Systems must therefore be put in place by the 
state to prevent exploitative behaviour. Furthermore, the realisation of equal 
exercise of will is not an undesirable outcome (as will be explained in the 
following chapters).   
The exercise of will must be compatible with a similar scheme for all, 
but since self-realisation entails the facilitation of self-realisation in others, this 
will ensure equality of opportunity in practice. The idea of an extended will, 
when allied to a perfectionist ideal of self-realisation, would channel the 
choices of the lucky, or the gifted, in a direction which assists the less 
fortunate since to do otherwise would undermine their own self-realisation. 
This will require that the choices that persons make are always subject to 
those choices being compatible with all other citizens having the opportunity 
to do likewise. 
Yet the concept of practical self-realisation does not commit a society 
to service all identified (or misidentified) choices, even if these appear to 
contribute towards self-realisation. Such choices are tempered by 
considerations of equal concern, compatibility with the wills of others, and 
affordability (not simply conceived as resources). Other members of that 
particular society are only obliged to facilitate self-realisation of the individual 
on an equal basis as a principle of social cooperation – fairness requires ‘will-
egalitarianism’. This means that in a society which cannot afford free 
education, say, there is no requirement that it be provided, so long as 
whatever the state can afford allows all members to have an equal 
opportunity to realise their respective wills within such restrictive 
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circumstances. Members of that society might be disadvantaged in relation to 
other societies, but not within their own society. On the other hand, in a 
society in which free education is affordable (in this case, that sufficient 
resources exist) then that society is obliged to provide it to those who need it 
for self-realisation. 
It might be thought that since will-egalitarianism seems to be doing 
most of the work in relation to the determination of fairness, then the 
combination with perfectionism and self-realisation is superfluous. Thus in a 
scheme in which all persons are to be treated by the state as moral equals, 
then it seems as if compatibility between competing views is the only 
regulating mechanism. The introduction of the idea of perfectionism would 
therefore seem to be unnecessary. Take Dworkin’s example of the frustrated 
racists: it is conceivable to have a racist society in which each racist treats all 
others as moral equals, so long as they remain racist towards the same 
‘others’. Yet such a scheme would be unstable: if the requirement of will-
egalitarianism were enforced by the state, any dissenters from the racist code 
must be given an equal opportunity to have their own will facilitated. The 
facilitation of such dissenters would require more than simple compensation, 
it would be incompatible with the wills of the racists and so destabilise the 
state. Furthermore, if will-egalitarianism is applied to a single racist within an 
ideal state, it might be claimed that such a person would warrant some form 
of compensation for having her will frustrated. The accusation might then be 
made that perfectionism is simply a practical device added to will-
egalitarianism in order to prevent such consequences. 
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The idea of perfectionism as a moral principle answers these 
objections. Perfectionism is the moralistic justification for treating each person 
as an end, whereas will-egalitarianism is the mechanism for the application of 
this moral ideal. By definition, the racist does not recognise that the self-
realisation of others, including those races that are subject to her hatred, is 
part of her own self-realisation. Such intolerance would also tend to erode her 
own well-being, perhaps resulting in mistrust of others that she might suspect 
of being ‘impure’ or sympathising with such groups. Such self-destructive 
intolerance can hardly be considered as an attribute of the perfectionist ideal. 
The frustrated racist might well count amongst the disadvantaged in virtue of 
being unable to realise her will, but since her ambitions do not contribute 
towards her self-realisation, her disadvantage is not unfair, and she would not 
warrant compensation.   
 Whilst will-egalitarianism is to be recognised as carrying the strongest 
regulating influence (in a mechanistic sense) it is not to be conceived as the 
only such influence. Impairment of the will can define disadvantage in itself, 
but the role of the state only becomes implicated when it is conceived as 
social disadvantage. Thus will-egalitarianism alone would recognise the 
person with expensive tastes as being disadvantaged; it would also accept 
the person who made it their will to preserve the eroding coastline of Martha’s 
Vineyard as disadvantaged by the failure; and it would likewise recognise that 
the racist prevented from realising her will is also disadvantaged. They are 
not unfairly disadvantaged, however. Whereas Dworkin turns to a scheme of 
distribution of resources to describe what the state should do, it is suggested 
that a scheme based upon a perfectionist view is better placed and more 
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consistent with the conception of social disadvantage: it is better placed to 
recognise that the assessment of social disadvantage is pluralistic in nature 
and therefore cannot be adequately addressed in terms of resources alone. 
In the example of the expensive tastes problem, there is a step missing 
from Dworkin’s account. Dworkin makes the assumption that the individual 
who possesses such tastes would automatically make it their will to satisfy 
those tastes. Yet just because a person has certain tastes, they can still 
choose, or rather will, to satisfy that taste or not. As the controversy over the 
acceptance of ‘non-practising’ homosexual priests within the Catholic Church 
would suggest, a person may have certain sexual tastes, but choose celibacy 
as an exercise of will over the taste.20 Those heterosexual priests that choose 
celibacy make a similar commitment. In doing so they acknowledge that they 
have certain tastes but recognise that their life would be better overall by not 
satisfying that taste (and thus further acknowledge that their own extended 
will incorporates cultural norms). Similarly, the person with expensive tastes 
may acknowledge such tastes but recognise that their life would be better 
overall by following a more frugal lifestyle. After all, it is extremely unlikely that 
one would build an entire life around the satisfaction of just one aspect, such 
as drinking only fine claret and eating only plovers’ eggs.   
It is this personal identification with satisfying the expensive taste that 
will-egalitarianism would recognise as causing the individual disadvantage 
when she fails to satisfy that aspect of her will. So, when one introduces a 
perfectionist ideal, the obsession with just one aspect of the person’s life can 
immediately be recognised as counter-productive to self-realisation. The 
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focus upon satisfying only personal tastes is entirely to ignore the recognition 
that the well-being of others is part of one’s own self-realisation, and is to 
ignore that our lives are considerably richer than the satisfaction of just one, 
or a few, tastes and desires.  
In the example of Martha’s Vineyard, an individual may indeed make 
such an objective her will to the exclusion of other aspects in her life. An 
account based upon will-egalitarianism alone would recognise the 
disadvantage, but be inadequate to address the pressures that this might 
place upon others. Such a will must be assisted up to the point where the 
expense becomes detrimental to the facilitation of the wills of others, or when 
the pressure from others with competing (or even opposing) wills overcomes 
the will of this particular environmental conservationist. Yet when the idea of 
perfectionism is introduced other regulating limitations are introduced much 
sooner. Firstly, because a single issue obsession of this kind is unlikely to 
contribute to an individual’s self-realisation, and secondly, because the failure 
to be able to recognise a lost cause, and to continue to expend resources 
upon such an objective, is not a trait that might describe the perfectionist ideal 
for humanity. The obsessed conservationist may well believe that such an 
action would also contribute to the well-being of others, so to that extent might 
align with self-realisation, but without consultation with those others, such a 
view becomes authoritarian. True self-realisation must take into account only 
those factors that genuinely contribute to the self-realisation of others. This 
requires some form of consultation, as will be discussed further in chapter 
eight. 
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Returning now to the levelling down objection. We are now in a 
position to understand why this objection cannot apply to will-egalitarianism: 
the objection is simply no objection at all. It would certainly be better in a way 
if society were levelled down so that all persons have an equal opportunity to 
exercise will, but there is no difference in this respect between levelling up, or 
levelling down. Will-egalitarianism thus represents an ideal at which a point of 
moral sufficiency coincides with a point of optimacy.  What might become a 
problem in practice is if some individuals were legitimately able to exercise a 
greater degree of will than others, since this would allow them to become an 
oppressor, or dominus, regardless of the perhaps good intentions of the 
individual.21 Since the practical application of will-egalitarianism is likely to 
differ from the ideal, this would suggest a tolerable range, such that a 
minimum level of opportunity for the exercise of will might mark a point of 
sufficiency, whereas an upper level might mark the point at which the greater 
opportunities for the better-off now harm the opportunities for the least well-
off. These issues will be explored further in the next chapter. 
There is thus a mechanism of conservation of will at work here too. 
This is not to say that there is an absolute maximum ‘amount’ of will to be 
distributed. Fluctuations of populations will ensure that the total extent must 
change. Yet regardless of the extent of the population each must have an 
equal opportunity to exercise will (directed towards a valuable end). One 
cannot have a greater degree of exercise of (extended) will without adversely 
affecting the wills of others (despite the tolerable range). This is not to say 
that persons cannot hold a greater amount of welfare, resources, or liberty: 
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these are just aspects in which traditional disadvantage might be expressed, 
but they have little to do with the evaluation of the fairness of disadvantage or 
how persons might legitimately exercise will (other than that they facilitate or 
enable the exercise of will). Just because a person is resource-rich this does 
not necessarily mean that they can be permitted a greater opportunity to 
exercise will than a poorer person. Power over goods is not the same thing as 
power over persons, and the two spheres ought to be kept separate. Persons 
must be allowed the same opportunity to control how their life will progress 
towards self-realisation. 
To sum up, the will is expressed in the direction of activities towards 
self-realisation, which in turn is the making real of an optimal self given the 
circumstances in which one finds oneself. It is perfectionism constrained by 
circumstances that determines what exactly the optimal self is able to realise, 
and this depends upon a principle for the equality of the extended will. The 
principle of equality of will is to apply to all members of the community and is 
the basis for an assessment of social disadvantage. One is unfairly 
disadvantaged when the arrangements of the society, or actions of others 
within that society, impair the will of any individual in progressing towards her 
self-realisation. One cannot be unfairly disadvantaged if one wholeheartedly 
chooses, in full knowledge of the possible consequences of that choice, to 
accept the resultant circumstances of disadvantage.  
 
6. Conclusion 
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As presented, the ‘will’ is about moral responsibility, self-realisation and the 
direction of activities towards that end. As Green suggests, it is a capacity 
when passive and an activity when directed towards a particular end.22 As a 
capacity, it is about the recognition of authorship. This gives the connection to 
moral responsibility: a notion that is dependent upon the social norms of the 
community. As an activity, it is about the exercise of control. This gives the 
connection with the wholehearted pursuit of a valuable end. Together, these 
two aspects of the will make the exercise of control towards a valuable end 
morally imputable to the individual, that is, it makes possible the idea of self-
realisation. However, self-realisation must describe the successful satisfaction 
of the will, and since the will is taken to be extended beyond the individual, 
includes the self-realisation of the wills of other persons within that 
community. The implications of this are that each person is to be afforded an 
equal opportunity to exercise will (the opportunity to achieve self-realisation) 
interdependent upon and compatible with a similar scheme for all. One is 
disadvantaged when she has been unable to achieve the same level of 
progress towards her own self-realisation relative to the progress achieved by 
others.  
 Even though the elimination of unfair social disadvantage might be an 
ultimately unachievable goal, it is nevertheless the case that where an 
individual has had the opportunity to wholeheartedly exercise will, then any 
resultant disadvantage must be considered to be fair. It is therefore 
suggested that in order to minimise unfair disadvantage it might be a viable 
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objective for the state to focus upon increasing opportunities for all citizens to 
exercise will.  
In the next chapter, some implications arising from the pursuit of will-
egalitarianism will be considered. As already discussed, the levelling down 
objection does not apply to will-egalitarianism since, when conceived as an 
ideal, it represents both a maximum and minimum level of control over how 
each person’s life might proceed towards self-realisation. This idea will now 
be developed to suggest that will-egalitarianism thus represents a 
sufficientarian position. 
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Chapter Seven   
Social Disadvantage: Thresholds, Sufficiency, and Priority 
 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, it was argued that unfair disadvantage is best 
conceived as impairment of the will of the individual when directed towards a 
valuable activity (self-realisation). This argument will now be developed to 
suggest that such a conception leads to a sufficientarian principle of social 
justice, that is, that will-egalitarianism leads to a threshold requirement in 
which all persons have enough. Such a view is unusual in that it combines a 
principle of egalitarianism with a view that is typically anti-egalitarian, at least 
in the version offered by Harry Frankfurt.1 Although Frankfurt targets only 
economic wealth, it will also be taken that other aspects in which 
egalitarianism can be expressed (such as resources, liberty, and the will) are 
also subject to his anti-egalitarian argument. In this chapter, Frankfurt’s 
challenge will be met by demonstrating that will-egalitarianism is compatible 
with his doctrine of sufficiency.  
 A further implication of perfectionist will-egalitarianism is the possibility 
of an upper threshold which accompanies the lower level. The upper 
threshold then represents that degree of excess that a person cannot fairly 
exceed in the presence of those below that threshold (bearing in mind that 
these thresholds represent equality of opportunities and satisfaction of the will 
respectively, and not the amount of goods that individuals might possess). To 
attempt to do so would be to either expose those at the lower level to 
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domination, and/or would be damaging to the better-off person’s progression 
towards self-realisation.  This meets the common criticism of 
sufficientarianism that it is not concerned with those above the minimum 
threshold.2 
The chapter will first discuss the conceptions of thresholds and 
sufficiency before looking to the rival doctrine of priority. Whilst 
sufficientarians (such as Frankfurt) typically point out that it is not the 
inequality but the suffering that is of moral concern, it is not accepted that 
disadvantage, by extension, ought not to be of moral concern either. By this 
reasoning, if a disadvantage results in suffering then it should be only the 
suffering that is of concern. However, if the disadvantage is unfair, then this 
can have moral implications regardless of the suffering. Whilst Frankfurt’s 
point would be correct if aimed at the generic conception of disadvantage (as 
discussed in chapter two), we are dealing here with social disadvantage. 
Frankfurt thus also commits the error of conflating the conception of 
disadvantage with unfairness: he assumes that all egalitarians, when making 
comparisons between persons, agree that those with less have been treated 
unfairly. As has been shown, this is not necessarily the case: the proper 
objection is to the unfairness, and not simply to the differential. The normative 
nature of this conception is therefore very much a concern of morality.  
As Paula Casal points out, Frankfurt’s sufficiency principle does not 
give a full account of social justice, and would need further support to become 
workable.3 It is suggested here that the conception of unfair disadvantage can 
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give that support.4 Furthermore, it will also be argued that Frankfurt’s 
dismissal of equality on sufficientarian grounds is premature. At root, it is 
suggested, the sufficiency principle relies upon the moral equality of all 
persons, and this fundamental egalitarianism also supports the focus on the 
will of the individual in relation to unfair disadvantage. The chapter finishes by 
considering some of the implications of these views to the conception of 
disadvantage as impairment of the will, before discussing some potential 
objections. 
 
2. Thresholds, Sufficiency, and Priority 
 
Harry Frankfurt argues in his influential paper ‘Equality as a Moral Ideal’ that 
the egalitarian’s “fetishistic” obsession with equality is misplaced, and that the 
fact of inequality should not be considered a matter of moral concern.5 
Furthermore, Frankfurt also believes that the preoccupation egalitarians have 
with the possessions of some persons in order to position others in a metric of 
equality, is morally reprehensible. It removes people from consideration of 
what should really be important to them, that is, the extent to which their own 
interests and needs are satisfied. Frankfurt points out that many egalitarians 
would be appalled if their own children were preoccupied with what others 
have, and would regard such an attitude as “rather shabby”.6 Frankfurt is 
therefore questioning why we should believe equality per se to be a morally 
good principle at all. Whilst I agree with Frankfurt that the possession of 
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goods is morally irrelevant, it is suggested that what should really be 
important is not whether interests and needs are satisfied, but the fairness of 
our relations with each other. 
  Worryingly for a conception of social justice, since the assessment of 
social disadvantage is also dependent upon a comparative assessment, 
Frankfurt would also dismiss the existence of disadvantage as being a moral 
concern too. Although Frankfurt’s target is economic equality, his arguments 
can also be directed at equality of welfare, or equality of liberty, or other such 
types of egalitarianism. He suggests that advocates of equality have 
misidentified the relative disparity between person’s holdings as being morally 
important in itself, when what they really object to is the hardship and 
suffering of the least well-off:   
 
many people believe that economic equality has 
considerable moral value in itself. For this reason they often 
urge that efforts to approach the egalitarian ideal should be 
accorded – with all due consideration for the possible 
effects of such efforts in obstructing or in conducing to the 
achievement of other goods - a significant priority. In my 
opinion, this is a mistake. Economic equality is not as such 
of particular moral importance. […] what is important from 
the point of view of morality is not that everyone should 
have the same but that each should have enough.7 
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He calls this “the doctrine of sufficiency”, and describes it as an alternative to 
egalitarianism.8 However, he does make an important caveat: he emphasises 
that in many cases the best way to ensure that everyone has sufficient may 
well be to promote equality. Nevertheless, he also holds that “the error of 
believing that there are powerful moral reasons for caring about equality is far 
from innocuous. In fact, this belief tends to do significant harm”.9 He supports 
this assertion by pointing to the conflict between equality and liberty, such that 
the imposition of a policy of equality will inevitably mean the repression of 
liberty for others.  
Yet Frankfurt’s view of egalitarianism may not be the best reading of 
the concept. As Gerald Cohen argues, the “right reading of egalitarianism 
[takes account of its purpose to] eliminate involuntary disadvantage”.10 For 
Cohen, ‘involuntary disadvantage’ is “disadvantage for which the sufferer 
cannot be held responsible, since it does not appropriately reflect choices that 
he has made or is making or would make”.11 Egalitarianism is thus not about 
comparing what others have in relation to oneself: it is about choice and 
equality of access to advantage.12  Such a conception recognises three 
fundamental aspects of social justice; that it is concerned with fundamental 
equality of the person; that it is concerned with disadvantage; and it is 
concerned with the effective will of the individual to make voluntary choices. 
As discussed in chapter one, Cohen recognises the need for something more 
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fundamental than the distribution of resources or welfare in which to express 
the idea of social justice, and the consequent concept of disadvantage.  
Economic egalitarianism treats equality as intrinsically valuable, rather 
than, as Frankfurt suggests, contingently valuable to the achievement of 
needs and interests.13 Yet Frankfurt’s focus on sufficiency alone leaves no 
place for voluntary acceptance of insufficiency. His objection to egalitarianism 
(that it is so obsessed with the principle of equality that it misses the important 
point) leaves him open to a similar accusation. It is thus suggested that 
Frankfurt’s obsession with sufficiency misses the importance of voluntariness, 
and thus the will of the individual. By this account, it is not just the suffering 
and hardship that is objectionable: it is the unfairness of such conditions. 
For Frankfurt, the urgency that motivates agency is a consequence of 
persons not having enough, or more precisely, it is the fact of suffering. Yet 
this is not due to the existence of inequality: not even inequality of well-being. 
In a particularly significant example, Frankfurt argues that the dogmatic 
pursuit of equality might sometimes produce disastrous results. He postulates 
a thought experiment in which ten people need five units of medicine each in 
order to survive. Unfortunately, only forty units are available (let us call this 
scenario one). This, he suggests, shows a problem with resource 
egalitarianism: if the forty units are shared equally, all will die, and “it would be 
morally grotesque to insist on equality!”14  
An alternative view to the doctrine of sufficiency is the principle that 
priority should be given to those who are suffering the most. This principle 
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supposes that the worse off the person is, then the more urgent the 
requirement to alleviate that condition. There will be more to say on such 
prioritarian principles shortly, but for now it is merely pointed out that such 
views have been particularly influential. One such principle underpins Rawls’s 
Difference Principle, which insists that it is only justifiable to benefit some 
persons if the worst off individuals also benefit.15 Frankfurt suggests that such 
a principle must fail in this situation: “If the available resources are used to 
save eight people, the justification for doing this is manifestly not that it 
somehow benefits the two members of the population who are left to die”.16 
Frankfurt thus concludes from this that where resources are scarce “an 
egalitarian distribution may be morally unacceptable”.17  
Whilst Frankfurt’s argument seems to be correct in this situation, it 
must be remembered that Rawls is expressly not arguing for equality: he is 
arguing that there are circumstances in which inequality can be justified. 
Frankfurt’s criticism thus only applies to the suitability of the difference 
principle to meet all possible circumstances of distribution. Rawls could still 
add the proviso that the difference principle is not to apply where resources 
are so scarce that the life of the wealthiest would be forfeit by any 
redistribution. Rawls implies this anyway, since he stipulates that the first 
principle of justice must first require that the basic needs are met.18 
Furthermore, Frankfurt is arguing for ‘step changes’ in which there is no 
morally significant difference between a person having four units of medicine 
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and another person having none: both have less than enough and are 
therefore both identically disadvantaged. Yet for Rawls, gradual incremental 
increases are recognised as beneficial, and in a way, the person with four 
units is better off than the person with none. Despite the implications that 
follow from these two different approaches, both Frankfurt and Rawls point 
out features of disadvantage that must be reconciled. 
Frankfurt would advocate the distribution of resources in such a way 
that as many people as possible have enough, in other words “to maximise 
the incidence of sufficiency”.19 That way, the forty units would save eight 
people and only two would perish. Yet such a move is flawed. As Paula Casal 
observes, “following such a policy would prefer a population of billions just 
above the threshold (with perhaps many below that level) to a less 
overpopulated world living in paradise”.20 Casal’s purpose is not to refute 
sufficientarianism, it is just to point out that it needs further support.  
Frankfurt then asks what should be done if we have forty one units 
instead of forty (call this scenario two). What should be done with the extra 
unit? After all, one unit is no good to those without any. Frankfurt suggests 
that since it would be right to give five units to eight people, “it is a mistake to 
maintain that where some people have less than enough, no one should have 
more than anyone else”.21 Frankfurt develops this claim by suggesting that 
giving someone with no units the extra one may even be harmful (if less than 
five units is toxic, say, or if the unit is food and one unit merely prolongs the 
agony of the inevitable death). It would therefore be better that one person 
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has six units even though others have none. His claim then is that it is also a 
mistake to say that “where some people have less than enough, no one 
should have more than enough”.22 His point is to demonstrate that it is not 
always justifiable to give additional resources to those who have less than 
enough: “Those below a utility threshold are not necessarily benefitted by 
additional resources that move them closer to the threshold. What is crucial 
for them is to attain the threshold. Moving closer to it may either fail to help 
them or be disadvantageous”.23  
Unfortunately for Frankfurt, there is an omission within his scenario 
that can have a significant impact on the validity of the implications he 
favours. This is the implication that redistribution can be imposed by some 
external observer. Frankfurt does not discuss the possibility that where some 
individual has too much, that the excess might be forcibly redistributed. The 
question put by Frankfurt was about what to do with just one extra unit: but 
this was an ‘unowned’ unit which by his account was no good to anyone. 
What if there were five extra units legitimately in the possession of some 
persons over and above the five units needed? Can they be forced to give 
them away? A caveat must be issued at this point: the framing of these 
arguments in terms of units can lead the reader into conceptualising 
disadvantage as a lack of goods. It must be emphasised that the significant 
feature (as argued within this thesis) is not the goods but the moral equality of 
persons and the opportunity for the exercise of will. 
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The question of the infringement of liberty relates to the justifiability of 
the use of force, but there are also further implications in relation to the 
redistribution of forcibly removed benefits. What if a new scenario involving 
ten persons is considered in which six persons have the requisite five units, 
one has seven units, another holds three, and two more have none (call this 
scenario three). According to traditional sufficientarianism, it would be right to 
take the excess from the richest and give it to the one to whom it would be 
most beneficial, that is, the person with three units, and not the persons least 
well off. This would suggest that it might sometimes be justifiable to ignore the 
plight of the most desperate, since those with none must be abandoned if the 
purpose is to save the most lives. Together, these scenarios have three 
implications: a) that property rights might be overruled by desperate need, b) 
that there is an upper limit to accumulated wealth in the presence of need, 
and c) that prioritarian views that focus on the most urgent need might divert 
assets to lost causes when they could be better used to protect saveable 
lives. Each point will be taken in turn. 
a) Desperate need and property 
Frankfurt recognises that it is sometimes (but not always) the case that giving 
the extra to the needy may allow them to accumulate or reach sufficiency, 
and therefore would be beneficial in moving toward or meeting the 
threshold.24 However, Frankfurt assumes that the things to be distributed are 
simply unowned. Yet what would be the situation if someone legitimately 
owned more units? Perhaps they may be the producer of the ‘medicine’ 
entirely from their own body (such as in the case of a blood donor in which 
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the ‘cure’ does not require any external materials). In this situation five units 
might represent an anaemic condition which is barely survivable, whilst seven 
units might represent a normal healthy individual who could afford to lose two 
units, although this would then leave them weak and anaemic (at the barely 
survivable condition). This is not intended to imply that a threshold of 
sufficiency ought to be set at such a meagre level: this example is merely 
intended to stretch the extremities of the argument. The person with only 
three units is in a serious life threatening condition and will die unless she 
receive two units within the next twenty four hours, say. Those with no units 
will die anyway, even if they received two units of blood. By what right then 
might distribution be forcibly imposed? An inference from Frankfurt’s 
argument is that where someone has excess in the presence of someone 
with insufficient, then it is morally justifiable to forcibly remove the excess to 
supply the less well-off person if doing so would raise them to the threshold.  
Such an argument would assert that meeting the sufficiency threshold 
can override certain property rights. More specifically, the rights of a person 
with insufficient means to meet her vital needs would trump the liberties of 
another person to dispose of her assets as she sees fit. The justification for 
such a move, so this argument would go, is a matter of fundamental moral 
equality. The arrangements of a society which did not permit such forcible 
transfer would be to fail to recognise the moral equality of those less well-off. 
This argument is not available to Frankfurt (since equality is of no moral 
concern) although it is available to will-egalitarianism. 
Even so, such an argument might simply be denied: it might be 
claimed that support for the inviolable rights of the individual is to affirm moral 
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equality. In the broadest scheme of arrangements, so this objection would 
claim, the affirmation of individual interests is a protection and recognition of a 
fundamental right without which we could not claim to be human in anything 
other than biological terms. The private interests of the individual would be 
claimed to have such weight that they would override the interests of any 
number of ‘others’. The denial of property rights held against all others, even 
in cases of extreme urgency, would be to undermine the very features of 
humanity that allowed the society to exist, and to forcibly remove property 
would thus be to act against the overall interests of humanity.  
Yet the distinction between private and public interests is not at all 
straightforward.25 There are numerous examples of limitations and restrictions 
on private property rights and liberties: one can own a listed building, but 
cannot alter or destroy it without permission; one can own a stretch of river, 
but cannot divert, block, or dispose of effluent into it without permission; one 
can own a motor vehicle, but not use it without suitable permissions. Such 
examples show conditions where restrictions are readily accepted. It would 
follow that where circumstances are sufficiently compelling (as assessed by 
the community’s representatives) then restrictions can be justifiably imposed, 
that is, ‘rights’ can be overruled if the public interest is strong enough. Even 
an appeal to something as important as human rights, or the protection of 
human liberties is never so important as to be inviolable simply on grounds of 
the public/private distinction. It is therefore suggested (reluctantly and with 
reservations) that even these claims can be overridden if the independently 
justifying reason is strong enough.  
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The circumstances that might permit such a move would have to be so 
serious that the threat to the individual would be congruent with the threat to 
the community. Thus if a failure to protect the individual would be to 
undermine the arrangements that permit the existence of a community, then 
the protection of individual interests have the stronger independent 
(perfectionist) justification. On the other hand, where the protection of the 
individual would undermine or threaten the existence of the community, then 
the community interests have the stronger independent justification. As 
examples, consider circumstances such as a civil or military emergency 
(widespread famine, floods, or war). Under circumstances of famine, the 
liberty to destroy one’s own crops, say, can be justifiably and forcibly 
prevented. In times of flood, a boat can be commandeered for the benefit of 
others, thus overruling a person’s right of ownership. In times of war, freedom 
of movement, or the liberty to shine lights at night, can all be forcibly denied. 
Since such property and liberty ‘rights’ might be overridden in times of 
emergency, then perhaps there might be other circumstances where such 
rights can overridden. Thus in (extreme) circumstances in which some 
individuals have excess where others have insufficient, then perhaps such a 
circumstance might justify forcible redistribution.  
Nevertheless, this thesis does not depend upon the public/private 
distinction: the conception of (extended) will-egalitarianism gives equal weight 
to the interests of all parties, and also adds the suggestion that the self-
realisation of each is dependent upon the self-realisation of others, further 
blurring the public/private distinction. The voluntary donation from the richest 
to the one best placed to benefit would tend to increase the self-realisation of 
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both the donor and the recipient. Conversely, forcible removal would only add 
to the self-realisation of the recipient, but may do nothing for the donor, or 
even harm her self-realisation.  The mere fact of her unwillingness to donate 
may make her the subject of condemnation by her fellows, thus harming self-
esteem, and that in itself may impair her extended will (but not unfairly). The 
justification for limitation or restriction of rights must therefore align with the 
perfectionist ideal for humanity, rather than rest upon the judgement and 
authority of a public body.  
Furthermore, these examples involve external possession, not the 
highly personal circumstances that would involve forcible removal of part of 
the self. Our current example involves a blood transfer, but circumstances 
might easily be adjusted to involve kidney transplants to help those with renal 
failure, or other organs such as the taking of one eye from the sighted to give 
to the blind as Parfit suggested.26  
Yet, the reason for hesitance when it comes to ‘property’ redistribution 
in terms of body parts is not a matter of inconsistency in the reasoning. The 
hesitancy is a reflection of the urgency and gravity of the circumstances 
themselves. It reflects the tension between the imperative to protect the 
liberties and integrity of the person, and the imperative to save the lives of 
others who, as moral equals, have claims upon us all to assist when doing so 
is reasonable. As Kant would observe, it is in recognition of others as ends in 
themselves that the duty to assist rests.27 The idea of the extended will further 
supports such a view, since an extreme measure that seriously affects an 
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individual is also likely to have a serious impact upon those around her. 
Furthermore, the threshold of sufficiency relates to the exercise of will for all 
concerned. It would therefore be a serious matter to deliberately impair one 
person’s will in order to advance another person’s will. Since both the donor 
and recipient are moral equals, and taking into account the conception of an 
extended will, there is a duty placed upon not only the donor to volunteer, but 
on the remaining members of the community to assist. At one end of the 
scale, this might include members of the community placing moral pressure 
upon the reluctant donor, or at the other extreme, justify the use of force. To 
do so would be to apply the principle of equality of opportunity of the will 
towards self-realisation, whilst allowing that force may be used where the 
individual’s will is not so directed. 
Even so, the liberty of those persons that might reasonably choose to 
refuse to donate body parts must also be protected.  With regard to the 
seriousness of what is at stake in the forcible removal of body parts, it would 
therefore only be in the direst circumstances that compulsion might be 
justifiable. Given the impact on the individual’s self-realisation as compared 
with the recipient’s, and in recognition of the impact upon those around her 
and upon the wider community, it is suggested that only in circumstances of 
life or death might forcible removal be considered. Moving a person away 
from self-realisation could only be justifiable (that is, not amount to unfair 
impairment of the will) when to do so moves other persons towards equality of 
the will. As moral equals, these other persons have an equal claim to be able 
to exercise will, even if this requires enforced redistribution of traditional 
‘goods’. However, such a requirement is only enforceable up to the point at 
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which a person is in danger of losing her life, since such a loss would be the 
ultimate violation of moral equality. As such, there must be no possible 
alternative since if there were, the circumstances would no longer amount to 
life or death. Such life or death situations would then represent the limitation 
of our moral obligations towards others. We cannot recognise one person’s 
rights claim if doing so would allow another to perish (since both have an 
equal claim to survive). The principle of moral equality would require that such 
rights (and the corresponding duties) can be set aside under conditions of 
dire emergency. Such an argument would thus support the forcible transfer of 
blood from the healthy individual to the saveable individual who would 
otherwise die, but it would not support the compulsory surrender of a kidney 
(since dialysis exists as an alternative) or the removal of a single eye to help 
the blind (since it is not a matter of life or death).  
Yet it might be objected that the forcible taking of blood would 
contravene Kant’s imperative that persons must never be treated “merely as 
means”, or contravene the requirements of will-egalitarianism.28 Whilst a duty 
to assist the recipient might be evident, a duty also exists towards the donor 
to not treat her as means either. The forcible removal of body parts for ‘good’ 
reasons could be seen as being little different from the removal of body parts 
for any other reason: the violation of the donor would be the same. Yet if this 
were the case, then the taking of blood could be equated with mutilation of 
the body under torture. Just as torture might be used as a means to get 
information, say, the forced removal of body parts (even if this is ‘only’ blood) 
can be seen as using that person’s body as a means for some other purpose.  
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Even so, the two situations are not the same. The removal of blood 
does not involve mutilation, and the intentions of the enforcer are morally 
different. Whereas the torturer will intend pain, perhaps to extract information, 
or even for no reason at all, the person compelling the donation of blood does 
not intend to cause pain or harm to the donor. An argument can be made that 
compulsory donation does not therefore contravene Kant’s imperative, or the 
requirements of will-egalitarianism. The person is not used simply as means, 
they also remain an end in that they retain dignity, are not stripped of 
personhood, and similar actions would be taken for their benefit if they too 
were in need of a transfusion. When an extended view of the will is taken, the 
will of the recipient can be balanced, not against but with, the will of the 
donor. Resistance to the voluntary donation could even be construed as 
acting against one’s own self-realisation, although forced donation would be 
unlikely to contribute towards the donor’s self-realisation. Furthermore, the 
removal of blood would be done in such a way as to minimise discomfort and 
distress, under conditions of care, and whilst monitoring the well-being of the 
donor for her own sake. 
Since different aspects of life would reflect or correspond with different 
and separate needs (such as for warmth, shelter, decent food, clean water, 
friendship, and the like) this might suggest a multiple threshold of sufficiency 
of ‘goods’ (in order to attain sufficiency of the will) dependent upon relative 
disadvantage, the particular community in question, and the aspect of 
traditional disadvantage at stake. Even within the same community, the 
threshold of sufficiency (conceived as the equal opportunity to exercise will) 
might entail the realisation of different levels of the goods by which 
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disadvantage is traditionally conceived. Thus individual needs might appear 
to require a particular threshold level of welfare ‘goods’, along with a different 
threshold for resources, or a threshold for liberty (the dimension in which 
bodily integrity appears to be at stake). Such a view would be mistaken, as 
will now be argued. 
b) Threshold Levels 
As can be appreciated, such a move would suggest a level of complexity over 
and above that usually required for a doctrine of sufficiency. Whereas the 
traditional view of disadvantage in terms of sufficiency would conceive a 
threshold level of resources as a minimum requirement (and mutatis mutandis 
for welfare or liberty), sufficientarianism of the will places the (extended) will 
of the individual as the defining feature. Each person ought therefore to be 
afforded a sufficient opportunity to exercise will. This is overlaid with a metric 
that can be observed and assessed in the traditional way, and thus might lead 
the assessor into the mistaken perception that inequality in resources, say, is 
indicative in itself of unfair disadvantage. As has already been shown, this is 
not necessarily the case: a person may choose to sacrifice resources in 
favour of leisure, or spiritual satisfaction, say, without being unfairly 
disadvantaged. Any person who does not have the equal opportunity to 
exercise will towards self-realisation does not meet the minimum threshold of 
sufficiency and is thereby unfairly disadvantaged, regardless of how this 
might be assessed in terms of welfare, resources, or liberty. This is the lower 
threshold, and represents that level at which a person has sufficient control 
over the way her life is going.  
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In a state that is impoverished, sufficient control might entail the ability 
for the individual to meet certain vital needs, or access primary goods (widely 
conceived), or realise basic capabilities. In a more developed state, what 
counts as vital, primary, or basic will reflect the achievements of others within 
that state. However, once the threshold of the will has been achieved, it 
becomes clear that the idea of ‘needs’, ‘goods’, or ‘capabilities’ are 
unnecessary to the judgement of unfair social disadvantage. Such things are 
therefore to be regarded as ‘enablers’ of the will. Sufficiency is where each 
person has enough to allow the exercise of the fully developed will of a moral 
equal. Below the lower threshold, impairment of the will has necessarily taken 
place and is unfair: the will has either been prevented from development, or 
its exercise towards self-realisation has been blocked (such as through a lack 
of the necessary conditions). This is not to say that inequalities in the 
distribution of ‘enablers’ cannot be permitted above or below this threshold: 
as Frankfurt suggests, such inequalities are not morally significant. They 
become significant insofar as the opportunity for the exercise of will is 
constrained, and this can be affected fairly or unfairly. Inequalities in enablers 
that prevent the person’s attainment of the threshold of sufficiency (impairing 
a person’s equal opportunity to exercise will) are necessarily unfair. 
Inequalities in enablers that do not impair equality of opportunity to exercise 
will are not morally relevant. Although inequality in enablers that do not affect 
the equal opportunity to exercise will are not necessarily unfair, the larger the 
inequality, the more difficult it will be to ensure that the equal opportunity to 
exercise will is not disrupted. The appearance of a need for threshold levels 
of welfare, resources or liberties is therefore not justified. One may have 
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insufficiency in these enablers, but that does not imply the existence of a 
threshold for these ‘goods’. The threshold conception applies to the will, 
whereas the levels of enablers required to meet this threshold can be as 
variable as the individuals, communities, and circumstances to which they 
might be applied. 
There are thus two important matters at hand here, both of which can 
have an independent influence: the exercise of will, and the conditions by 
which such exercise is possible. A person’s will can be prevented from 
development either by the actions of another, or by a lack of welfare, 
resources, or liberty. The actions of others are relevant to the lower threshold 
of sufficiency of the will, whereas the latter aspects represent the potential 
disruption of enablers of that will: the vital needs of each individual. Once the 
conditions have been met to allow an individual to exercise will, the extent of 
relative control becomes an issue. Access to enablers can be independent 
from human agency though, and can thus be fairly or unfairly denied. Where 
such access is denied without the involvement of human agency, then the 
question of fairness is not appropriate to social justice (although the response 
by other persons to those conditions will be). Where such access is denied 
through human agency, then such intervention that impairs the will (towards 
self-realisation) is necessarily unfair. Since all persons are to have an equal 
opportunity to exercise will towards self-realisation, the threshold of 
sufficiency is the point at which disadvantage as impairment of the will ceases 
to be an imperative social concern. 
Such circumstances relate to a lower threshold level. Might there be an 
upper limit too? Returning to our blood donor example, the upper limit is 
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implied by the suggestion that where need exists for some in the presence of 
excess for others, then provided that the excess is sufficient to alleviate that 
need, that is, to bring them from a position of insufficiency (in enablers) to the 
threshold of sufficiency (of the will), the excess must be surrendered. 
However, in the scenario in which the donor would drop from seven units to 
five (the level of barely survivable anaemia) the upper limit appears to be 
identical to the point of sufficiency. In terms of ideal will-egalitarianism too, the 
lower threshold would appear to be identical with the upper level since all 
persons would have an equal opportunity to exercise will. However, equal 
exercise of will is not the same thing as the achievement of perfectionist self-
realisation. The two fixed points (the threshold of sufficiency of the will and 
the threshold of achieved self-realisation) do not actually coincide. They might 
appear to do so only when one slips into the error of cashing out 
disadvantage as a lack of welfare, resources, or liberty once again. In practice 
though (and in recognition that such a perfectionist ideal might be impossible 
to achieve) it will be necessary to invoke a range of acceptability. 
It is therefore argued in this thesis that an upper threshold is 
necessarily required even when all apparently have sufficient. It might be 
thought that the weaker claim of ‘usually’ rather than ‘necessarily’ should be 
made, in recognition of the complexity involved when one takes into account 
the different aspects in which disadvantage can be assessed, and the 
individual differences between persons. Thus it might be suggested that if 
welfare is measured as longevity, for example, then it might be possible for a 
person to live significantly longer than others even if all have the same 
opportunity to live sufficiently long lives, and without this being to the 
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detriment of anyone else. However, the difference between the traditional 
assessment of disadvantage (in terms or welfare, resources, or liberty), and 
the advocated conception of disadvantage (in terms of impairment of the will) 
must be emphasised here. The lower threshold relates to the opportunity for 
the exercise of will, not the assessment of how many resources, or extent of 
health, happiness, or range of liberties that persons may have available. The 
term ‘apparently’ is intended to suggest that what counts as sufficient is often 
shaped by the presence of excess. One need only look to the influence that 
economic wealth, particularly extreme wealth, has upon those other less well-
off persons that interact with the extremely wealthy. Economic wealth makes 
the mature man attractive to the much younger woman (and vice versa); 
others defer to their opinions, or kowtow to their preferences; titles can be 
bought along with the land (and usage of the title insisted upon, simply to 
reinforce the inferiority of those who do not possess a title); political 
preferences can be funded; the possession of land can be used to exercise 
power over tenants, even though such exercise is to the detriment of others.  
The list of examples is extensive, each showing that the presence of 
excessive wealth also leads to the exercise of power over those who do not 
have it. This exercise is improper where it leads to the lowering of the self-
esteem or status of others as moral equals. In Pettit’s terminology, the 
existence of excessive wealth allows its owner to become a dominus.29 Such 
circumstances ought therefore to be unacceptable on grounds of the adverse 
effect upon the interests of the remaining less wealthy, and on the adverse 
effect upon the wealthy person in precluding her own self-realisation. Whilst it 
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might be suggested that such a view is based on the notion of envy, the root 
of this view clearly lies in the dominus, not those who are dominated. To 
suggest otherwise is to simply get things the wrong way round.  
Since inequalities in enablers (welfare, resources, and liberty) are 
permitted above the threshold of sufficiency so long as no one suffers social 
disadvantage, some difference in these measures is to be expected. This will 
reflect the different rates of progress towards self-realisation between 
individuals. The upper threshold is then the point at which equal satisfaction 
of the will is achieved. This is not to say that equality has been achieved in 
any of the enablers. Variations are permissible such that one person may 
have more wealth, say, than another, but when one considers both to have 
equal satisfaction of the will then neither is unfairly disadvantaged. Neither 
prefers the other’s bundle of welfare, resources or liberty (similar to Dworkin’s 
point about bundles of resources, but recast more widely).30 The proper 
subject of this ‘bundles’ approach should clearly be in terms of wholehearted 
self-evaluated choices (and therefore the will) rather than any particular 
aspect by which the will might be enabled. After all it is the will that becomes 
satisfied, not some abstract formula for parity between the different 
permutations of amounts of welfare, resources, or liberty. However, the 
differences between these amounts would not generally be expected to be 
great since the perfectionist ideal would require persons to be selfless, 
generous, and compassionate. Thus awareness of the needs of others would 
immediately generate assistance from those with the means to meet those 
needs. However, differences might be considerable in isolated circumstances, 
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such as in the case of the hermit who might shun all materialistic conceptions 
of a valuable life. In this case, since the will is equally satisfied, there is no 
discrepancy between needs. 
As will be discussed shortly, persons would still be able to develop 
beyond the upper threshold, but this would entail progression towards mutual 
self-realisation. However, beyond this upper level, we are in the realms of the 
perfectionist ideal in which this objective would be co-terminous with the 
simultaneous progression of all others (and in which those others must also 
have reached the upper threshold). In practice, the upper threshold would 
therefore represent the maximum achievable level beyond which one cannot 
progress in the presence of others below that level. At this point, all persons 
have equal satisfaction of the will, and since this is extended to include one’s 
culture, and environment, further personal development towards human 
perfection would not be possible without the simultaneous identical 
progression of others. If just one of those others had yet to reach equal 
satisfaction of the will, then those approaching the upper threshold are 
obligated as a condition of human perfection to assist that person to become 
similarly satisfied. If this were not the case, the attempt to seek further 
personal progress in the presence of another person below that threshold 
would be an act of greed or selfishness, and would move that person away 
from, rather than toward, self-realisation. 
The lower threshold level must be maintained despite any differences 
in the amount of goods that persons have. If it were not, then the possession 
of those goods would lead to an infringement of the wills of those less well off. 
In pushing persons below the threshold, they would necessarily be unfairly 
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disadvantaged and so warrant redress (either through the provision of goods, 
or the removal of goods from those above the threshold, or limiting the 
influence that the possession of those goods allowed). Take the example of a 
person who is resource-rich, but uses these resources to exert improper 
influence over others, that is to exercise greater will for herself at the expense 
of the wills of others. The dominated individuals would necessarily fall below 
the lower threshold since they no longer have an equal opportunity to 
exercise will, that is, they have been caused unfair disadvantage. Improper 
influence refers to those activities that would limit the ability or opportunity for 
others to exert will towards self-realisation: it would be to fail to recognise 
persons as moral equals. 
Furthermore, as the resource-rich person attempts to exert improper 
influence, she must also fail to recognise the role of others in her own 
possibility of self-realisation, and therefore would not be acting in her own true 
interests. This would lead to a self-regulating upper threshold beyond which 
the possession of other goods combined with the attitudes and behaviours of 
individuals, a person cannot progress further towards perfection. It is 
important to note that the possession of goods alone would not set the upper 
threshold. It is entirely consistent with this view that a rich philanthropist might 
be careful not to let his resources lead him to dominate or devalue others. 
She might even accumulate wealth in order to benefit mankind through the 
elimination of some disease or other. Yet the greater the disparity in ‘goods’, 
the more difficult such a position would be to sustain, since the temptation to 
use such resources for personal non-self-realising activities would grow (as 
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would the willingness of others to submit to domination for the same personal 
non-self-realising reasons). 
The upper threshold would therefore represent that level of exercise of 
will beyond which one cannot progress further towards self-realisation in the 
presence of others that have not matched the same level of exercise of the 
will. This would be the case even if all other persons are at or above the level 
of sufficiency. This is because progression towards personal self-realisation 
includes the self-realisation of others. Any greater exercise of will for those at 
the upper threshold would necessarily be to the detriment of those below. The 
level of the upper threshold would therefore appear to vary depending upon 
the conditions of those less well off: in practice, it would mark the boundaries 
of a range of acceptable conditions.   
This mechanism would suggest that an upper threshold would track 
the lower threshold. However, this appearance can be prone to 
misinterpretation, and a clarification is necessary. Whilst the lower threshold 
of equality of opportunity to exercise will represents a fixed point, the upper 
limit of realised will actually represents a second fixed point. The upper limit 
does not actually track the lower but the distance between these points, 
although fixed, appears to vary when considered in terms of access to 
enablers. To use an analogy, consider road traffic law: a road can have both 
a minimum and a maximum speed limit. It is legally irrelevant if one car is 
more expensive than another, or if one is larger than another, or more 
luxurious, or able to travel off-road. The distance between these speed limits 
is fixed in terms of velocity, but reaching the upper limit can be done in a 
number of different ways, with a great deal of variability in aspects that are of 
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no legal relevance. Similarly, when one considers social justice: if the morally 
relevant feature is the exercise of the will, the lower threshold is equivalent to 
the minimum speed limit and the upper threshold the maximum speed. One 
can have more or less welfare, more or fewer resources, more or fewer 
freedoms. Yet none of these aspects are morally relevant. Both of these 
thresholds are fixed points, but the variety of ways of reaching the upper 
threshold can give the appearance of a variable upper point.  
Nevertheless, as with all analogies, they are not exact. In this example, 
a significant omission is that the attainment of an upper threshold is also 
dependent upon access to enablers. However, this omission simply 
demonstrates how easy it is to fall into the error of perceiving the upper 
threshold to be a variable point since it reinforces the appearance that a lack 
of an enabler is morally significant in itself. One must bear in mind that such 
an appearance is to fail to compare like with like, and to revert to the 
measurement of disadvantage in terms of a lack of welfare, resources or 
liberty once again. 
Take the example of economic wealth (as an enabler for the exercise 
of will): where the threshold of equality of opportunity to exercise will 
coincides with a very low level of economic wealth, such as would only just 
meet the basics of life, this would reduce the apparent ‘distance’ to the 
attainment of the upper threshold of realised will. It should therefore be easier 
to move from equality of opportunity, to equality of realised will. However, 
even though citizens may have equality of opportunity to exercise will, the 
range of available opportunities is low, and the vulnerability to domination is 
high. Even a modest amount of wealth at this limit would tend to lead to its 
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possessor dominating those at the lower threshold. In practice, such 
impoverished societies often show huge differences in wealth between the 
richest and poorest. By this account, such societies would be paradigmatically 
dysfunctional since they would not accord all citizens moral equality.  
Conversely, in a generally wealthier society, a lower threshold of the 
will that coincides with a comparatively high level of access to enablers will 
provide those at that level the necessary dignity to resist attempts by the 
wealthy (either intended or otherwise) to exercise domination. The range of 
available opportunities has increased whilst vulnerability has reduced. Those 
who already have their basic needs met, and perhaps several more luxury 
‘wants’ too, might not be pressured quite as readily as those who are 
suffering deprivation.  
Although the position of the lower threshold is fixed, the distance to the 
upper threshold might therefore appear to increase: the possibility of 
attainment of equality of realised will would appear to become more difficult 
as the number of available opportunities and possible outcomes increases. 
However, it is the realisation of the extended will that is the morally relevant 
feature, and not the means by which that is achieved. The range of available 
opportunities can in itself increase the level of satisfaction of the will, but only 
if inequalities of enablers are kept low. A richer society should therefore make 
it easier to move from the lower to the upper threshold provided that the 
inequalities between richest and poorest are kept to a minimum. A society 
with a large differential in access to enablers would, by this account, be 
dysfunctional since it would prevent citizens from moving from the lower 
threshold towards the upper threshold. Such a society would allow 
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impairment of the will towards self-realisation, and would therefore not be 
treating all citizens as moral equals. Regardless of the availability of enablers 
between different societies, it would therefore appear to be the case that the 
existence of inequalities is the symptom by which a fair society can be 
judged.  
This is also the conclusion reached by Wilkinson and Pickett.31 Yet 
whereas Wilkinson and Pickett merely report the symptoms, it is suggested 
that the reason for the evaluation of unfairness is not because of the 
existence of the inequalities per se: it is because of the impairment of the will 
of citizens and the failure of the basic structures of such a society to treat all 
citizens as moral equals. Wilkinson and Pickett point to empirical evidence to 
suggest that regardless of the wealth of a particular society, it is the existence 
of inequality that is particularly harmful.32 Evidence covering such wide topics 
as mental health, drug use, physical health, life expectancy, obesity, 
educational performance, teenage birth rates, violence, and such like all 
suggest a correlation with inequality.33 These examples of resource, welfare 
and liberty disadvantages all suggest that it is the gap between the least well-
off and the most well-off that is the significant feature. Since it is not the level 
of wealth that matters here, such a correlation supports the idea of upper and 
lower thresholds. Although Wilkinson and Pickett have identified a broad 
association, they have not been able to demonstrate how or why such a 
relationship might exist. As has already been suggested, such a correlation 
might be explicable in terms of the unfair impairment of the will: large short-
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term discrepancies between the least well-off and the most well-off are 
objectionable not because of the inequality in a particular enabler, but 
because the structures that allow such a circumstance do not recognise the 
moral equality of the persons subject to unfair social disadvantage. Likewise, 
long-term persistent inequalities in enablers would be evidence of persistent 
disregard of moral equality. Social disadvantage conceived as the unfair 
impairment of the will can account for (and be responsive toward) this 
relationship since it would require empowerment of those persons. 
Before moving on to the question of priority, a final comment is 
necessary in relation to temporal implications. Since a child born into the ideal 
society could not be expected to know her own will, at least until it is fully 
developed, she cannot immediately expect to achieve equal satisfaction of 
the will. This is in recognition that our individual wills develop and change 
diachronically. Nevertheless, as soon as her will has developed sufficiently 
she must be accorded an equal opportunity to exercise will. She must 
therefore be provided with the conditions to meet the lower threshold of 
sufficiency. Furthermore, these conditions must be maintained from this point 
onwards whilst also allowing her personal development towards self-
realisation. In contrast, the upper threshold represents a culmination of 
individual personal development. In temporal terms, it must be regarded as 
an achievement towards which each person’s development ought to be 
directed: it would therefore be a ‘snap-shot’ of achievement, perhaps only 
maximally attained at the later stages of an individual’s life. However, this 
does not make either of these thresholds any the less universal: they would 
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still represent a level of sufficiency or equality regardless of the individual 
lives of the persons that make up that community. 
So far, the upper threshold has been described as being no more than 
a theoretical requirement of a scheme of will-egalitarianism. Whilst such an 
upper threshold might be a likely consequence of the pursuit of will-
egalitarianism, such a mechanism would be difficult to prove. It may be 
possible to construct an economic argument for the apparent tracking 
principle (in terms of enablers of the will), but since the upper threshold 
regulating mechanism includes the metaphysical conception of self-realisation 
towards an unachievable perfectionist object, then such a mechanism must 
remain unmeasurable. Although indirect indicators (such as happiness, 
satisfaction, charitable activity, hours devoted to communal pursuits, and 
such like) might be used, the upper threshold must remain merely conjecture.  
c) Priority and Inefficiency 
Turning now to the third point: that prioritarianism would allocate welfare, 
resources, or liberty under conditions of shortage to lost causes.  Such a 
principle would be wasteful, or at least inefficient, when the community can ill 
afford to be so. Simple prioritarianism would advocate giving assistance to 
those with the most urgent needs, that is, it would favour those persons in the 
absolute worst position. As the example in scenario three illustrates, 
prioritarianism would advocate giving medicine (or blood) to the two persons 
with no units rather than giving it to the only person that might be saved by 
such a redistribution. Although following prioritarianism in such a scenario 
would be absurd, it is an admittedly extreme situation. We must therefore look 
at little more closely at the more general arguments of prioritarianism. 
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Prioritarians believe that “the moral value of a benefit, or disvalue of a 
burden, diminishes as its recipient becomes better off”.34 This would suggest 
that the needs of the poorest outweigh the needs of those better off, or 
suggest that the needs of the poorest are more urgent. As Frankfurt points 
out, this is mere assumption, entirely contingent on other features and not on 
the fact that one person has less than another: “There is no necessary 
conceptual connection between a person’s relative economic position and 
whether he has needs of any degree of urgency”.35 It is entirely possible for 
someone with little money to have no urgent needs, whilst a wealthy but 
miserable person does so. Even more everyday cases such as the disabled 
person with moderate economic means may still have urgent needs. This is 
because, as Frankfurt puts it, “the notion of ‘urgency‘ has to do with what is 
important”.36 
Prioritarians can agree with Frankfurt that it is not relative 
disadvantage that matters, but maintain that the disparity does account for the 
degree of urgency. As Derek Parfit explains: “on the Priority View, benefits to 
the worse off matter more, but that is only because these people are at a 
lower absolute level. It is irrelevant that these people are worse off than 
others”.37 Yet the use of terms such as ‘worse off’ invites comparison and 
maintains the link that Parfit had hoped to sever. To describe one set of 
circumstances as having priority cannot be achieved without asking ‘priority 
over what’, or ‘priority over whom’? This then invites comparison of one set of 
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circumstances with another in order to decide which case is the worst. Parfit’s 
priority view would advocate always benefitting the one with the least (unless 
the inequality was voluntarily accepted) but in doing so cannot escape the 
trap of relativities, or recognise that it is sometimes better to help those with a 
bit more than the least (as the example in scenario three shows).  
Principles that prioritise the worst off, such as Rawls’s difference 
principle, would suggest that benefitting the absolute worst off (even if only 
very slightly) is to be preferred over benefitting the second worst off 
substantially.38 As Roger Crisp suggests, this “is almost as absurd as levelling 
down”.39 Whilst this objection is not effective against all prioritarian views, it 
does suggest that further support would be necessary. Although arbitrary 
disclaimers might be made, such as the restriction of application to persons 
within the normal range, such a move would be to admit that the principle of 
priority is not universalizable. Nevertheless, additional support would still be 
necessary to account for differential treatment of persons to whom priority is 
to be allocated. This could perhaps be applied through a system of 
‘weighting’. Such a system would then need to take into account numbers 
affected and degree of benefit. Yet the suggestion of weightings just 
introduces further difficulties: the reason for applying such a weighting 
principle must be given independent justification, and must be able to 
reconcile numbers affected with the degree of benefit (a task that Crisp 
argues cannot be done within a prioritarian framework).40  
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In choosing which case to prioritise, the question is then in relation to 
how much weight is to be given to different degrees of deprivation. Should 
one unit of benefit to the averagely well off count as ten units to the worst off, 
and five units to the one in between? If so, then why should this be the case? 
As Brad Hooker suggests, there seems to be no non-arbitrary reason to 
choose these weightings, yet the need for such weighting is clear.41 The 
relationship is an analogue of the marginal utility argument for excess, such 
that each unit of deprivation becomes exponentially more important to the 
prioritarian. Without such a mechanism, then increasing deprivation would not 
invoke the increasing urgency upon which prioritarianism depends.  
Yet the idea of weighting reveals a tension between the view that we 
are all moral equals and the view that we should (or should not) prioritise the 
least well off under conditions of scarcity. Prioritising the absolute worst off (in 
the presence of others in desperate need) seems to conflict with the 
impartiality between persons that the principle of moral equality requires.42 
Adding weight just seems to bias the response towards particular individuals 
regardless of moral equality. Since the worst off persons are all moral equals, 
there is no reason by that account to favour any one of them. Just because 
one person is in greater absolute need, this does not make his case on 
grounds of moral worthiness any the stronger: all remain equally worthy. In 
following prioritarianism, the principle that each person is to be treated as a 
moral equal is ignored: favourable treatment is awarded to the person with 
the greatest need. 
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Yet if there is no moral reason to choose between persons, this does 
not paralyse the decision: we merely choose another relevant reason. Take 
the situation described in scenario three. Our three worst off persons are all 
moral equals, yet only one has a chance of survival. Will-egalitarianism would 
require that we give each person an equal opportunity to exercise will, and 
since only one person might realise that opportunity, this gives reason to 
choose to save the saveable life. Enablers of the will (resources, welfare or 
liberty) can be distributed unequally without infringing moral equality, 
therefore these goods are to be distributed so as to maximise sufficiency of 
the will. This will require unequal distribution of enablers (in this case, 
resources) in favour of the saveable life. As such, will-egalitarianism is a 
principle of sufficiency, not priority.  
However, ‘maximisation’ of sufficiency in this way would only apply 
during conditions of extreme scarcity (life or death situations). There is no 
requirement to allow everyone to perish at an equal rate in order to maintain 
equality of opportunity: this would be a Frankfurtian obsession with equality. 
The justification for this limitation is for the same reasons that forcible removal 
of body parts is restricted to life or death situations. It is a limitation on our 
obligations towards others as moral equals, reflected in the limitations of our 
rights and duties held against others. My obligation towards you as a moral 
equal no longer applies if adherence to such a principle would result in one or 
both of our deaths. At other times, (not life or death situations) shortages 
would be reflected in the acceptance of perhaps severe deficiencies or 
inequalities (in enablers) as long as equality of opportunity to exercise will is 
maintained. 
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In summary, we can agree that prioritarians and egalitarians ought to 
focus on the suffering rather than the inequality, but must add that fairness 
also needs to be taken into account. As a consequence, it is suggested that 
Frankfurt’s argument does not apply to all forms of egalitarianism. When 
equality is applied to the fundamental idea of the individual wills of each 
member of the community, and since will directed towards valuable activity 
determines fairness, will-egalitarianism aligns with Frankfurt’s objective of 
sufficiency. Furthermore, it has been argued that prioritising the absolute least 
well off under conditions of scarcity does not always lead to the best moral 
outcome. Will-egalitarianism is thus sufficientarian, not prioritarian. In the next 
section, some objections to this view will be discussed. 
 
4. Objections to Will-Egalitarianism 
The first objection is one that is commonly levelled against sufficientarian 
concepts: that it is committed to either an ambiguous, intuitive, or arbitrary 
determination of the threshold of sufficiency.43 Furthermore, so the objection 
proceeds, sufficientarianism is indifferent to inequality above the threshold. 
Will-egalitarianism though, in positing both a lower and an upper threshold, 
avoids this second criticism.  
Although these thresholds might appear to be variable, they are not 
intuitive or arbitrary: they depend upon a scheme of compatibility between the 
extended wills of all members of a community so long as such wills are 
directed towards self-realisation. Since self-realisation includes recognition 
that the same ends (self-realisation) of others are part of one’s own, complex 
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systems of social cooperation and interdependence will be developed. Yet 
since such levels appear to be variable (inasmuch as different levels of 
enablers may be evident) they may also appear ambiguous, but this 
appearance is only due to the complexity when cashed out in terms of 
welfare, resources, or liberty. When conceived as fixed points (the lower 
being the point at which all persons are able to express will as a moral equal, 
and the upper threshold being that point of achieved realisation of the will 
beyond which one cannot progress further towards self-realisation in the 
presence of others below that threshold), then such points are neither 
arbitrary nor ambiguous. 
 A second objection commonly levelled against liberal idealism is that it 
focuses on needs rather than where the wealth is generated. Perhaps will-
egalitarianism is vulnerable to this challenge? This objection asks how it can 
be fair to determine the level of equality without regard for the effort that goes 
into producing those goods? As an illustration of the problem, take the 
example of Hercules, a man with extraordinary physical abilities. Assuming 
that Hercules has laboured long and hard, without using more than his equal 
share of resources, his efforts might produce considerably more wealth than 
others. Yet if the level of equal distribution were less than the level of 
sufficiency, (so the objector might say) would he be justified in keeping his 
extra wealth even in the presence of others starving? If all of a society were 
below the point of sufficiency, could Hercules keep all the fruits of his labour, 
or must he share?  
This is a matter of determining which principle matters the most: 
equality or sufficiency. As the examples in relation to our blood donor 
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suggested (particularly in scenario three) sufficiency is the more pressing 
moral issue. However, one must bear in mind that will-egalitarianism relates 
to equality of the will, not equality in the enablers of that will. So, differences 
in wealth would be permitted provided that Hercules does not use those 
additional resources to exercise a greater degree of will than others. Unfair 
disadvantage as impairment of the will allows deviations in distribution, just 
that the further from equality, the stronger the required justification. Thus the 
effort to produce goods would allow unequal distribution of goods (conversely, 
so would idleness), provided that the producer does not use that inequality to 
dominate others. Under conditions of sufficiency, Hercules would be able to 
keep the fruits of his labour (within the appropriate range) and still add to his 
own self-realisation, whereas the idle person would be allowed to have less 
than the person willing to work.  
Nevertheless, the justification for allowing inequality in enablers is not 
sufficient reason to allow others to slip below the point of sufficiency of the 
will, or rise above a level of acceptability in the presence of those below. It is 
therefore suggested that if all of a society were below the point of sufficiency 
of the will, perhaps due to a lack of enablers, (including Hercules - although 
he may have more than others) there is no requirement to share: this situation 
is typified in a widespread famine. Survival is under threat, therefore 
individuals are under no obligation to forfeit their own survival for the sake of 
another, or for the sake of maintaining equality of the will (so that all perish as 
equals). The requirement to share only comes into effect once at least one 
person is above the threshold of survival in the presence of those below. The 
need to treat others as moral equals now becomes an obligation, and the 
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conception by which the facilitation of the self-realisation of others is part of 
one’s own self-realisation, would require sharing. So if Hercules were the only 
one above the level of sufficiency of the will, he would have a duty to share. If 
he did not do so, he would be moving away from, rather than towards, his 
own self-realisation. Yet if others were above the lower threshold, he would 
not have a duty to share with them, other than as he might volunteer to do so 
(although so doing would align with the perfectionist ideal and thus move him 
toward self-realisation). Once the upper level is approached, in the presence 
of others below that level, then the duty to share becomes increasingly 
pressing depending upon the differential. This is because activities towards 
Hercules’s own self-realisation become increasingly difficult the further 
removed other persons are from their own self-realisation.  
On the other hand, duty (although a powerful motivator) only becomes 
elevated to an obligation to share, when a limit of acceptability is reached. 
Although this level appears variable, this is the point at which membership of 
a community produces those obligations. When persons are below the level 
of sufficiency, then the upper level of acceptability is identical with the lower 
level of sufficiency. However, continuous progress towards self-realisation 
from this point onwards must maintain equality of opportunity to exercise will, 
but this level would tend to require a more equal distribution of enablers. It 
would therefore be expected that in a wealthy society sufficiency of the will 
would be reflected in a more equal society in terms of distribution of that 
wealth. A wealthy society in which a large differential exists between richest 
and poorest would tend to show a dysfunctional society: the existence of a 
large differential would be evidence that all persons are not being treated as 
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moral equals unless other evidence could demonstrate that equality of 
opportunity to exercise will was being maintained. 
When persons are above the level of sufficiency, then the upper level 
of acceptability (the upper threshold) represents the point at which the 
wealthiest cannot progress further toward their own self-realisation. The 
excess then becomes a burden that hinders moral progress. Under normal 
circumstances, and without a superhuman member of the community, this 
upper limitation is in virtue of both the perfectionist ideal of self-realisation and 
recognition that one can only achieve excessive levels through trade with 
others, or accumulated from the labours of others.  
Although this mechanism only partially answers the objection, it does 
at least address some of the wealth production issues. However, there is 
another mechanism that would operate, and thus provide additional support. 
The failing of the production side of the equation is that the strategy of free-
riding is a powerful disincentive for others to be productive. Yet those persons 
who are able to be productive but who might choose not to do so would not 
be able to move towards their own self–realisation. Furthermore, they would 
hinder the possibility of other productive persons from moving towards self-
realisation. Since it would appear that a lower threshold entitlement prevents 
economic leverage from being applied to such persons, how might the 
problem of free-riding be addressed?  
The answer is that the existence of a lower threshold alone does not 
rule out economic leverage: it is a threshold of will, not the enablers of that 
will. Recall that one may exercise will in choosing disadvantage without 
thereby becoming unfairly disadvantaged. This would allow economic 
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leverage to supply a powerful incentive to participation such that free-riders 
would not be able to access additional resources that did not contribute 
towards self-realisation. Given that self-realisation requires the equal 
opportunity to exercise will, and as the example of the fasting monk in the 
previous chapter shows, the voluntary exercise of will allows persons to 
forego resources if they choose. The monk, in choosing to starve, is not by 
that account unfairly disadvantaged. Since the free-rider is making a 
wholehearted voluntary choice to exploit the efforts of others, then they have 
no entitlement to further support in terms of the provision of enablers (such as 
the provision of resources): the free-rider has already demonstrated 
sufficiency of the will. In choosing not to support themselves when they are 
able to so, such persons are voluntarily choosing disadvantage without this 
being unfair. This will be discussed further in chapter eight when the 
implications for the state are discussed.  
Nevertheless, it is also possible for persons to not so much free-ride as 
put in the minimum productive effort. Such persons must then be satisfied 
with a minimum acceptable level: they must assess their personal 
circumstances and balance the benefits that they will be granted against the 
efforts of production, loss of self-esteem, loss of social participation, and 
possible marginalisation. Even though such a lifestyle would be acceptable 
within a scheme of will-egalitarianism, it would be a very individualistic and 
self-centred approach. It would tend to isolate such persons from participation 
in society and limit engagement to others in a similar situation. As a 
consequence such persons would not be able to progress towards self-
realisation. However, the minimal effort strategy would only be worthwhile 
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under circumstances in which there is no prospect of improvement. This 
would give further support to policies intended to facilitate the exercise of will 
towards valuable ends, and to ensure that these are accessible to all citizens. 
Therefore in a fair state, access to education, public office, public 
participation, consultation, and other such policies designed to increase social 
mobility will all act to break down barriers to improvement. Examples of such 
policies will be described further in the next chapter, but even though some 
individuals may still choose the minimal effort option, once the opportunities 
to better one’s life are seen to be accessible, the reason to be satisfied with 
minimal participation is diminished.   
 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter it has been suggested that unfair disadvantage as the 
impairment of the will towards a valuable end entails a lower threshold below 
which no individual can be allowed to ‘fall’ without thereby treating them as 
less than a moral equal. The term ‘fall’ does not include voluntary acceptance: 
one might deliberately choose to suffer without being treated other than as an 
equal. Such an idea would suggest that at times of scarcity, assistance 
should be given to those best placed to make use of it, not necessarily to the 
absolute worst off. It would further imply some form of limitation on the 
wealthiest in the presence of those at or below the threshold level.  
Although the assessment of disadvantage is pluralistic (referring to 
comparisons of welfare, resources, or liberty) it was suggested that these are 
only ‘enablers’ to the exercise of will. It was therefore argued that unfair social 
disadvantage is best understood as the impairment of the will of the individual 
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when directed towards a valuable end. So understood, it was then argued 
that such a conception would lead to a sufficientarian principle of social 
justice in which a lower threshold of sufficiency of the will would be 
accompanied by an upper threshold of realised equality of the will. It would 
follow from this that the role of the state should be to eliminate unfair social 
disadvantage through the facilitation of the individual (but extended) wills of 
its citizens. This raises the question of how the state should respond to such 
a task. It is this issue that we turn to next. 
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Chapter Eight 
Implications for the State’s Response to Social Disadvantage  
 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter, the implications arising from the adoption of will-egalitarianism 
are described. These would include policies designed to increase social 
mobility, break down class barriers, increase public consultation and 
accountability, prevent the perpetuation and stagnation of wealth along 
genealogical lines, to provide a minimum level of support for all persons, and 
ensure that any increases in wealth or standard of living for the most well-off 
are reflected in the increasing empowerment of the least well-off. Differences 
in welfare, resources, and liberty are permissible only if equality of opportunity 
to exercise will is maintained.  
In terms of welfare, it would seem almost decadent to accept that 
some persons enjoy a life that goes very well in the presence of others in 
misery, particularly if those very well off could address that misery by 
reducing their own satisfaction somewhat. Will-egalitarianism applied to this 
particular enabler would recommend increased opportunities for the least well 
off to satisfy will, and perhaps reduced opportunities for the very well off. In 
terms of resources, a growing economy cannot allow the concentration of 
wealth in the hands of a few to result in the disengagement or domination of 
the poorest. Similarly in a shrinking economy, those with the most wealth 
cannot be permitted to use their additional resources to insulate themselves 
from the suffering that the poorest in the community endure. In terms of 
liberty, it would be unacceptable for some persons to have great liberties at 
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the expense of the restriction of the liberties of others. The policies required to 
address such issues would not be radical, and for the most part would 
support some mainstream policies whilst rejecting others. What might be 
surprising for a thesis that advocates a form of egalitarianism is that it also 
offers a means to address the ‘benefits culture’: the disputable idea that many 
persons in receipt of benefits in the UK see this as a lifestyle choice.1 
What will-egalitarianism does is to provide justificatory reasons to 
pursue certain policies, often where no good reason other than intuition was 
previously available. In many respects this approach advocates (as Andrew 
Mason would say) “levelling the playing field”.2 However, whereas he 
suggests mitigation of disadvantage rather than neutralisation, my approach 
advocates using both means. Mason sees neutralisation as being “equivalent 
to fully cancelling out” inequalities of access to advantage.3 Such an 
approach would recognise the natural differences between persons, but seek 
to eliminate these differences from becoming realised as inequalities of 
condition. The intuitively uncomfortable implications of this characterisation 
cause Mason to reject neutralisation in favour of mitigation: 
 
My claim is that if the neutralisation approach were the correct 
one, parents would have a reason of justice not to behave in any 
way whatsoever that advantages their child relative to others, yet 
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this is highly implausible. Not even egalitarian parents believe 
there is such a reason.4 
 
Mason suggests that the neutralisation approach would disallow parents from 
such things as reading to their children, or seeking to provide better 
education, or encouraging development of their talents if this would give them 
an advantage over others. Such a claim sees it as inevitable (and acceptable) 
that parents will seek to favour their own children, and act in such a way as to 
benefit their own children regardless of what other parents might be able to 
provide. He therefore suggests that the neutralisation approach is “highly 
implausible” and should be rejected in favour of mitigating those effects.5 This 
statement is a turning point for Mason since he hangs his justification of the 
mitigation approach entirely on this seemingly self-evident claim.  
This particular egalitarian parent suggests that there are very good 
reasons of justice to ensure that children are not favoured by their parents in 
regard to development of the will, and suggests that other egalitarians would 
recognise this too. Parents would be committing an injustice to their own 
child, as well as to others, if they raised their own child to believe that she 
was more than the moral equal of others, or thought that their own child’s will 
were more important than the wills of others. In one respect this is a 
mainstream position, as over indulging a child is widely recognised as 
‘spoiling’ the child. Strictly speaking this is not behaving so as to produce 
                                            
4
 Mason, A., 2006, p. 99 
5
 Mason, A., 2006, p. 99 
Chapter Eight – Implications for the State’s Response to Social Disadvantage   
S. Magee                                     June 2012 260 
advantage, even if the intention is to advantage them, but the reason it does 
not do so is because of the reaction of others. 
It would thus appear to be appropriate to favour neutralisation in regard 
to unfair social disadvantage conceived as impairment of the will, but to 
mitigate many of the inequalities in the enablers of will (welfare, resources, or 
liberty) that are traditionally assumed to constitute disadvantage. Such a 
move follows the distinction in the ontology of disadvantage between its 
assessment and its evaluation (inasmuch as the conception of disadvantage 
is normative in two different ways): whilst unfair social disadvantage must be 
eliminated (or neutralised), it may be advisable to mitigate its manifestations 
in order to do so.  
Jonathan Wolff categorises such measures as targeting “internal 
aspects”, “external aspects”, or “social structure”.6 These categorisations of 
policies to address disadvantage are taken to be the best currently available. 
In the next section, these categories will therefore be followed in discussing 
the implications for the state in addressing unfair social disadvantage 
conceived as impairment of the will. Whilst each of these categories carries 
implications for the state as to how social disadvantage ought to be 
addressed, the conceptualisation of disadvantage as impairment of the will 
also carries some implications that do not fall under these headings. This is 
because in identifying what disadvantage is, this thesis necessarily identifies 
what disadvantage is not, and thus eliminates some of what might otherwise 
be considered to be obligations of the state. These implications will be 
discussed in section three, and describe the means by which the proper 
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conception of disadvantage can give guidance to address the problems 
associated with the ‘benefits culture’. Section four will discuss some practical 
objections to these implications. 
Whilst many of the methods advocated by this thesis to realise will-
egalitarianism are recognisable mainstream liberal policies, the underlying 
reasoning is different. This reasoning does not regard disadvantage as a 
peripheral concern to equality, it places it at the centre. As such it can 
simultaneously support policies that might appear to be from either the left or 
right of liberal politics without contradiction. For example, the private 
ownership of property would be supported alongside the restriction of 
inherited wealth. Thus the private ownership of a dwelling would be 
compatible with self-realisation so long as others that would choose to do so 
could also purchase a similar dwelling. What would not be compatible would 
be the forms and mechanisms of private ownership that perpetuate unequal 
ownership. In short, this might disallow long-term leasehold arrangements, or 
restrict inheritance to the transmission of the family home. Despite such 
implications, this chapter will not make specific recommendations for the 
state, or describe the structure of a fair society. Such specifics are beyond the 
scope of this thesis, therefore only examples of the sort of policies that would 
be implied under a scheme of will-egalitarianism are offered. 
 
2. Will-Egalitarianism and the State 
 
So far, it has been argued that wherever the will is impaired relative to others, 
there is disadvantage (but not always unfairly). Such disadvantage would be 
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fair if the will were not directed towards the valuable end of self-realisation, 
and would be unfair if the will were so directed. Wherever the will is 
wholeheartedly exercised towards this valuable end, there can be no 
disadvantage. Given that the state must treat all of its citizens as moral 
equals, the state should take steps to prevent unfair social disadvantage from 
becoming realised in the basic structures of the state (following Rawls). A 
state cannot claim to treat persons as equals whilst allowing systems of moral 
inequality to become established between persons. The state must therefore 
ensure that all citizens have the equal opportunity to develop the will and to 
exercise it in progressing towards self-realisation. The state need not attack 
the circumstances of disadvantage directly, but need only seek to empower 
its citizens whilst ensuring that empowering some does not thereby facilitate 
domination by others. How then, might the state achieve this task? 
 In seeking to empower citizens, equality of welfare, or resources, or 
liberty, would only be instrumental to the fair treatment of persons, and thus 
need not be the aim in itself. These aspects are merely indicators by which 
disadvantage can be assessed: they do not constitute social disadvantage. If 
the state is to treat all of its citizens as moral equals, it should direct its 
activities towards that end through pursuing policies that facilitate equality of 
the extended wills of those citizens. Consequently, will-egalitarianism would 
only give suggestions for the type of policy that one ought to adopt. This may 
entail mitigating inequalities in welfare, resources, or liberty in order to do so. 
Yet the exercise of will is both limited and moulded by the opportunities 
with which the individual observes and identifies. In asking ‘what determines 
someone’s opportunities in life?‘ Jonathan Wolff identifies three factors: 
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internal resources (the natural assets of strength, charm, intelligence, beauty 
and so forth); external resources (money, wealth, property, friends and 
family); and the social structure (laws, customs, class structure, culture, and 
technology).7 Whilst other examples could be added, each of these factors 
represents an aspect in which policies to enhance or protect the exercise of 
will can be targeted.  
Although Wolff’s categorisations seem broadly useful for this thesis to 
adopt, the term ‘resources’ used in describing these factors is misleading: it 
might suggest a return to the prioritisation of resources over welfare or liberty. 
This would be inappropriate since Wolff is addressing a question related to 
well-being. Wolff is clearly referring to such things as health, and access to 
public institutions, as well as resources when they would be better understood 
as welfare and liberty concerns. As Wolff’s later work indicates, he is firmly of 
the view that the assessment of disadvantage ought to be pluralistic.8 Whilst it 
is accepted that disadvantage can be assessed in terms of welfare, 
resources, or liberty, the state would be better advised to target the root of 
unfair social disadvantage as impairment of the will. Furthermore, as 
Nussbaum points out, well-being is often associated with utilitarianism.9 This 
thesis will therefore refer to ‘internal and external aspects’ of self-realisation, 
rather than using Wolff’s terminology.  
It is suggested that policies directed towards securing equal 
opportunity for the exercise of will can align with Wolff’s objective of 
addressing disadvantage through increasing life opportunities. This would 
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target such things as education and health (to enhance natural assets); 
encourage civic responsibility and sound economics (to enhance external 
aspects); secure equal opportunities; and the removal of barriers to social 
mobility (to enhance the social structure). Although Wolff’s suggestions are 
based on a practical approach to the mitigation of disadvantage, it is 
suggested that the theory of unfair social disadvantage as impairment of the 
will can supply the missing theoretical basis to pursue such policies. These 
options will be discussed further below. 
 
2.1 Internal Aspects 
As already suggested, the state should facilitate independent living as a 
means of securing equal exercise of will. This will require policies directed at 
encouraging healthy lifestyles, literacy, numeracy, and civic participation. 
Nevertheless, measures must also be put in place to prevent an authoritarian 
approach to such policies since this would serve to prevent rather than 
enhance exercise of will. ‘Nudging’ policies might be best placed to serve this 
function. Aspects to be encouraged (those adding to the objective of equal 
opportunity for the exercise of will) should receive state support, whereas 
aspects that do not so contribute would not (although need not be actively 
prevented).10 As an example of how this might work, consider smoking: since 
smoking is recognised as being bad for health it would be unlikely to 
contribute towards self-realisation or enhancement of the will (its incidental 
addictive nature notwithstanding) – yet it need not be prohibited for this 
reason alone. Measures to assist persons to quit could be supported through 
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free help, negative advertising, free nicotine patches and such like (although 
care must be taken to avoid reinforcement of divisive stigmatisation).11 
 Wolff suggests that internal aspects could be improved through 
education, training, or in some cases through medical intervention to rectify a 
disability.12 The promotion of will-egalitarianism would add that such 
measures should also be readily available (or even cost-free) to those who 
need it. This would be in line with the state’s duty to treat all of its citizens as 
moral equals. Even though the policy of securing equal opportunity for the 
exercise of will might require such measures to be taken, this would not be 
regardless of cost: the threshold of sufficiency of the will can also set limits of 
maximum relative to minimum, particularly in relation to resources, and would 
dictate the maximum amount of funding available. In a state with the wealth 
and technology available, it cannot reasonably refuse to provide the 
necessary assistance for disabled persons, say, to express equality of the 
will. In a state without the wealth and technology, assistance must still be 
provided to allow equality of the will, but this would be limited by the negative 
impact upon the able bodied within that state. 
In a developed state, therefore, if the lack of funding for higher 
education, or lack of access to health care, were to prevent any individual 
from the equal opportunity to achieve self-realisation, then the state would 
have failed in its obligations towards its citizens. It would be to fail to treat 
those individuals as moral equals, and to cause or allow impairment to their 
wills. Such a duty would therefore support such policies as free higher 
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education, and free health care for many of its citizens (in a society with the 
resources to do so). The claim of insufficient resources would only apply in a 
society in which no one is able to exercise a greater degree of will than 
anyone else, since under conditions of scarcity the lower threshold (equality 
of opportunity to exercise the will) would be set at the same level (or close) as 
the higher acceptable level (when cashed out in terms of welfare, resources, 
or liberty). As discussed in the previous chapter, it is only under 
circumstances of surplus that the range between the lower and upper 
thresholds appears to increase (as differences between amounts of enablers 
of the will) as persons progress towards self-realisation at different rates. Yet 
one must bear in mind that some may progress towards self-realisation 
through the rejection of materialistic concerns. Where this is the case, 
widening differences in possessions is not a relevant moral concern. 
The problem of adaptive preference is relevant here. This problem 
concerns those who are poor but nevertheless consider themselves to be 
satisfied with their lot.13 If unfair social disadvantage relates to the impairment 
of the will, yet the person’s will appears to be fully functioning, it would 
suggest that those who do not recognise that they are being treated less 
favourably, are not disadvantaged after all. Thus, for example, the poorly 
educated Muslim woman in Taliban Afghanistan would not be described as 
disadvantaged unless she actually sought education. Yet she may even 
agree that it is not the place of women to be educated. Since she would not 
expect to be educated, so the argument would go, she would not have such 
an aspiration and therefore would not be unfairly disadvantaged. 
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Remember though that the account of unfair social disadvantage as 
impairment of the will also requires progress toward the attainment of will 
through the idea of self-realisation. Thus a person who is prevented from 
progressing towards self-realisation to the extent that she is unable to 
develop her will would also count as having her will impaired. Such a person 
is clearly disadvantaged by those conditions: although the will appears to be 
fully functioning, this is only because it has not been allowed to develop. The 
appearance of a fully functioning will is therefore deceptive in these cases. 
The advocated policy of the state to target the development and exercise of 
the will (and not just to provide the necessary resources) would meet this 
requirement through the provision of education to all that need it for self-
realisation, and thus develop that internal aspect of well-being as Wolff 
recommends.14  
One of the greatest challenges of social justice relate to those persons 
with severe disabilities. It bears repeating that John Rawls considered this an 
issue upon which his own scheme of “justice as fairness may fail”.15 It might 
be suggested that this could also present difficulties for will-egalitarianism. 
For a scheme in which social disadvantage is defined by unfair impairment of 
the will, it might appear that the plight of the severely disabled, particularly in 
relation to mental disabilities, would be missed since such people are often 
incapable of autonomy: without autonomy, one would be unable to exercise 
will. It must now be shown how will-egalitarianism can meet this challenge. 
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Recall that it is possible for a person to suffer from impairment of the 
will but not necessarily unfairly. Such circumstances might come about (it 
might be suggested) when an individual is born with a mental defect or suffers 
a brain injury where no human agent was responsible. The challenger could 
argue that such an individual should be regarded as disadvantaged. 
However, such a challenge must rest on a misinterpretation of will-
egalitarianism: whatever will that the person might develop has not been 
impaired, it has been precluded. The case cannot be made that a will that 
does not exist ought to be developed, or regarded as though it could be 
developed. Whilst unfortunate, without anyone to blame such misfortune 
cannot properly be described as unfair.  
Even if this argument is accepted, the objection might still be pressed. 
It could be suggested that the focus upon the will would leave a huge ‘blind 
spot’ by disregarding certain vulnerable groups as a concern of justice. If 
state policies were only directed towards assisting the exercise of will of those 
capable of doing so, then it may leave such individuals unprotected, and any 
theory that did not protect the most vulnerable members of the community 
must be regarded as inadequate.  
The answer to this problem is that we still have obligations towards 
these individuals, but that this obligation comes from a different source: it is 
from the same source that places a duty upon persons to not abuse children 
or animals, and to look after their care and welfare. Any individual that cannot 
exercise will would not have personhood: either such personhood has already 
been lost, or was never achieved. Without wanting to get drawn too far into 
the debate over personhood, and despite his advocacy of utilitarianism, Peter 
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Singer’s arguments that personhood relates to our ability to exercise will is 
accepted.16 Any individual that does not have that capacity cannot count as a 
person even though they might remain a human being with all of the rights 
and protections that that status affords. Individuals that are incapable of the 
exercise of will thus fall into the same category as many of the higher 
mammals (conversely, if any higher mammals were capable of such exercise 
then they would count as persons). This lack of ability in such individuals 
does not mean that they can be harmed, or that their lives would be 
considered to be less valuable. It would not entail a lowering of respect for 
such individuals, but a raising of our appreciation of animals. Non-persons 
simply do not have will, and therefore cannot exercise what they do not 
possess. It would thus be inappropriate to describe individuals that do not 
have will as unfairly disadvantaged. This does not produce a ‘blind spot’ in 
relation to such vulnerable groups since we still have duties and obligations 
towards them. Nevertheless, a failure to provide due care must still be 
construed as behaving unjustly towards the individual’s friends and family. 
A further complication is that some forms of disability are not clear or 
uncontroversial. Take for example the case of deaf parents having in vitro 
fertilisation and choosing to have a deaf child.17 Those parents are making a 
statement that they do not agree that their condition is a disadvantage at all. 
Any attempt by the state to attempt to rectify this ‘defect’ would be a misuse 
of authority: it would be in opposition to the wills of those affected citizens. 
Although it may be further objected that the will of the yet-to-be conceived 
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child has not been considered, as Steiner points out, since persons not yet 
existing cannot reciprocate duties, they cannot hold corresponding rights.18 
Although this view is not universally accepted, such persons cannot yet 
exercise will, and since this thesis proposes will-egalitarianism, the state has 
no obligations towards future persons: it cannot ‘second guess’ what the will 
of future citizens might be without becoming authoritarian.  
Nevertheless, recently deceased persons can exercise will, as seen in 
the obedience of the next of kin to adhere to a deceased person’s wishes, 
and as seen in the state’s recognition of the legal standing of a written ‘last 
will and testament’. This is consistent with an extended view of the will in 
which the will of one’s deceased loved-ones becomes a part of one’s own will. 
Even so, carrying out the wishes of a deceased person is still subject to the 
will of the living as to whether they choose to comply. The implications of will-
egalitarianism to future generations is beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
would perhaps be interesting for a future project. 
Finally, in relation to the internal aspects of social disadvantage, the 
state must allow persons to make mistakes, or change their minds, or make 
adjustments in their choice of pathway to self-realisation. If this were not the 
case, the state would become unduly authoritarian or paternalistic. This in 
itself could amount to the unfair impairment of the wills of those subject to 
such restriction. Two questions then arise. The first asks whether a person 
mistakenly volunteering to accept a disadvantage is unfairly disadvantaged or 
not? The second asks if the person that frequently changes her mind is 
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vacillating between being disadvantaged and not being unfairly 
disadvantaged? 
In answer to the first question, the person who mistakenly accepts a 
disadvantage in the belief that this would contribute toward her self-realisation 
may or may not become unfairly disadvantaged when she realises that she 
has made a mistake. However, her original voluntary acceptance of the 
disadvantageous circumstances are no longer sufficient to nullify the 
assessment of unfair disadvantage. However, if she has the opportunity to 
rectify the mistake, she is not yet unfairly disadvantaged: such an evaluation 
only becomes appropriate where that opportunity is denied. To clarify this 
point, since social disadvantage is defined in terms of the impairment of will, 
at the moment that she realises that she has made a mistake, her will has 
been changed but is not yet impaired. Her will becomes impaired if she is 
prevented from realising her newly directed will in the presence of the 
disadvantageous conditions (even though she previously volunteered to 
accept them). She becomes unfairly disadvantaged.  
In answer to the second question, such a person may well vacillate in 
the assessment of disadvantage every time she changes her mind, but only if 
the opportunity to progress in the new direction is blocked. The state must 
therefore ensure that a variety of pathways remain equally open to all of its 
subjects. The assessment of disadvantage as impairment of the will is 
sufficiently flexible to cope with such circumstances without becoming unduly 
authoritarian or paternalistic. It accomplishes this by setting boundaries to a 
range of ‘acceptable’ conditions inasmuch as the boundary is set by the 
perfectionist model of human well-being. The extended will, in being informed 
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by the community in which the person lives, would rule out destructive or 
extreme miss-assessment of the route to self-realisation. Take the example of 
a person’s miss-assessment of vocation. A person can mistake the path 
towards self-realisation by choosing the wrong career, but if all career paths 
remain equally open to all persons, then a readjustment would not present a 
problem. A wrong career choice would not make the person unfairly 
disadvantaged since an alternative career path remains open, that is, the 
person’s will is not impaired by her change of mind. However, she would be 
unfairly disadvantaged if alternative pathways were closed to her relative to 
others, since that would amount to an impairment of her will towards self-
realisation. 
 
2.2 External Aspects 
Since external aspects include such things as money and wealth, an obvious 
priority of the state (that need not be dwelt upon) is sound economic policies. 
Other external aspects include property, and social relationships. Implications 
of a policy designed to equalise the opportunity for the exercise of will would 
therefore include the requirement to encourage civic responsibility, public 
ownership of communally important properties, access to the internet, access 
to libraries, and so forth. As a sufficientarian thesis, persons at the lower 
threshold must have enough external ‘goods’ to enable their exercise of will 
towards valuable activities, that is, towards self-realisation in accordance with 
the ideal of perfection.  
Even if self-realisation is unachievable in practice, movement toward 
this objective would advocate such policies as a minimum wage, and a 
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minimum standard of social benefit for those unemployed and willing or 
unable to work. It would also commend policies that protected the individual’s 
need for shelter and security above the protection of the interests of those 
whose needs are already satisfied. Take the example of the judicial ruling to 
require Camden Council to publish a list of long-term vacant property in 
London.19 Such a policy should favour squatting relative to protecting the 
interests of absentee landlords and corporate property speculators, but would 
oppose squatting where this clashes with another person’s right to live in their 
own home. Since this policy would align with the objective of empowering 
those below a threshold of sufficiency (given that the need for shelter is a 
prerequisite of the equal opportunity to exercise will) and would facilitate the 
possibility of such persons to progress towards self-realisation, then such a 
policy would align with the principle of will-egalitarianism.  
Policies that contribute towards equality of opportunity to exercise will 
should be encouraged, whilst those policies that do not should be 
discontinued. Policies to be encouraged would therefore include those that 
promoted education, or promoted participation in social and political activity, 
or promoted employment. Policies to be discontinued would include such 
things as the closing of libraries, destruction of public spaces, the closure of 
rural shops and post offices, and the sale of certain public assets where such 
actions are pursued on economic grounds alone. The impact of the closure or 
sale of such assets upon the requirements to maintain the ability for all 
citizens to participate in society, and the need to safeguard the possibility of 
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all members of the community to progress towards self-realisation must all be 
taken into account.  
Nevertheless, any policy which turns on the exercise of will must to 
some extent relate to the choices that are made, and the preferences of the 
person making that choice (congruent with progress towards self-realisation). 
Since persons must be allowed to make poor choices, this leaves an opening 
for individuals or groups to attempt to benefit from these poor choices. It must 
therefore be the business of the state to protect persons from exploitation 
whilst also allowing mistakes. Nevertheless, in order to avoid 
authoritarianism, state intervention can only be to maintain the balance of 
competing interests in a network of individuals seeking (or rather, being 
nudged towards) self-realisation.  
Furthermore, as individuals become aware of others better off than 
themselves, they are likely to become dissatisfied with their own 
circumstances. Although this would not necessarily require any adjustment, it 
could do so if an inequality in opportunity to exercise will became revealed. 
Thus if it becomes apparent that some have excessive opportunities then that 
arrangement must be mitigated. Take the example of inherited wealth: if the 
arrangements of the basic structure permitted inheritance to adversely impact 
upon equal opportunity to exercise will, then that arrangement must be 
restricted to prevent such encroachment. Likewise, the long-term leasehold 
arrangement for property usage must be regarded as unacceptable if the 
period of lease is longer than the owner’s lifetime (unless the owner is a 
public or charitable body). Such arrangements are made in order to 
perpetuate an advantage, typically along family lines. As such they also 
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perpetuate inequality of opportunity of the will, and are therefore necessarily 
unfair.  
One must also remember that the wealthier, or better placed, or 
dominant, or exploitative person is also prevented from self-realisation by the 
presence of socially disadvantaged persons within her community. As a state 
policy, the toleration of social disadvantage, even if those affected are 
unaware or accept that disadvantage, would undermine the potential of all 
members of the community for moral development. Thus the internal aspect 
of individual personal need (or adaptive preference) could become manifest 
as a negative external effect upon others within that community. 
A further external aspect that might present a challenge to a will-
egalitarian scheme of social justice becomes apparent when we question why 
the state need not target unfair social disadvantage directly. Since it is the 
circumstances of disadvantage that appear to be the most pressing factor, the 
obvious route to addressing poverty, for example, would seem to be through 
benefits payments. Whilst it is accepted that this might be beneficial, such a 
policy is only effective inasmuch as it empowers people, that is, facilitates 
exercise of will. Thus removing a person from poverty would empower that 
person to exercise will. Even so, such a remedy might also run the risk of 
making that person dependent upon benefits, particularly if cases of short-
term alleviation of the immediate circumstances become established as long-
term dependency, and thus undermine self-reliance (the implications from this 
effect will be further discussed in section three). It is therefore more 
advantageous to both the individual and the community to facilitate autonomy 
rather than to simply relieve a particular shortage. The morally significant 
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feature of such an action is that it allows the person to function as an equal 
moral agent. A policy aimed at addressing the long-term circumstances of 
poverty in such cases would be instrumental to the achievement of that 
status. 
The use of targeted resources to address poverty is often regarded as 
the only way to address all forms of unfair disadvantage. It thus seems as 
though the view of money as a universal exchange mechanism leads to the 
view that it is also the appropriate mechanism to address all social 
disadvantages. This approach, it is suggested, is entirely inappropriate. 
Unfortunately, the convenience and simplicity of this approach to policy 
makers directs resources into the wrong sphere (to paraphrase Walzer).20 As 
has been argued, the most appropriate means to address all forms of unfair 
social disadvantage is to empower the individual so affected. This allows the 
individual to access welfare where this is unfairly denied; to access resources 
where these are unfairly denied; and to access additional freedoms where 
these are unfairly denied.  
 
2.3 Social Structure 
These aspects include laws, customs, class and culture. Policies should 
therefore be directed towards promoting individual liberty, tolerance of others, 
and the breaking down of barriers to equal opportunity and barriers to social 
mobility.  Furthermore, the recognition of the importance of culture and 
identity would direct the state to protect such structural arrangements even in 
the face of economic arguments to do otherwise. 
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As Wilkinson and Pickett show, inequality is strongly associated with 
health and social problems. They argue that it is not the amount of wealth that 
is significant: it is the amount of inequality. Although an association is 
suggested, they cannot show a causal relationship. The evidence they 
present points out that unequal societies consistently perform poorly in terms 
of such things as crime and imprisonment rates; life expectancy; trust; 
obesity; unwanted pregnancy rates; unhappiness; children’s well-being; 
status of women; mental illness; drug abuse; numeracy; literacy; social 
mobility, and so forth.21 The conception of social disadvantage as the unfair 
impairment of the will would suggest that it is not the fact of material inequality 
that causes these problems, (such a causal relationship cannot be drawn) but 
could perhaps be a consequence of the lack of treatment as moral equals.  
The blocking of the potential for self-realisation in those least well off, 
whether caused by individual acts or the arrangements of the state, can be 
implicated as causal to the symptoms. This does not imply any intent, but 
suggests that individual (supposedly self-interested) actions on the part of the 
wealthiest, or the arrangements of the state, unfairly impairs the wills of those 
least well-off. Once the pathway towards self-realisation is blocked, 
individuals will act in other directions which will necessarily be away from the 
perfectionist ideal. If a person is prevented from becoming a ‘better’ person, 
they are likely to look to crime, or drugs, or other means to improve self-
esteem such as through pregnancy, or acts of violence, or domination of 
other similarly placed individuals. Once persons are treated as though they 
are in a Hobbesian war of all against all, they are likely to behave in that 
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way.22 When the arrangements of the state fail to protect the interests of all 
citizens equally, then inequality is the consequence, perhaps along with these 
health and social problems. 
The obvious means to secure the conditions to allow citizens to equally 
exercise will, and thus equally exercise control over the way their lives might 
go for them (at least insofar as the state is able) is to enshrine that equality in 
legislation. This measure has already been taken in most (if not all) properly 
functioning democracies to some extent. Legislation that can help individuals 
to equally exercise their wills include such things as the prevention of 
discrimination on grounds of race, ethnic background, gender, sexual 
orientation, disability, age, or beliefs. In each case, employers and public 
authorities are required to ensure that citizens and employees are treated 
fairly. This can include such measures as public scrutiny of employment 
profiles, provision of wheelchair access to public buildings, and the 
encouragement of toleration.  
Although Wolff does not specifically mention public consultation, it is 
suggested that such a mechanism would be essential to the removal of unfair 
disadvantage. Since the state must enforce the law, and since it would not be 
realistic to obtain consent from every person subject to the state’s authority, 
then the state must consult widely in order to track the interests of its 
subjects.23 Laws must assist individuals in the progression towards self-
realisation, but this progress must be self-assigned. Consultation is a 
compromise. It is an alternative to gaining consent from each individual, such 
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that the state may use compulsion only when to do so would be in alignment 
with each person’s self-realisation (even if they do not recognise it as such at 
the time). Consultation would ensure that laws that are passed not only track 
the interests of the community, but are on terms that persons affected cannot 
reasonably reject.24 They must also align with the interdependent network that 
is apparent in the conception of the extended will. This extended will is 
sensitive to the needs and interests of the individual as she relates to the 
needs and interests of others within her community. Given that the advice to 
the state is to target the enhancement and protection of the exercise of the 
wills of its citizens, public consultation should form part of this process 
(although ensuring participation may be an issue).  
Daniel Munro recognises the importance of public participation, and 
although he is addressing a different (but related) issue, points out that any 
theory of social justice must address the gap between the advocated system 
and the motivation to follow it: this “may require citizens to refrain from 
performing acts that they are already motivated to perform [or] demand that 
citizens perform acts for which they lack the motivation, or even the 
motivational capacity, to perform”.25 Munro’s solution is through the use of a 
suitable forum for participatory debate, such as the participatory budgeting 
model used in Porto Alegre in Brazil.26 His remedy to address this gap would 
only be effective inasmuch as it increases the opportunity of citizens to 
exercise will over their circumstances, and not simply having a state’s solution 
imposed upon them. In this example ordinary citizens were given the 
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opportunity to engage in the decision making process to determine the 
allocation of scarce municipal resources. Munro suggests that such “mini-
public” participatory-deliberative arrangements might provide not only a 
solution to the problem of motivation, but ensure that citizens feel included in 
the process.  
Despite the potential of such arrangements, there are associated 
difficulties. If mini-publics only deal with the smaller parochial issues, and 
ignore the larger issues, they can suffer from the perception of tokenism. 
When citizens are only empowered to make decisions in relation to trivial 
matters, this can become a disincentive to participation. The problem of 
imposition may therefore persist and lead to disillusionment with the system 
of social justice, even if the system is otherwise ideal. Even a perfectly just 
system, if it cannot be followed in practice, will become unjust.  
Nevertheless, further support to participation might be gained by the 
use of incentives. An incentive might encourage a change of motivation 
towards the duties of the state. This is the approach of Vittorio Bufacchi. He 
suggests that “our task is to think of creative ways in which the institutions of 
justice can use the stick of bad reputation or the carrot of a good reputation 
as incentives to get citizens to embrace the principles of fairness and 
impartiality”.27 In spite of this, his suggestions appear tentative and limited or 
undefined. He endorses systems such as public voting, at least for elected 
representatives, and the declaration of funding for political parties. 
One such creative way might be for the further use of social networking 
sites, although to take advantage of such means of consultation would require 
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widespread public access to the internet. Yet even using such methods of 
gaining consensus may only be partially successful.28 As Kevin Zollman 
notes, such methods might correctly identify the ‘truth’ of public perception, 
but such views may be divorced from the ‘correctness’ of an advocated 
solution.29 Thus widespread consensus might suggest solutions that would be 
oppressive to minority interests. Then again, the awareness of this problem 
can minimise the effect, for example, by the state issuing limitations on 
consensus such that decisions must be commensurate with the state’s 
obligations to facilitate will-egalitarianism within the perfectionist framework. 
Moreover, the use of social networking sites as a short-cut to 
ascertaining the views of a community may not reflect a true picture after all. 
Without the actual personal interaction between individuals that exists in 
traditional human relationships, the individual contributor to the social network 
becomes isolated from the normal sense of responsibility for her postings. 
She becomes unaccountable and immune from the challenges that she would 
normally have to deal with in face-to-face communication. This is seen in the 
phenomenon of the internet ‘troll’: the person that makes outrageous or 
offensive comments simply to provoke a response. The use of social 
networking sites may thus not be a reliable indicator of public views and 
would not necessarily contribute positively towards the extended will or self-
realisation. 
Due to these reservations, no claims are made as to the effectiveness 
of each element in isolation. It is only suggested that such ideas would be in 
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line with the proposal to focus on the empowerment of citizens as a means to 
increase exercise of will and thus to undermine the causes of social 
disadvantage. Social networking in particular may promise much, but without 
considerable development in providing an effective feedback loop, may distort 
public views or even fragment into like-minded interest groups. The use of 
such systems as a means for the state to engage more directly with its 
citizens must therefore be treated with caution. 
A further implication for the state was raised in the opening paragraph 
of this section: the importance of culture and identity. The pursuit of policies to 
protect these aspects of social structure would require the state to take into 
account factors other than economic viability in reaching decisions which 
affect communities. One area where this is particularly evident is in 
employment. Persons strongly identify with their professions: it gives a sense 
of both identity and worth. As examples, a person is described as a potter, or 
trawlerman, or factory worker: personal identity becomes intertwined with the 
description of the profession. This facilitates social relationships, and in 
certain cases defines a local community. Thus in the UK, the area around 
Stoke-upon-Trent becomes known as ‘the potteries’, or the area around 
Kingston-upon-Hull becomes identified with the fishing industry, or the entire 
West Midlands becomes associated with the car industry. Should one 
become unemployed one loses both personal identity and the sense of worth. 
Both of these feature strongly as part of each person’s self-realisation. 
Unemployment is thus a scourge for more than just economic reasons. This 
has two implications for the state: firstly in relation to the chronically 
unemployed, and secondly in relation to the state’s economic policy.  
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So far as the chronically unemployed are concerned, and assuming 
that such persons would choose to work if they could, the state must assist 
such persons to become active members of the working community and 
therefore pursue policies with the objective of maximising employment. Yet 
whereas the traditional reason for doing so is economic, following will-
egalitarianism would require the state to do so even where the economic 
reason alone is not compelling. This would suggest the use of job creation 
schemes such as public works where this would be beneficial to the 
community. This would include such work as the maintenance of public 
spaces (to improve the communal environment), or the maintenance of public 
transport infrastructure (to improve communications) even on economically 
unviable routes. 
This in turn would have a significant influence upon the state’s 
economic policies, and would require that the social needs of local 
communities receives due recognition in the decision making process of 
government. Had such a requirement been in place during the 1970’s and 
1980’s, the widespread closure of ‘uneconomic’ coal mines in Yorkshire, 
Wales, and the Midlands would have been prevented, or at least mitigated. 
The benefits of personal and community worth would most likely have 
outweighed the disputable economic grounds for closure. Certainly such 
closures would not have been handled as badly as they were. Closure might 
eventually have occurred, but not so rapidly, simultaneously, and not before 
alternative employment had become established. No doubt this might have 
entailed government support for ‘lame duck’ industries, but the alternatives for 
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individuals and communities in terms of the violation of will-egalitarianism 
would have been unacceptable. 
In contrast to the protection of the needs of those adversely affected at 
the lower threshold, there are also implications for those at the upper 
threshold. In the previous chapter it was suggested that persons would not be 
able to progress towards self-realisation without recognising that this entailed 
the assistance of others to similarly progress. It was emphasised that this 
should not be taken to mean that an individual should be disallowed from the 
accumulation of perhaps fabulous wealth (if they did so for philanthropic 
reasons). One way to perhaps incorporate such an idea within a state’s 
economic policy would be to offer tax incentives for such purposes. This 
would allow the establishment of such things as the Bill Gates’ Foundation to 
fund the eradication of malaria (or other such purposes) that a state alone 
might not be able to achieve. The fabulously wealthy would thus be able to 
progress towards self-realisation, although they could not exceed the upper 
threshold by this means alone since it necessarily entails the existence of 
those below that threshold. This shows the increasing difficulty (and the 
greater commitment necessary) as the upper threshold is approached. 
Nevertheless, certain safeguards would be necessary, including mechanisms 
to ensure that the wealthy individual would not be able to access funds 
directed towards the charitable foundation for personal gains, and ensuring 
that tax incentives are only available for appropriate philanthropic purposes. 
Such incentives would encourage philanthropic giving whilst maintaining the 
effectiveness of the market capital system in the creation of wealth. However, 
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such creativity would be constrained towards mutual interdependent self-
realisation for all persons within and beyond the state. 
A final implication for the state under the ‘social structure’ heading is 
related to punishment: it would disallow the use of solitary confinement. If one 
considers an extended will, that is, that the will of the individual encompasses 
the wills of others who also reciprocally perfuse the will of that individual, and 
since self-realisation requires community, then denial of interaction would be 
to unfairly impair the will. Such a measure would block the pathway to that 
person’s restitution since she would need access towards self-realisation in 
which the good of others was also part of her own objective. The state could 
not therefore endorse the use of solitary confinement on the grounds of 
punishment (although confinement for the protection of others might still be 
possible). Nevertheless, this is not to deny the place of voluntary isolation: the 
person who decides to live as a hermit, and thus voluntarily chooses to limit 
the extent of their will, would be disadvantaged but not unfairly.  
 Having now discussed some of the implications for the state in meeting 
its obligations towards its unfairly disadvantaged citizens, we must now turn 
to the implications that the new definition carries for those no longer 
considered to be unfairly disadvantaged. These implications tackle the 
problem associated with the so-called ‘benefits culture’.30 
 
3. Disadvantage, Social Participation, and the Free-Rider problem 
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The existence of a benefits culture is broadly promoted by the British popular 
press, although it has now gained recognition in official government 
publications.31 Broadly speaking, this is the view that the long-term 
unemployed prefer to remain on benefits rather than work, perhaps also 
choosing to have large families in order to access increased child benefits. 
Notwithstanding the loss of a sense of identity and worth, the suspicion is that 
geographic clusters of endemic and sustained unemployment have removed 
the cultural stigma of unemployment. One possible explanation is the 
introduction of the ‘welfare system’. Prior to the implementation of the 
Beveridge report in 1942, the loss of work through redundancy or dismissal 
would result in severe poverty and shame for the families of those suffering 
unemployment.32 Since Beveridge, the National Health Service, The National 
Insurance Scheme, and other welfare benefits have become established and 
relied upon to give care to all citizens “from the cradle to the grave”.33   
It is possible that the clustering of disadvantage noted by Wolff and de-
Shalit has, over the intervening years, perhaps normalised unemployment 
thus adding to the removal of any associated stigma.34 When combined with 
the provision of a welfare benefit system, those persons unemployed become 
accustomed to a ‘state will provide’ attitude. In many cases, the unemployed 
individual can do a cost-benefit analysis and calculate that they would be 
worse off taking low-paid employment.35 This is because unemployment 
benefit is a ‘trigger’ that then allows the individual to access other benefits 
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such as housing support, Council Tax relief, tax credits, free dental care, free 
prescriptions, and other peripheral benefits. As the Work and Pensions 
Secretary Iain Duncan Smith admits, since the individual would lose all of 
these additional benefits once they begin employment, “people [are] better off 
claiming dole rather than working in a job paying £15,000 a year or less”.36 
The suggestion then is that over time the culture of acceptable unemployment 
can become embedded within these communities. 
Despite this popular conception, the idea of a ‘benefits culture’ is 
disputable.37 Data from The Office for National Statistics shows that the 
number of persons claiming unemployment benefit for five years or more has 
fallen dramatically over the last ten years (from 47,700 in 2000 to 4220 in 
2011), and now amounts to only 0.3% of all those claiming Job Seeker’s 
Allowance.38 However, it must also be borne in mind the possibility of a ‘yo-
yo’ effect as the same individuals might fall in and out of short-term 
employment. This would distort the long-term unemployment figure. 
Furthermore, the allegation of benefits claimants choosing to have children in 
order to access greater benefits does not stand scrutiny.39 The idea that one 
would be financially better off by having more ‘burdens’ does not make sense, 
and cannot be a rational reason for having more children. As Donald Hirsch 
(advisor to the Centre for Research in Social Policy at Loughborough, and the 
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Family Budget Unit at the University of York) puts it: “[t]he notion that you are 
going to be better off by having an extra child is bizarre”.40 
The relative lack of numbers, although putting the matter into context, 
does not affect the theoretical response of this thesis. Yet the evidence for 
those choosing to have children for financial gain alone is scant, and confined 
to anecdotal or popularist opinion: the reasons for having children are always 
far more complex than the accusations suggest and are not systematically 
recorded. Nevertheless, the possibility of just one person choosing to claim 
benefits rather than work, or choosing to have children for financial gain 
alone, would require this thesis to respond. Furthermore, the ONS record that 
over seven thousand economically inactive benefits-claimants admit that they 
“do not want a job”, (perhaps more accurately reflecting the yo-yo effect), and 
this too warrants a response.41 Since the problem might exist, even if only to 
a very limited extent, the implications of implementing a policy based on the 
conception of social disadvantage as the unfair impairment of the will must 
now be discussed.  
Since the state is stipulatively required to treat all of its citizens as 
moral equals, it must facilitate will-egalitarianism. So, if a lifestyle choice were 
taken to live entirely on the state benefits system when the person is 
otherwise able to work, then this would be an exercise of will and therefore 
not amount to unfair disadvantage. The state benefit system, by definition, is 
to ensure that citizens are not disadvantaged below a certain threshold, thus 
meeting the state’s obligation towards its citizens as moral equals. Yet when 
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the threshold is conceived as one of sufficiency of the will, this would require 
a certain level of economic and social support unless individual 
circumstances allowed variation of this support. Thus a millionaire lottery 
winner, for example, would not be able to claim support when she quits her 
job; or the person losing a job through ill health may require more than 
financial support alone. In contrast, those who choose not to work (rather than 
those who are simply unable) have made a deliberate voluntary choice.  In 
making such a choice, it is taken that the chooser has made a rational self-
centred cost-benefit analysis, and calculated that they would be better off all 
things considered by remaining on benefits. We will not be concerned here by 
the person that has chosen to claim benefits through ignorance of 
alternatives, or through inability to make the necessary calculations: such 
persons have not made a wholehearted choice, or have difficulties that 
disable that choice. It will be assumed that the person ignorant of the 
alternatives would readily choose the alternative if it makes them better off all 
things considered. If they do not choose the alternative, that is to work, it will 
be taken that the person has now made a wholehearted choice in full 
possession of the relevant information and the expected consequences. The 
person that cannot make such a calculation, perhaps because she has 
learning difficulties, would not figure in this process as she would warrant 
further support independently of the ability to make a wholehearted choice.  
Where such a voluntary and wholehearted choice is made, then as 
was argued in the previous chapters, the person cannot be said to be 
disadvantaged by the circumstances that result. This must not be understood 
as some form of ‘permissibility’ condition by which the point of sufficiency can 
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be overruled: this would be to confuse the traditional assessment of 
disadvantage as a lack of goods with the idea of sufficiency of the will. The 
lower threshold represents that level at which all persons must have sufficient 
opportunity to exercise will, therefore the person freely choosing any lifestyle 
is not by that account unfairly disadvantaged regardless of the level of goods 
that that person might possess. To do otherwise would be to ignore the 
autonomy of the individual. Since the individual choosing to live on benefits 
would no longer be regarded as unfairly disadvantaged, the state can 
legitimately withhold support.  
Turning next to the allegation that some persons would consider 
having children just in order to gain financially. The conception of unfair 
disadvantage as impairment of the will gives guidance: if the motivation is 
entirely financial, then having children to ‘profit’ from the resultant needs 
(regardless of how irrational this may seem) would not amount to unfair 
disadvantage, and therefore the benefits can be withheld from the parents. 
This would necessitate some other means of ensuring that the children do not 
suffer from the withdrawal of benefits in this way. Whilst the details of such 
means would need to be devised, these might range from removal of the 
children into state care (at one extreme) to the provision of benefits in kind 
(such as directly supplying clothing and food). Whilst removal of children 
would be extreme, the protection of those children must be paramount. The 
parenting skills of anyone having children purely for financial gain must be 
seriously questionable, and cast doubt on their ability to care for those 
children. On the other hand, these extreme cases would be expected to be so 
few as to be negligible. The suspicion is therefore that a few isolated cases 
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become exaggerated by those with a vested interest in undermining welfare 
systems, or to deflect attention from other matters. 
The proposals for withdrawal of benefits would be further supported by 
the idea of self-realisation at the core of disadvantage as impairment of the 
extended will. Since an individual’s self-realisation includes the self-realisation 
of others, those who choose not to work entirely based on a self-centred cost-
benefit analysis are failing to appreciate the impact on others. It is to fail to 
recognise that the benefits they receive are paid for out of the contributions of 
those who are working. Such claimants do not contribute towards the self-
realisation of others, and therefore cannot contribute towards their own self-
realisation either. This is not to say that recipients of benefits can never 
contribute to the self-realisation of others: non-employed parents raising 
children are still contributors, and therefore actively contribute to the 
development of their children and families. Similarly, where persons are in 
genuine need of assistance, the possibility of philanthropic giving can be seen 
as contributing towards the giver’s self-realisation in a way that is not affected 
by the ‘voluntariness’ of the recipient. However, this would not be the 
mechanism by which the state must act. The state’s actions would be to 
implement a mechanism to facilitate mutual self-realisation, and this would 
require reciprocity between those capable of doing so. 
The voluntary choice to free-ride would deny the chooser the 
opportunity to progress towards her own self-realisation. The prevention of 
free-riding by the denial of benefits would therefore assist that individual to 
progress along the right (perfectionist) path. This would require the individual 
to engage with other members of the community in a more mutual 
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relationship. Furthermore, this would also answer the potential objection that 
the denial of benefits would be to fail to treat the individual as an end. This 
objection was raised in chapter two in relation to those systems of procedural 
justice in which the process might allow considerable hardship so long as the 
process was fair. The objection is that a system of justice that would allow 
perhaps considerable hardship is misplaced since it would fail to recognise 
that the point is to protect vulnerable individuals. Even so, the denial of 
benefits would undoubtedly cause hardship, at least in the initial stages, but 
the justification for this is that in the longer term it would be in the interests of 
that person. This would still regard that person as an end in herself, but would 
merely nudge (admittedly very robustly) the free-rider into the acceptance of 
her responsibility to engage with others on a symbiotic rather than a parasitic 
basis. 
A further implication from this view is that those able to work but in 
receipt of benefit for reasons other than lifestyle choice (such as temporary 
unemployment) must also be given the opportunity to continue contributing 
towards the self-realisation of others. Such persons would be entitled to those 
benefits for reasons of meeting the threshold of sufficiency and to address 
unfair disadvantage. Such beneficiaries would therefore be expected to 
engage in suitable community-based work or training in order to receive those 
benefits. Suitable work might include, maintenance of gardens and parks, 
rendering assistance to vulnerable members of the community, or even 
assisting with workplace crèches in order to allow others to work (all suitably 
risk assessed, of course). Suitable training might allow more challenging 
community roles to be undertaken in the future, such as training to be a 
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Special Constable; or Community Safety Adviser; or Teaching Assistant, for 
example. Such measures would provide the individual with a sense of 
engagement with community, add to self-esteem (since the benefits are 
‘earned’), and ensure that recipients cannot be accused of malingering or 
‘scrounging’. Only those who are unable to work would be entitled to receive 
benefits without contributing towards the community needs of others.  
Taken to extreme, it might be suggested that the benefits claimant 
could continue training such that it might allow her to take the role of the 
teacher, say, or other appropriate but more highly skilled occupation. Such a 
mechanism could then reduce class sizes by distributing the workload more 
thinly, or reduce the working hours for the other employees. However, this 
might then be perceived as a threat to the existing workforce. It could be used 
as a means to reduce wages, either through increased competition or 
reduced remuneration: the ‘claimant’ could be working for much less than 
other teachers (thus applying downward pressure on pay scales) or hourly 
rates might remain the same but the total pay reduced in line with the fewer 
hours worked. Clearly such an eventuality would not be popular with those 
adversely affected, but the benefits for the otherwise unemployed can offset 
this concern. Since there is an obligation to furnish all persons with an equal 
opportunity to exercise will in the pursuit of self-realisation, it would not be 
defensible to restrict the benefits claimant from accessing full employment by 
this route. In effect, there would be little distinction between a benefits 
claimant and a public employee: both would be paid by the community in 
return for communally beneficial work. Although this may have a tendency 
towards reducing wages, it can also be regarded as having a tendency to 
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raise benefits. However, it would still be expected that the greater the level of 
skill required to perform a task the greater the remuneration should be, but 
equal work must still be rewarded with equal pay. 
Although further work would be necessary on the economic 
implications of this development, the pressure towards a reduction of public-
sector wages might be offset by the reduction in the level of general taxation: 
since only those unable to work would be effectively unemployed, there would 
be a reduction in the overall welfare costs from the reduced numbers of those 
non-productive claimants. This would suggest that reduced tax deductions 
would be necessary from the workforce to pay for the benefits scheme. 
Furthermore, since more persons would be employed, more would be in a 
position to pay income tax, thus spreading that reduced cost. 
Insofar as equal work should attract equal pay, this would also imply 
that benefits claimants put into communally beneficial work should not all 
receive the same remuneration. This would also have the advantage that the 
idle, or misbehaving, employee would not have the comfort of job security for 
life. Whilst some might wish to pursue self-realisation through active 
engagement in the workplace, others might see it as a reason not to bother, 
or to take advantage of those that do. However, this would run the danger of 
becoming a wholehearted choice to free-ride, and would therefore not 
preclude the dismissal of such employees. This would be without the 
additional safety of guaranteed alternative employment or access to payment 
for remaining idle. Those that are simply incompetent or incapable might 
access additional training, or access less demanding work (without violating 
the lower threshold). However, a mechanism must be available for the 
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remorseful idle or misbehaving employee to return to employment (perhaps in 
a less attractive but necessary role) as a continued means of nudging 
towards self-realisation.  
Whilst the requirement to work for benefits may appear harsh to some, 
they ensure that individuals can progress towards their own perfectionist self-
realisation (or at least not fall or slide backwards) whilst also ensuring that 
they assist other members of the community to progress. In practical terms, it 
would remove the perverse incentive not to work, improve the environment of 
our towns and cities, keep individuals in the habit of work, and encourage the 
recognition of social worth from those better off towards those in receipt of 
benefits. Yet there are some practical obstacles to be overcome, and not just 
in relation to the receipt of benefits. It is these practical objections that are 
considered next. 
 
4. Practical Objections 
 
Since Wolff and de-Shalit have identified social structures as one of the 
aspects that affect how a person’s life will go, then any structural deficiency in 
a scheme based upon will-egalitarianism may have a profound effect upon 
individuals, or perhaps threaten the stability of the scheme. Daniel Bell raises 
two objections in a review of Wolff and de-Shalit’s book Disadvantage, firstly 
against their claim that the least advantaged must always be prioritised.42 He 
rightly points out that during a war situation, this should not be the priority. 
Secondly, he also points out that during peacetime, the least advantaged 
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within a state are not always the ones that ought to be prioritised. He explains 
that if the cost of the state’s action (for example, farming subsidies to support 
poor western farmers) were to impose costs on the poor of other countries, 
then that action ought not to be taken. Even though Wolff and de-Shalit want 
to leave aside issues of global justice, this is an area that they cannot treat in 
isolation. 
 Despite will-egalitarianism being a sufficientarian rather than 
prioritarian conception, perhaps similar objections might be raised against the 
conception of unfair social disadvantage as the impairment of the will. Firstly, 
since all persons are moral equals, this will require that any unequal 
application of policy (such as through the impairment of one person’s 
opportunity for self-realisation relative to another’s) will also be unfair. Even in 
times of extreme circumstances (such as times of war or famine) the principle 
of non-impairment of the will must be maintained. If it is not, then this would 
be to distribute the burden of the emergency unfairly. Although unequal 
burdens might be inevitable as a consequence of the emergency 
circumstances, the arrangements of the state ought to minimise this effect 
where possible. Any inaction of the state under these circumstances can even 
be construed as contributing to the distress of some in order to allow others to 
bear less of that distress. Certainly, the state could not contribute to the 
distress of some in order to protect others (unless by their voluntary 
acceptance) without treating those with the greater load as less than moral 
equals.  
Even so, this would not rule out a general reduction in the opportunities 
available for all persons, or differential reduction with the voluntary agreement 
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of the individual affected. So long as all persons get an equal (but perhaps 
substantially reduced) opportunity for self-realisation, then the situation is fair. 
It might even be the case that the recognition of the communal need for self-
sacrifice can enhance self-realisation, and so paradoxically increase one’s 
satisfaction of the will. Although the level of opportunity for self-realisation 
might vary at times of desperation any circumstances in which equality of 
opportunity to take self-realising actions is impaired through human agency is 
paradigmatically unfair. This would also disallow torture under any 
circumstances – even war. The person is not being treated as a moral equal 
and has not volunteered to be afforded a less than equal opportunity for self-
realisation.   
Although Bell’s first objection is against prioritising the least well off 
during times of emergency, social disadvantage conceived as the unfair 
impairment of the will would not advocate policies susceptible to his objection. 
Will-egalitarianism would require that a balance of burdens is struck, such 
that all members of the state bear the circumstances of the emergency 
equally. This would be to advocate policies such as equal rationing of food, 
for example, regardless of the wealth or background, or role, or status of the 
individual members of that state. 
Turning to Bell’s second objection, that the impact on developing 
nations is ignored, perhaps this too can be levelled against social 
disadvantage conceived as unfair impairment of the will since this thesis also 
argues that the state ought to empower its own citizens. The net effect of 
such isolated actions might favour modern liberal societies at the expense of 
developing nations since they are in a better starting position to embark upon 
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such a task. Thus a policy to empower an impoverished citizen in the west 
might adversely affect the impoverished in other countries as they are 
exploited to meet the needs of the westerner. For example, to facilitate the 
westerner’s desire to be seen in public without shame may entail his being 
able to afford decent clothing. This in turn may support the use of child labour 
in a developing nation in order to meet the ‘affordability’ problem. 
 Although this thesis is focussed upon the individual state, this is a valid 
objection. Whilst an answer can be provided to the effect that a global 
application of a principle of will-egalitarianism would prevent such exploitation 
taking place, it would run into difficulties. These would turn on issues of 
practicality, and in the conceptual difficulty of recognising that one’s own self-
realisation is dependent upon the self-realisation of others perhaps thousands 
of miles away, and of whom one might never be aware. Nevertheless, it is the 
awareness that is the key here: once a person becomes aware of the unfair 
disadvantage of others, they become drawn into the extended wills of those 
better off, and the obligation to assist becomes apparent. There will be more 
to say on this in the next chapter. Although this gives an indication of an 
answer, the question of global justice must be put to one side for the present 
time as being outside the scope of this thesis. However, if each state sought 
first to establish equality of opportunity of the will for each of its own 
members, then the question of global justice could be facilitated at a later 
stage. 
 A further objection might be that disadvantage in terms of will makes 
the subject entirely psychological, and thus somehow devalues the 
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circumstances of social injustice.   If, for example, impairment of the will can 
account for all forms of unfair social disadvantage, then this suggests that all 
disadvantages are ‘in our heads’ so to speak.  This is not to say that all forms 
of disadvantage can be interpreted as a disruption of some mental process, 
although this is one way in which a person might be disadvantaged. 
Remember though, the distinction between the assessment of disadvantage 
and its evaluation: whereas the assessment of disadvantage is pluralistic (in 
terms of a relative lack of enablers of the will), unfair social disadvantage is 
the impairment of the will when directed toward a valuable end, and to that 
extent is ‘in our heads’. This does not devalue the suffering, but places it 
more accurately in relation to disadvantage. Starvation for example, is 
suffering, but not yet unfair social disadvantage. It only becomes an unfair 
social disadvantage if others are not starving. The existence of others says 
nothing about the distress, but adds everything to the evaluation of fairness. 
Where is the location of this unfairness if not ‘in the heads’ of the persons 
concerned? This is further supported by the recognition of will as extending 
outside of each individual to incorporate one’s environment. The awareness 
of the distress of others makes this part of one’s own self-realisation and if the 
observer is not likewise starving, the conditions become recognisable as 
unfair. 
 It is this distinction that makes the ‘lifestyle’ benefits-claimant 
vulnerable: in choosing not to work, she disqualifies herself from accessing 
benefits. However, the circumstances of poverty would remain and the 
individual must either comply with the requirement to ‘earn’ those benefits, 
gain paid employment, or persist with some other activity in order to survive. 
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This then leads to some other practical objections that need to be met. The 
first is the objection that such a policy might encourage criminality, since the 
work-shy might prefer to steal, or deal illegal drugs, or undertake some other 
illegal activity rather than earn a legitimate living. The second objection is in 
relation to the children of the work-shy: it would not be fair to prevent the 
development of the child’s will in order to coerce or ‘nudge’ the parent. 
Taking the former objection first, it is almost inevitable that some 
persons would choose the illegal route regardless of the systems or policies 
enacted by the state. Since those who are not in receipt of benefit and not in 
receipt of paid employment would have no visible means of support, they 
would be expected to be very few. Furthermore, they would not be able to pay 
rent, obtain loans, or engage with the community in any legitimate way. Such 
persons, it is suggested, would become apparent either because they might 
attempt to live on the streets as beggars, or through prostitution, or because 
they live on savings or inherited wealth. Those living by begging or 
prostitution could easily be made known to the social services, who could 
then check on their welfare and ensure that such circumstances remain as a 
lifestyle choice. Where they do not, such persons can be encouraged to 
receive benefits in return for their re-engagement with the community. For 
those who are living on savings or inheritance, that wealth would gradually 
diminish until such times that that person also chooses to re-engage through 
work. Those few that turn to crime for support would be relatively easy to 
identify, since they can be challenged to provide evidence of how they are 
supporting themselves. This could be part of a standard process to ensure 
that suitable levels of taxation are applied. 
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As for the second objection, if a parent chooses not to work for his or 
her benefits claim, then it is only right that his or her children should not 
suffer. This would be a delicate judgement to balance the needs of the child 
to be with her natural parents, and the need to ensure that the child’s 
development is not impaired by staying with the parent choosing deprivation. 
It must be made clear to the parent at an early stage that if they do not wish 
to do community work in exchange for welfare support, that they run the risk 
that the children will be taken into the care of the state. Even single parents 
might be able to work in crèches, or other such activities in which care for his 
or her own children can be incorporated. However, this is not to be taken as 
devaluing the social contribution that child rearing does as a task in itself: 
single parents that cannot access suitable ‘family friendly’ work should not by 
that account be penalised. Withholding benefits may seem harsh, but 
ultimately, it is the will of the parent that determines this outcome: if she 
chooses the free-rider lifestyle, then the state cannot allow the child to be 
harmed by that choice, but if the choice is made to engage with the wider 
community, then support must be provided. It is, in practical terms, a delicate 
balance. 
One must also bear in mind that an absentee parent must also 
contribute to the process of support. Even if his or her will were directed away 
from the provision of support, this would be in a direction away from his or her 
own self-realisation. The state can therefore apply pressure to nudge the 
reluctant parent along the right (perfectionist) path. Mechanisms such as 
direct wage deductions for child support would be possible, since even 
benefits claimants would be expected to work. It would thus be evident to the 
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absent parent that part of their own labour is taken for the benefit of the child, 
and thus enforce recognition of responsibility for that support. Only in the 
minority of cases where the parent is also unable to work would this 
mechanism not be applicable.   
Two final objections relate to the requirement for claimants to work for 
the benefits: firstly, it might be objected that such a requirement is 
demeaning, or amounts to punishing persons for being unemployed (almost 
as if unemployment were a crime against the community); secondly, it might 
be objected that these measures would encourage some women to choose to 
have children in preference to engaging in such demeaning work.  
The answer to these two objections is the same. The nature of the 
community-based work must not be menial: it must not be confused with the 
sort of tasks performed as community service punishments awarded by 
Courts (typically litter clearance, removal of graffiti, removal of chewing-gum 
from pavements and such like). Although these tasks are valuable, the nature 
of benefits-claimant’s work must be distinctively more satisfying and valuable 
to the individual, further equipping the claimant to gain paid employment. If 
women choose to have children as an alternative to such work, then this can 
hardly be seen as an easy alternative: it would be rather absurd to suggest 
that the only motive for such a practice is to avoid work when the task of 
raising children is considerably demanding. In practice, the motivation is likely 
to be far more complex than any perceived financial gain. It would only be in 
the very rare (and almost pathologically abnormal) circumstances of a parent 
choosing to have children for a purely financial or work avoidance purpose 
(and for no other associated reason, such as for the love of children, or for 
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perceived benefits in self-esteem, or for the desire for the ‘completeness’ of a 
family, or other such reason) that removal of children, or withdrawal of 
benefits would be possible. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Wherever the will of the individual has been impaired in such a way that her 
moral equality has been neglected, then that person has suffered unfair social 
disadvantage. Conversely, wherever the person is able to exercise will in 
progressing towards self-realisation, then that person is not unfairly 
disadvantaged. Will-egalitarianism is the idea that all persons ought to have 
an equal opportunity to exercise will in accordance with this objective. 
Therefore, the aim of the state ought to be to facilitate its citizens’ exercise of 
will as a means to eliminate unfair social disadvantage.  
However, this thesis is restricted to an analysis of the conception of 
disadvantage, and as such makes no specific recommendations as to how 
such a conception is to be implemented. Instead, this chapter is limited to the 
indication of the types of generic policy that would align with will-
egalitarianism. This has produced no rabbits from hats, or other novel or 
otherwise surprising policies that have not been seen elsewhere under 
different guises. Nevertheless, it does give a new way of justifying the pursuit 
of certain policies, and adds further theoretical underpinnings to other 
observations (such as Wilkinson and Pickett’s Spirit Level observations).43  
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Identification of the types of generic policy consistent with will-
egalitarianism were suggested by following the three factors that Jonathan 
Wolff noted as influencing the life opportunities available to persons. These 
were the internal aspects of self-realisation, the external aspects, and the 
social structures. The policies that the state might pursue relating to internal 
aspects included free education and healthcare. Since will-egalitarianism 
relies upon the capacity of persons to have will, certain cases of severe 
disability (those involving brain injury) rule out such individuals from 
participation within the scheme. Even so, this does not undermine our duties 
towards the care of such people. Policies relating to external aspects included 
a sound economy and the encouragement of civic responsibility. This would 
include wide public consultation. As Daniel Munro suggested, ‘mini-publics’ 
might be a useful way of increasing consultation although participation might 
be problematic. Whilst social networking might encourage participation, the 
state must be clear as to the need to protect minority interests, and so must 
limit the options available for consultation within these bounds. Policies 
relating to the social structure were intended to break down the barriers to 
equality of opportunity and social mobility, and to recognise the importance of 
individual and community worth. These included the use of legislation, 
limitations on inherited wealth, recognition of social impact in government 
decision-making, measures to prevent free-riding, and the cessation of 
solitary confinement as a means of punishing prisoners. 
In the next chapter, the thesis will conclude with an overview of 
what has been shown, a reflection on the process, and the original 
contribution that the conception of unfair disadvantage as impairment of the 
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will has made. Some observations will also be made as to possible future 
developments of the thesis. 
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Chapter Nine 
 
Conclusion 
 
Originally, this thesis started out as a critique of John Rawls, or rather, a 
critique of the acceptance of inherited wealth within his theory of Justice as 
Fairness. Quite soon, it became apparent that such a narrow concern 
provided insufficient fuel for a thesis. In spite of this, the more research that 
was carried out, the more the subject of disadvantage became troublesome. 
The subject seemed to revolve around the obligations that we may or may not 
hold towards those less fortunate than ourselves, and it did not seem clear 
either who these people were, or how their problems ought to be addressed, 
if indeed this was a suitable subject of justice. The conception of 
disadvantage thus became the focus of the thesis: one that it is hoped the 
reader has found engaging. The first chapter therefore described the nature 
of the problem, and how it was intended to go about providing a solution. 
As with all intriguing conceptions, the difficult part has been arriving at 
the right question. The first problem to be addressed was therefore to define 
exactly what is meant by the term ‘disadvantage’. This was the subject of 
chapter two. It is only when one attempts to describe disadvantage that the 
multiple variations in its usage are noticed. Yet all such usages are 
supposedly describing the same concept. As examples, it was pointed out 
that one cannot assess disadvantage without also specifying in relation to 
what, and in relation to whom; that disadvantage can relate to trivial matters, 
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or life and death issues; that one might even describe a person as 
simultaneously advantaged in relation to X but disadvantaged in relation to Y. 
Furthermore, the assessment of disadvantage is not the same thing as 
suffering a disadvantage. So when we describe a person as disadvantaged, 
we also make certain assumptions in regard to fairness, and significance.  
The next chapter reviewed the literature of the significant contributors 
to the debate surrounding social justice in general, and distributive justice in 
particular. These traditional views of social justice describe ‘the 
disadvantaged’ in terms of relative shortages of resources (Rawls, Dworkin) 
or welfare (classical utilitarianism) or liberty (libertarianism). Such approaches 
did not seem to meet the challenge of accurately defining disadvantage, or of 
identifying disadvantaged groups. They were compromises at best, and 
seemed to play off one attribute against another, or attempt to incorporate the 
rival aspects within the description of the favoured aspects, or assume that 
the favoured aspect rightly deserved priority, or set constraints to avoid 
potential conflicts of interests. Furthermore, some views implied destructive or 
unpalatable consequences, as shown by Dworkins’s ‘expensive tastes’ 
example, or the suggestion that frustrated racists might warrant 
compensation, or the libertarian’s dismissal of the claims of the poor, weak 
and vulnerable as not being a matter of justice at all. 
In chapter three, it was argued that the concerns of the poor, the weak, 
and the vulnerable are indeed a matter of justice, although right-libertarians 
would deny this. Amartya Sen has shown that such a denial is itself a failure 
of libertarians to recognise that they are actually egalitarians, but of liberty. 
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Libertarians must therefore accept at least the form of social justice that 
relates to inequality of liberty. The conception of social justice was thus 
affirmed, regardless of whether this is assessed as a relative lack of welfare, 
resources, or liberty. It was then argued that all such traditional views of 
social justice are only dealing with the assessment of disadvantage, and have 
overlooked the evaluation of the goodness or rightness of those 
circumstances. Consequently they have tended to conflate the issue of 
assessment with the separate issue of fairness. When these issues are 
separated, it becomes possible to recognise that disadvantage can be 
assessed in many different forms without making a commitment to any 
particular form as being the right or best way of conceiving disadvantage, and 
without succumbing to the objections of triviality or destructive incoherence.  
 With Rawls as the starting point, the least well-off were considered to 
be persons within the ‘normal’ range who happened to have fewer resources 
than others. Yet this restriction to ‘normality’ immediately marginalises those 
who might be the most disadvantaged. One cannot read Rawls thoroughly 
without also studying the capabilities approach, either as a corrective to his 
position, or as a stand-alone rival system. The two main versions of the 
capabilities approach (those of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum) were 
accordingly discussed in chapter four, along with the practical application of 
such an approach as described by Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit. By 
these views, the least well-off group now includes persons outside of the 
normal range.  
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Although a Rawlsian conception of social justice (as amended by the 
capabilities approach) can be considered as inclusive of both resources and 
welfare aspects of disadvantage, it has yet to meet the challenge of the 
libertarian: it is all very well coming to some form of agreement about who ‘the 
disadvantaged’ are, but this counts for nothing if addressing disadvantage 
would mean the violation of individual liberties and rights. It would be to 
acknowledge that disadvantage exists, but to admit that there is nothing that 
can be rightfully done about it. However, this would be an internally 
inconsistent view of justice: since social disadvantage has already been 
shown to be unjust, it cannot then be unjust to seek to rectify that injustice.  
Something was needed to help make sense of it all. That ‘something’ 
was the will of the person affected by disadvantage. The recognition of the 
will as the key came about through analysing the common factors in all of the 
above conceptions of disadvantage, and the recognition of the intimate 
association between liberty and will. When one considers disadvantage in 
terms of a lack of resources, the impact upon the individual affected is that 
they cannot do or become the person that they want to be. When one 
considers disadvantage in terms of capabilities, it is the language of doing 
and being that again defines the issue. When one considers rights, liberties 
and entitlements, once more the person disadvantaged is the person that 
cannot do or become the person that they want to be. Yet capability alone 
does not appear to be the fundamental feature. Despite Sen’s recognition of 
the importance of agency, and its incorporation within his definition of 
capability, the evident caution in using the language of agency rather than 
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‘will’ perhaps causes him to overlook the fundamental nature of that concept. 
Nussbaum’s conception of capabilities takes liberty as being no more 
significant than any other item on her list. Nussbaum thereby undervalues the 
significance of the will, and misses the point that capabilities are not 
fundamental to the conception of disadvantage. The whole issue of 
disadvantage thus seemed to turn on the notion of the will. How the will is to 
be conceived was the subject of chapter five. 
The conception of the will is a notoriously obscure issue. Despite the 
persistence of the conception for thousands of years, it has somewhat fallen 
out of favour, particularly over the last fifty years or so. Many philosophers 
(like Sen and Pettit) avoid the term, preferring to use ‘agency’, or coupling the 
term with the notion of freedom (as in discussions of ‘free will’). With the 
subject of the thesis now firmly focussed on the nature of disadvantage, the 
turn towards the will looked at first like another pathway further into the fog. 
Yet there was something about the will that struck a chord as intuitively 
correct. Despite the theistic trappings (this word is used to mean more than a 
synonym for ‘framework’) T.H. Green recognised that the will of the individual 
must be understood as a part of the wider community, with the person’s good 
being dependent upon the good of all. Yet Green went even further, speaking 
of a “unity of self-consciousness” between persons.1 It was much later that 
this idea was found repeated in modern discussions of the extended will.  
Contemporary authors such as Dennett, Clark, Wegner, and Ross now 
agree that the will is best conceived as a useful illusion extending beyond the 
                                            
1
 PE Sec. 202 
Chapter Nine – Conclusion   
S. Magee                                     June 2012 311 
individual conscious being.2 This idea acknowledges that many of our 
technologies have become incorporated into our own abilities: memory is 
augmented with electronic notebooks; hearing can be enhanced with 
implants; even the possibility of superior-to-natural prosthetics allows such 
facilities to be incorporated into one’s self-identity. Furthermore, when one 
considers the impact of culture, education, social interactions and such like, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to see where the true ‘self’ might lie. The edges 
between the self, and supposed mere influences upon the self, have become 
so blurred that it is impossible to tell where the self begins and ends: it is 
impossible to conceive of one’s personal identity (what it would be, look like, 
attitudes and behaviour, and so forth) if all such components were removed. 
None of us would have the wills we think we possess without the environment 
in which we live, and it seems reasonable to suppose that if we had been 
brought up in a different culture, say, then we would not have the same will or 
self-identity that we currently have. How then can we say which part of the will 
is truly our own, and which is a reflection of the wills of others? The answer, 
one suggests, lies in the extended will. 
The idea of a will extending beyond the self and intertwined with 
others, despite being posited over a hundred years ago, is still relevant today 
and can provide the foundation for a perfectionist morality. Although Green’s 
view forms the inspiration for my own view of the will, his theistic approach is 
rejected. By retaining a wide conception of the will in which others are 
recognised as a part of what each of us is, and applying this to a perfectionist 
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ideal, this forms a framework within which the will is connected with morality. 
A right or good act is then one that contributes to a person’s progression 
towards self-realisation, and this in turn must be in alignment with the 
perfectionist ideal. A bad or wrong act would be one with the opposite effect. 
The connection with a widely conceived will makes the interests of each 
person (to progress towards self-realisation) the interests of all. It is this 
connection that allows the conception of the will to be applied towards the 
conception of social disadvantage.  
It is the idea of self-realisation that resonates with the capabilities 
approach once more. Recall that the concept of social disadvantage is 
normative in two ways, (the comparative assessment of the circumstances, 
and the evaluation of the goodness or rightness of those conditions). A 
person’s circumstances can be evaluated in the second way as being unfair 
when, as a result of the actions of another person, she cannot be or do 
something which is essential to her well-being. Since these beings and doings 
are necessary attributes of self-realisation, the denial of a person’s agency 
freedom (her opportunities to realise functionings) is also a denial of the 
opportunity to progress towards self-realisation: her will has been impaired 
when directed towards this valuable end. Within the framework of an 
extended will, all persons must hold the same opportunity, and recognise that 
progress towards self-realisation is a matter of mutual dependency. The idea 
of the unfair impairment of the will can thus provide the foundations for a 
capabilities approach to the assessment of social disadvantage. 
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It therefore became apparent that the opportunity to exercise will in 
virtue of one’s moral equality was a matter of fairness. This led to the idea of 
will-egalitarianism, discussed in chapter six, in which it was argued that 
impairment of the exercise of will towards a valuable end is the defining 
feature of unfair disadvantage. This conception allows that one can be fairly 
disadvantaged if she has exercised will in exposure to those circumstances, 
but that one has been unfairly disadvantaged if she has been denied the 
opportunity to exercise will through the actions of others in a way that denies 
her moral equality.   
As far as I am aware, this is the first time that the conception of the will 
has been directed towards the conception of social disadvantage. The great 
benefit of this approach is that it identifies a fundamental unifying currency 
that so eluded Gerald Cohen. As his remark reported in the opening 
sentences of chapter one put it: “One hopes that there is a currency more 
fundamental than either resources or welfare in which the various egalitarian 
responses [to disadvantage] can be expressed”.3 It is suggested that this 
response ought to be made in terms of the conception of will-egalitarianism. 
Thus social disadvantage is defined as the unfair impairment of the will (by 
human agency) when that will is directed towards self-realisation, and 
interdependent within a similar scheme for all. To impair a person’s will in this 
way would be to fail to treat her as a moral equal. 
Since this conception of social disadvantage requires equality of the 
will of each person to be able to pursue their own self-realisation towards an 
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(ultimately unachievable) perfectionist end, and since the extended view of 
the will recognises that the activities of others towards their own perfection is 
part of one’s own progress, this leads to a sufficientarian conception of social 
justice. It is sufficientarian inasmuch as a lower threshold of equality of 
opportunity to exercise will is advocated (directed towards self-realisation). 
This lower threshold is then accompanied by an upper threshold of realised 
will beyond which one cannot progress any further toward this ideal in the 
presence of others below that level. It is not prioritarian since it is not always 
the case that priority is given to the absolute worst off. This discussion was 
the subject of chapter seven. As the blood donor example in scenario three of 
this chapter suggested, sometimes it is necessary to save those who are 
saveable over the idea of equal distribution. Yet by employing the conception 
of an extended will, even those in that absolute worst off position must 
acknowledge that the good of saving those saveable lives is better in a way: 
not only is it better that some should survive, but that their own sacrifice 
would, in a way, contribute towards their own perfectionist self. 
As for the implications for the state (the subject of chapter eight) the 
acknowledgement of all persons as moral equals would give the fair state an 
obligation to facilitate the exercise of will for all citizens equally. This would be 
manifested in many familiar and relatively uncontroversial policies, such as 
universal health care, and universal education. It would also support such 
things as suggested by Rawls, that is, equal liberty for each person 
compatible with a similar scheme for all. Nevertheless, the facilitation of each 
citizen’s will would also extend into other areas, such as opportunities for 
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higher education, the dismantling of class and caste systems, the  ‘mitigation ‘ 
of genealogical privileges, and other such steps designed to, as Andrew 
Mason puts it, “level the playing field”.4 
Yet the requirements of will-egalitarianism would give the state a 
protective as well as a facilitative function. In one way, this has parallels with 
Nozick’s justification for a minimal state, but whereas Nozick argues that it is 
the state’s role to protect equal liberty by assuming a ‘policing’ role for the 
enforcement of contracts, the protective role is now much wider. In line with 
the distinction between the assessment of disadvantage and its evaluation, 
we can argue that Nozick’s justification of the state’s role can be applied more 
widely to cover all aspects in which social disadvantage might be assessed. 
Thus the state ought also to protect welfare and resource distribution. On this 
analysis, welfare, resource, or liberty disadvantages are merely different 
manifestations of the assessment of the circumstances of disadvantage, and 
as Nozick would agree, are beyond the remit of the state to redistribute 
unless an injustice has occurred. This evaluation of injustice therefore falls 
within the state’s remit to make and address. It is this evaluation, regardless 
of how the circumstances of disadvantage are manifested, that looks to the 
moral rightness of a particular distribution, and considers whether all subjects 
of the state have been treated as moral equals. The state’s role is then the 
protection of equal will (towards self-realisation) by assuming a policing role 
to prevent the domination by the strong, or the fortuitous, or the exploitative, 
over the weak, unfortunate, or unfairly exploited.  
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Wherever the will is impaired relative to others, there is disadvantage 
(but not always unfairly). Wherever a person’s will is wholeheartedly and 
voluntarily exercised in the acceptance of a particular set of circumstances, 
there can be no unfair disadvantage to that individual. The state must 
therefore allow certain voluntarily accepted disadvantages as long as the 
principle is maintained to ensure that all citizens have been able to exercise 
their (extended) will towards self-realisation, compatible with the same 
scheme for all. Together with the protective role for the state over welfare and 
resource distribution, aside from protecting the vulnerable, this would also 
address the free-rider problem since this too can be seen as a form of unfair 
exploitation of the benefits system. The idea that a person is not 
disadvantaged when she has exercised will would make the ‘life-style’ choice 
to claim benefits rather than work no longer count as unfair disadvantage, and 
therefore not be subject to state support. However, it is also recognised that 
such a lifestyle choice is rather rare, and often misrepresented in the popular 
press. 
The implications for the state have only been fleshed out in a limited 
way, and it is therefore this part of the thesis that would benefit the most from 
further research. For example, very little has been said about the global 
implications of will-egalitarianism. Yet the rise in concern for global justice 
raises an interesting possibility. As discussed in chapter three, Robert Nozick 
framed the question of distributive justice in terms of ‘Robinson Crusoe’ 
islands between which no communication existed.5 The question then was 
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whether it should matter to persons on the ‘rich’ island that people were in 
poverty on another island that they did not even know existed. Once the idea 
of an extended will is introduced, then an answer becomes possible. The 
existence of poverty would not be significant to the rich so long as they 
remain unaware, but becomes very relevant once the poverty becomes 
known: the rich could no longer move towards their own self-realisation in the 
knowledge of, and inaction towards, the suffering of those others. Such a 
conception is similarly applicable when applied to the growing concerns for 
global justice. As our technological accomplishments in global 
communications progress, the awareness of the circumstances of others, the 
recognition of such persons as connected to ourselves, and the assimilation 
of their needs as our own (reflected in our self-realisation of the kind of 
persons we are, or would wish to be) is manifested in the global concern for 
justice. Unfortunately, there is neither the time, nor the space, within this 
thesis to explore the implications of will-egalitarianism across state 
boundaries. 
Further work would also be required in relation to impairment of the will 
for those with limited capacity. Since an assessment of disadvantage 
depends upon the impairment of the will, there may be many marginal cases 
where the existence of will is not clear. Although Rawls declared that justice 
as fairness might fail in relation to cases of severe disability, such cases do 
not present a problem for disadvantage as impairment of the will. The 
difficulty arises for those persons with mental impairments that are not so 
severely disabled. Such persons can be lucid on one occasion, and 
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completely lacking in capacity on another day. Furthermore, persons can 
have mental capacity in relation to such things as current personal financial 
arrangements whilst simultaneously being unable to consider future planning, 
and without mental capacity, one cannot have will. Given the complexity of 
such marginal cases, it is improbable that a distinction can be made between 
individuals that possess the necessary conditions of personhood, and those 
who do not. Since the matter of fairness is dependent upon the conception of 
the will, and since only persons can hold such a conception, only those with 
the attributes of personhood can suffer unfair disadvantage. Marginal cases 
may therefore present a conceptual difficulty: identifying those individuals with 
mental capacity issues as being unfairly disadvantaged (rather than 
mistreated) would be so imprecise as to be open to accusations of 
arbitrariness. 
In practice, the conceptual difficulty is relatively easily dealt with: there 
would be little practical difference in the steps that would need to be taken to 
rectify unfair disadvantage in the person capable of will, as opposed to the 
duty of care towards those who are not. The current UK practice of carrying 
out an assessment of individuals under the Mental Capacity Act can provide a 
template for the process, and includes temporal considerations, knowledge of 
the previous condition, history of the person, and various practical tests of 
ability. Where an individual is sometimes lucid (and thus capable of will) her 
views are made known and must be taken into account. When she is not, 
then measures are taken in her best interests under our duty of care, and 
take into account her previously expressed will. Yet in either case, rectifying 
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unfair disadvantage or rectifying mistreatment would involve the same 
practical measures.  Such marginal cases will not be explored further here 
though: the issues are merely raised as an indicator of possible future 
research. 
This thesis set out to explore a new conception of disadvantage in 
which to express egalitarian responses to the suffering and harm of many 
persons. It has been shown that when conceived in terms of the impairment 
of the extended will of the individual, that this can provide the fundamental 
currency that so eluded Cohen. Furthermore, it has also been demonstrated 
that when social disadvantage is so conceived, that this would support a 
sufficientarian position in relation to social justice. Such a conception would 
suggest that a fair society is organised along the basis of will-egalitarianism: 
one in which each person would be able to exercise (extended) will equally, 
when directed towards self-realisation, in a scheme interdependent within the 
extended wills of all. The idea of an extended will in each case recognises 
that the self-realisation of each person also encompasses the self-realisation 
of others. The single-most significant implication for this new conception of 
disadvantage is that the state ought not to treat the symptoms of 
disadvantage directly (such as relative poverty, misery, or lack of freedom) 
but would be better advised to treat the fundamental deficiency. This 
deficiency is the lack of equality of the will.  
Unlike the typical Hobbesian or libertarian view of the will in which the 
individual is set as a rights holder against the rest of the world, the extended 
view of the will is social. This immediately sets disadvantage into the correct 
Chapter Nine – Conclusion   
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context, allowing space for an assessment of relative positions, and allowing 
an evaluation of the fairness of those relations. The final words are left to 
Thomas Hill Green, the inspiration for this view: 
 
Man cannot contemplate himself as in a better state, or on the 
way to the best, without contemplating others, not merely as a 
means to that better state, but as sharing it with him.6 
                                            
6
 PE Sec. 199 
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